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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.). Search the whole document.

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Bonaparte (search for this): chapter 2
sonal affections? Will he know how to divest himself of prepossessions? Was not Suwaroff repulsed by Potemkin because of his personal appearance, and was not all the skill of Catharine needed to cause a regiment to be given to a man who afterwards shed so much lustre upon her arms? It has been thought that public opinion would be the best guide; nothing is more hazardous. Has not public opinion mode a Caesar of Dumouriez, who understood nothing of great warfare? Would it have placed Bonaparte at the head of the army in Italy, when he was known but by two directors? Meanwhile it must be acknowledged that this opinion, if it be not always infallible, is none the more to be disdained, especially, when it survives great crises and the experience of events. The qualities most essential for a general-in-chief will ever be: A great character, or moral courage which leads to great resolutions; then sang-froid or physical courage which predominates over dangers. Knowledge appears bu
Marsin (search for this): chapter 2
of his house, as has frequently been seen since the time of Louis XIV. The prince was often decorated only with the titular command, whilst a counselor was imposed upon him who commanded in reality. This was the case with the Duke of Orleans and Marsin, at the famous battle of Turin, then with the Duke of Burgundy and Vendome, at the battle of Oudenard. I believe even that it was so at Ulm, between the Arch-Duke Ferdinand and Mack. This last mode is deplorable, for then, in fact, no person is responsible. Every one knows that at Turin, the Duke of Orleans judged with more sagacity than Marshal Marsin, and the exhibition of full secret powers from the king was necessary, to cause the battle to be lost against the advice of the prince who commanded. In the same manner at Ulm, the Arch-Duke Ferdinand displayed more courage and skill than Mack, who was to serve him as mentor. If the prince have the genius and experience of an Arch-Duke Charles, he should be given the command with
Russian (search for this): chapter 2
e. If irregular troops are nothing when they compose the whole army, and if they do not know how to gain battles, it must be owned that, supported by good troops they are an auxiliary of the highest importance; when they are numerous, they reduce the enemy to despair, by destroying his convoys, intercepting all his communications, and holding him as it were invested in his camps; they render above all retreats disastrous, as the French experienced in 1812. (See article 45.) The same Russian general, with the same troops, will not be able to dare every thing against European armies, having the same instruction, and nearly the same discipline as his own. Finally, one can venture before a Mack what he would not venture before a Napoleon. The action of the cabinet upon the armies has an influence also upon the audacity of their enterprises. A general whose genius and arm are chained by an aulic council at four hundred leagues from the theatre of war, will struggle with disadva
Blucher (search for this): chapter 2
essary for directing every thing according to his own will, the best system which he can adopt, will be to imitate precisely what the Prussian government did with Blucher; that is to say, to call to his assistance two generals the most famed for their capacity, the one taken from among men of acknowledged executive qualities, the oe should be given the command with carte-blanche, and with the choice of his instruments. If he have not yet required the same titles, he may be sur rounded like Blucher, with an instructed chief of staff, and with a counselor taken from among men of tried execution. But in no case would it be wise to give those counselors other mo may live in good harmony; the glory is sufficiently great to yield a part of it to a friend who should have concurred in preparing successes. It was thus that Blucher, assisted by the Gneisenaus and Mufflings, covered himself with a glory which probably he never would have acquired all alone. Without doubt, this kind of double
Paskevitsch (search for this): chapter 2
on this subject in speaking of national wars. On the other hand, a general ought to do every thing to electrify his soldiers, and to give them that same transport which it is important to allay in his adversaries. All armies are susceptible of the same enthusiasm, the motives and the means only differ according to the spirit of the nations. Military eloquence has made the subject of more than one work ; we will only indicate it as a means. The proclamations of Napoleon; those of General Paskevitsch; the addresses of the ancients to their soldiers; those of Suwarof to men still more simple, are models of different kinds. The eloquence of the juntas of Spain, and the miraracles of the Madona del Pilar, have led to the same results by very opposite roads. In general, a cherished cause, and a chief who inspires confidence by past victories, are great means for electrifying an army and facilitating its successes. Some military men have contested the advantages of enthusiasm, and
Tranchant Laverne (search for this): chapter 2
ation more rational than that of military policy or philosophy of war. Lloyd has well treated this subject in the 2d and 3d parts of his Memoirs; his chapters on the General and on the Passions are remarkable; the 4th part is also interesting; but it wants completeness, and his points of view are not always just. The Marquis de Cham bray has also treated this subject, and not without some success, although he has found Opponents; moreover, he has only walked in the footsteps of M. Tranchant de Laverne We shall stop at the first, for, although the true acceptation of the word philosophy may be applied to war as well as to the speculations of metaphysics, so vague an extent has been given to this acceptation, that we experience a kind of embarrassment in uniting those two words. It will be recollected then that by policy of war, I understand all the relations of diplomacy with war, whilst that military policy designates only the military combinations of a State or of a general.
