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Browsing named entities in Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, The Passing of the Armies: The Last Campaign of the Armies..

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October (search for this): chapter 3
the losses of the Corps in the assault of June 18th on the salient covering the Norfolk Railroad and the Jerusalem Plank Road. Owing to the casualties among commanders, the action of that day has never been adequately reported. Colonel Powell had no data on which to base a just account of the overture of Forts Sedgwick and Mahone,--surnamed by the performers Fort Hell and Fort Damnation. Glance now at the record of the whole army. Those treated in the field hospitals up to the end of October were officially reported as numbering 57,498, and to the end of December, 68,840. Report of Surgeon McParlin, Medical Director of the Army of the Potomac. Some of these, no doubt were cases of sickness, a no less real casualty; but taking the ratio of one fifth the wounded as indicating the number of the killed outright, we reach a total of 59,000 men killed and wounded in this campaign up to October 31, 1864. This is to take no account of the missing, --a list governed by no law of rat
1864 AD (search for this): chapter 3
Chapter 1: the situation. It was a dreamy camp along the lines investing Petersburg in the winter following the all-summer campaign of 1864,--that never-to-be-forgotten, most dismal of years. Although shadowed at the very beginning by melancholy tokens of futile endeavor and grievous losses,--consolidations of commands which obliterated the place and name of proud and beloved corps and divisions,flags made sacred by heroic service and sacrifice of noble manhood now folded away with tender reverence, or perhaps by special favor permitted to be borne beside those of new assignments, bearing the commanding presence of great memories, pledge and talisman of unswerving loyalty, though striking sorrow to every heart that knew their history,--yet this seemed not to make for weakness but rather for settled strength. We started out full of faith and hope under the new dispensation, resolved at all events to be worthy of our past and place. Now all was over. The summer had passed, a
Stonewall Jackson (search for this): chapter 3
tance had been peculiarly intimate and deep, and we had for them a strong personal regard. The causes were wide apart, but the manhood was the same. We had occasion to observe their religious character. More free thought and wider range of code no doubt prevailed in our Northern army; but what we are accustomed to call simple, personal piety was more manifest in the Confederate ranks than in ours. Not presuming to estimate the influence of particular cases of higher officers, like Stonewall Jackson or General Howard, making prominent their religious principles and proclivities, but fully recognizing the general religious character of most of the officers and men from our Northern homes, it must be admitted that the expression of religious sentiment and habit was more common and more earnest in the Confederate camp than in ours. In one thing we took the touch of elbow. It was no uncommon incident that from close opposing bivouacs and across hushed breastworks at evening voice
McClellan (search for this): chapter 3
vote showed how much stronger was their allegiance to principle than even their attachment to McClellan, whose personal popularity in the army was something marvelous. The men voted overwhelmingly y thousand men never rose. The development of this campaign led many to compare Grant with McClellan. They marched their armies over much the same ground, with much the same result. Only McClelMcClellan was brought to Washington; Grant was permitted to remain at City Point and the Appomattox. The rumor ran that McClellan had also proposed to cut across the James and around Lee's flank. Many stMcClellan had also proposed to cut across the James and around Lee's flank. Many still believed in his soldiership, but broader elements now entered into the estimate. Something in the nature of the man and something in his environment caused his failure. With great organizing poNorth is perhaps to be pardoned for the reason of its impelling motive; but it demanded of General McClellan impossibilities. And these were created quite as much by forces in his rear as by those i
Fitzhugh Lee (search for this): chapter 3
ise on weakly-defended Petersburg, and thus cut Lee's main communications and turn his entire posit as by far exceeding the whole number of men in Lee's army at any time in this last campaign. Rerand tactics in the continuous movement to turn Lee's right, and also cut his communications. Whenf Petersburg or Richmond, or the destruction of Lee's army, or even the quick overthrow of the rebeent, and this must be still to the left, to cut Lee's communications and envelop his existing lines their last avenue of sea-coast communication. Lee had two railroads: the Richmond and Danville, le with his alert and dashing army he threatened Lee's sea communication and also the flank and rearr flank and rear, and thus between his army and Lee's we should be caught in the jaws of a leviatha to do. We were more troubled by the rumor that Lee, presuming on our inertness, was preparing to m the Potomac. Grant was evidently anxious lest Lee should manage to get away from our front and ef[7 more...]
