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Jefferson Davis (search for this): chapter 4
rejoin his chief. By a severe night-march he reached the Potomac at Shepherdstown, and on the morning of the 16th crossed the river and rejoined Lee. Walker followed him closely, and reached the battlefield at about the same time. McLaws rested for some time near Harper's Ferry, and then moved towards Sharpsburg, which he did not reach until about 9 o'clock on the 17th. Of the soldiers of the Federal garrison cooped up in Harper's Ferry none escaped except about 1,300 cavalry under Colonel Davis. They silently made their way up the north bank of the Potomac at the foot of Maryland Heights during the night of the 14th. Next morning in their retreat they ran foul of some of Longstreet's trains near Sharpsburg and did some damage. The road by which these soldiers escaped was on General McLaws's line. Stuart had suggested to McLaws the propriety of guarding it, and Jackson had cautioned him against the danger of the garrison's attempting to escape into Maryland, but McLaws, no
Robert E. Lee (search for this): chapter 4
street leads us to infer that he prevailed over Lee's hesitancy to go into Maryland at all by reminn the campaign. General Longstreet thinks that Lee ought not to have attempted the reduction of Ha Maryland campaign are not hard to understand. Lee had just defeated one-half of the Federal trooptil Harper's Ferry should fall. It was not General Lee's original intention to dispute the passage the information to General Lee at Hagerstown. Lee received it some time during the night of the 1il too late to press McLaws on the 14th. Hence Lee withdrew towards Sharpsburg next morning. Whilies. Later in the day Jackson learned from General Lee of the great danger threatened by McClellandvantage of his good fortune. As we have seen, Lee was able to hold him back at the South Mountainhe two armies were separated by Antietam creek, Lee occupying the hills west of the stream, which ol others. The rapid advance of McClellan threw Lee on the defensive, forced him to fight at South [44 more...]
George B. McClellan (search for this): chapter 4
y in regard to the value of that dispatch to McClellan and its effect upon the fortunes of the camp cross over. This was the very day on which McClellan obtained the lost dispatch. On the 14th HaD. H. Hill and Stuart were expected to delay McClellan's march until the operations at Harper's Fere to Washington, and served simply to hamper McClellan. Nor could any agencies, even had they been more efficient than usual, have revealed to McClellan the position for days to come of every part eneral Lee of the great danger threatened by McClellan's unexpectedly rapid advance, and was informHill with him, and as this fact was known to McClellan, it is difficult to account for the deliberaon to some extent by this, and slow at best, McClellan not only did not attack on the afternoon of tre was over by one o'clock in the day. Here McClellan's heaviest blows had been delivered, and theany rate that Lee and Jackson and Sumner and McClellan thought so, and their views may be taken as [40 more...]
Ham Chamberlayne (search for this): chapter 4
right and in the rear of the Federal line of defence. Jones's division, near the Potomac, was thrown forward to attack the portion of the Federal line in its front. Ewell's division was moved forward on the turnpike between the two. During the night Colonel Crutchfield took ten guns over the Shenandoah, and established them near the foot of Loudoun Heights, so as to attack the formidable fortifications of the Federals in reverse. Colonel Lindsay Walker, and his gallant adjutant, Ham. Chamberlayne, brought up a large number of Hill's batteries to a position which a portion of Hill's infantry had gained. The greatest activity prevailed in Jackson's command during the night. The General himself took little if any rest, and soon after daylight mounted his horse and rode to the front. Fire was opened from all of Jackson's batteries that were in position at an early hour. This fire was seconded by McLaws's and Walker's guns from the mountain tops. In an hour, says Jackson, the ene
Blucher (search for this): chapter 4
id one. He left Harper's Ferry sixteen hours after McLaws, but reached the battle-field only five hours behind him. McLaws had, however, the night to contend with. The vigor of Hill's attack, with hungry and march worn men, is shown by the fact that he completely overthrew forces twice as numerous as his own. Though his force of from two thousand to three thousand five hundred men was too small to permit of an extended aggressive, his arrival was not less opportune to Lee than was that of Blucher to Wellington at Waterloo, nor was his action when on the field in any way inferior to that of the Prussian field marshal. The battle of Sharpsburg was a very bloody one, and a very exhausting one to the Confederate army. As General Longstreet says: Nearly one-fourth of Lee's men were killed and wounded, but they had met and defeated all the attempts of an army more than twice as numerous as themselves to drive them from their position. We think General Longstreet must have forgotten m