Boileau (search for this): chapter 2
s, Heruli and Gauls, the loss of the empire became inevitable. Without doubt, nothing of that which may augment the prosperity of a country ought to be forgotten o<*> despised; it is necessary even to honor skillful men and traders who are the first instruments of this prosperity, but it is necessary that this be subordinate to the great institutions which make the strength of States, by encouraging the masculine and heroic virtues. Policy and justice will be agreed in that, for, whatever Boileau may say of it, it will always be more glorious to brave death in the steps of the Caesars, than to fatten on the public miseries, by playing upon the vicissitudes of the credit of the State. Woe to those countries where the luxury of the contractor and the stockholder insatiable of gold, shall be placed above the uniform of the brave man who shall have sacrificed his life, his health or his fortune, in the defence of the country. The first means of encouraging the military spirit is to
Alexander (search for this): chapter 2
the excitation of the military spirit. It must be said none of these conditions could be neglected without grave conveniences. A fine army well manoeuvred, well disciplined, but without skillful conductors, and without national resources, allowed Prussia to fall in fifteen days under the blows of Napoleon. On the other hand, it has been seen, in very many circumstances, how much a State ought to congratulate itself for having a good army; it was the care and the skill of Philip and Alexander in forming and instructing their phalanxes, which rendered those masses so movable, and so fit to execute the most rapid manoeuvres, and which permitted the Macedonians to subjugate Persia and India with that handful of choice soldiers. It was the excessive love of the father of Frederick for soldiers, which procured this great king an army capable of executing all his enterprises. A government which neglects its army under any pretext whatever, is then a government guilty in the eyes
M. D'Yvernois (search for this): chapter 2
or one or two campaigns. If England has proved that money procured soldiers and auxiliaries, France has proved that love of country and honor equally gave soldiers, and that at need war supported war. Doubtless France found in the richness of its soil and in the exaltation of its chiefs, sources of transient power which could not be admitted as the general base of a system; but the results of its efforts were not less striking. Each year the numerous echos of the cabinet of London, and M. D'Yvernois especially, announced that France was about to succumb for the want of money, whilst that Napoleon was keeping up two millions of savings in the Tuileries, at the same time cancelling regularly the expenses of the State and the pay of his armies. There was a deficit at his fall, but there was none in 1811; it was the result of his disasters, and of the extraordinary efforts which he was required to make. A power which should abound in gold could badly defend itself; history attest
Moreau (search for this): chapter 2
even in our day, notwithstanding the immense progress which civilized nations have made in all the sciences, statistical, political, geographical and topographical. I will cite two examples of them of which I was a witness; in 1796, the army of Moreau, penetrating into the Black Forest, expected to find terrible mountains, defiles and forests, which the ancient Hercinius called to memory with frightful circumstances; we were surprised after having climbed the cliffs of that vast plateau, which of the great states of Europe has not been happy in his sayings and his predictions; he sees obstacles everywhere; he presents, among others, as impregnable, the frontiers of Austria upon the Inn, between the Tyrol and Passau, where we have seen Moreau and Napoleon manoeuvre, and triumph with armies of a hundred and fifty thousand men in 1800, 1805 and 1809. The greater part of those reasonings are open to the same criticism; he has seen things too materially. But if these sciences are not
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