August 24th (search for this): chapter 3
This exposition of the state of mind and body among our officers and men in the later operations along the Petersburg lines may help to find a reason for their failure. For instance, the fiasco of the mine explosion of July 30th, where well-laid plans and costly and toilsome labors were brought to shameful disaster through lack of earnest co-operation, and strange lethargy of participants. For another instance, the unexampled reverses of our renowned Second Corps at Ream's Station, August 24th, where, after every purpose and prospect of success, these veterans were quickly driven from their entrenchments, even abandoning their guns,--conduct contrary to their habit and contradictory of their character. But these were exceptional even if illustrative cases. Along our lines reigned a patient fortitude, a waiting expectation, unswerving loyalty, that kind of faith which is the evidence of things unseen. Among these men were some doubly deserving-comrades whom we thought l
May 5th (search for this): chapter 3
weeks from the Rapidan to the James bring the total to 16,245. This is 3398 more than half the present for duty at the start. The records of the Medical Inspector of the Fifth Corps show the number admitted to the field hospitals alone from May 5th to June 19th to have been II,105 of the Corps, besides many from other corps and not a few Confederates. Reckoning the killed outright as 2200, and the missing as 4000,--which is quite within the fact,makes a total of casualties for this periodseem to rest too much on estimates (although in every case inductions from unquestioned fact), let me offer the solid testimony of General Grant in his official report of November 1, 1864. He gives the casualties in the Army of the Potomac from May 5th to October 30th as: killed 10,572; wounded, 53,975; missing, 23,858;--an aggregate of 88,405, a result far more striking than those adduced, and more than confirming the statement of our losses as by far exceeding the whole number of men in Lee'
Howard (search for this): chapter 3
liarly intimate and deep, and we had for them a strong personal regard. The causes were wide apart, but the manhood was the same. We had occasion to observe their religious character. More free thought and wider range of code no doubt prevailed in our Northern army; but what we are accustomed to call simple, personal piety was more manifest in the Confederate ranks than in ours. Not presuming to estimate the influence of particular cases of higher officers, like Stonewall Jackson or General Howard, making prominent their religious principles and proclivities, but fully recognizing the general religious character of most of the officers and men from our Northern homes, it must be admitted that the expression of religious sentiment and habit was more common and more earnest in the Confederate camp than in ours. In one thing we took the touch of elbow. It was no uncommon incident that from close opposing bivouacs and across hushed breastworks at evening voices of prayer from ove
March 27th (search for this): chapter 3
some bold stroke. That would be a shame for us. We would far rather fight, even if unsuccessful as usual. Then we were much annoyed by rumors coming around from Washington, that Sherman was coming up with his power and prestige to take our business out of our hands and the glory of success to his army. But in the depth of our doubts and apprehension word came that Grant had brought Sherman to a conference at his headquarters, and had invited Sheridan as a participant, on the evening of March 27th, and we knew now that something was to be done on a grand scale. Soon came the thrilling General Order. It announced one more leftward movement, but it woke new courage and inspired confidence. Its very style and manner was new. It seemed to take us all into confidential relations with the commander; the whole object and plan set forth in a manner clear, circumstantial, and complete, so that each subordinate knew the part he was expected to take. The colonels, on whom the brunt of b
May 16th (search for this): chapter 3
ick and wounded who have received attention in this hospital,--that following the army. Hundreds passed through under circumstances which rendered it impossible to register their names or even accurately estimate their numbers. So unremitting were the calls for professional duty during the first fortnight that it was impossible to prepare morning reports, and it was not until the Ioth of May that even a numerical report was attempted. From that date the daily reports show that from the 16th of May to the 31st of October, 1864, there have been received into this hospital and treated for at least forty-eight hours, 68,540 sick and wounded officers and men. Rebellion Records, Serial 60, p. 271, and Serial 67, p. 269. I have often thought it would be profitable reading for some if a competent observer would recount the scenes at the rear of a fighting army removing from the field after a great battle. A glimpse of this was given at Fredericksburg in ‘62. But to throw ligh
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