Franklin (search for this): chapter 4
r stores. During the 14th McClellan had thrown forward Franklin to Cramp ton's Gap, through which McLaws had entered Pleaear guard, the mountain pass was forced, and at nightfall Franklin had full possession of the road to McLaws's rear. But a e Valley in so strong a position, and so skillfully, that Franklin next morning declined to attack. After the surrender of by the garrison at the one end of Pleasant Valley, and by Franklin at the other, was relieved from his unpleasant position. the corps of Hooker, Mansfield, and Sumner, supported by Franklin if necessary, against the Confederate left wing, and, as f his army upon Lee's left and support it if necessary by Franklin in addition. His other operations were to be in concert led with such fearful loss to the Federal army, that when Franklin reached the field about midday Sumner would not permit hibattle had taken place. Sumner had refused permission to Franklin, with more than 1,000 fresh men, to resume the attack. S
McLaws (search for this): chapter 4
Ferry to make his attack by Bolivar Heights. McLaws made a hurried march to reach Maryland Heightsry and to guard the mountainpass which led to McLaws's rear until Harper's Ferry should fall. It w his front, and, turning down upon the rear of McLaws, might raise the siege of Harper's Ferry, and rampton's Gap, but not until too late to press McLaws on the 14th. Hence Lee withdrew towards Sharpf the brave and skillful part performed by General McLaws and General Walker in the reduction of Harttack. After the surrender of Harper's Ferry, McLaws who, on the morning of the 15th, was hedged inached the battlefield at about the same time. McLaws rested for some time near Harper's Ferry, and in this brilliant operation. All honor to General McLaws for what he did, but his was not the severd Sharpsburg during the forenoon of the 16th. McLaws and Anderson were a day later, and arrived on ntil reinforcements could arrive. Fortunately McLaws and J. G. Walker were rapidly approaching. St[28 more...]
Grigsby (search for this): chapter 4
rom this that Jackson had nothing to fear from Hooker and Mansfield, the advance of Sedgwick's five or six thousand fresh men threatened to overwhelm the weak Confederate line. But one brigade (Early's) of Jackson's command had not been seriously engaged. Early was instructed (in conjunction with the other forces at hand) to hold the enemy in check if possible until reinforcements could arrive. Fortunately McLaws and J. G. Walker were rapidly approaching. Stuart, with his artillery, and Grigsby, with a handful of Jackson's old division, clung tenaciously to some ground in Sedgwick's front, while Hood, in the woods near the church, fiercely contested every inch he was forced to yield. A bold and skillful move of Early defeated and drove back some of Mansfield's men, who were pressing Hood, and opened the way for a crushing flank attack upon Sedgwick. In a few moments this attack was made by McLaws, Walker, and Early, all in conjunction, and in twenty minutes two fifths of Sedgw
Charles Sumner (search for this): chapter 4
s to throw the corps of Hooker, Mansfield, and Sumner, supported by Franklin if necessary, against tthe field. Now it was that McClellan threw in Sumner, whose corps made the Federal force that had bft of the Confederate army, in all 40,000 men. Sumner's corps became divided in moving to the attackines in the woods north of the Dunker church. Sumner found that at this time Hooker's corps was notd his gallant colleagues held the field. When Sumner was leading Sedgwick to the attack the other tlater R. H. Anderson's division reinforced it. Sumner, when Sedgwick was being pressed, ordered Fren(Hooker's), Twelfth (Mansfield's), and Second (Sumner's) corps, but after that the attacks were succt when Franklin reached the field about midday Sumner would not permit him to resume the offensive llines, where the main battle had taken place. Sumner had refused permission to Franklin, with more s certain at any rate that Lee and Jackson and Sumner and McClellan thought so, and their views may [2 more...]
Swinton (search for this): chapter 4
character as a commander, and by the sensitiveness of the Federal Government in regard to Washington. This expectation was defeated by the loss of the dispatch containing General Lee's plans, and, we believe, by this alone. General Longstreet seems to think that only Virginian writers consider this dispatch of great importance. We believe that Generals Longstreet and D. H. Hill are the only two people who refuse to see the decisive importance of the lost dispatch upon the campaign. (See Swinton, Comte de Paris, Palfrey, &c.) General Lee, we know, thought it the most important factor in the campaign. It changed all his plans and, as he believed, the result. A single day of delay on McClellan's part at South Mountain would probably have rendered the battle at this barrier unnecessary. Two days delay would certainly have relieved Lee from all necessity of defending the passes, and would have rendered possible the concentration of his army anywhere in the Hagerstown Valley in time
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