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George E. Pickett (search for this): chapter 2.6
ves there. But if Longstreet was waiting for Pickett, he was not allowed to wait long enough, beca intention to assault the enemy's centre with Pickett's division, with the assistance of troops frooned gentleman and old army officer, General George E. Pickett, and the pride and courage of the Ar rest fled in confusion, and what is known as Pickett's charge was over, with no results but the exGeneral Lee? And why was it not done? General Pickett, if he had known it, would never, under tcted anything, and if we had been repulsed as Pickett was, which would not have been at all improbao-operation — it is difficult to conceive how Pickett could have been expected to be successful agae stated previously, the enemy did not pursue Pickett. If they had, I would have at once called tot's two divisions. But a short while after Pickett's charge was over and while my men were at re that the order was given no doubt because of Pickett's repulse, but as there was no pursuit there [18 more...]
Pope (search for this): chapter 2.6
tion across the Rappahannock, that, though driven back with loss, they captured General Stuart's headquarters with all his orders and correspondence, and forced General Lee to display his infantry or partially to do so. From both these sources General Hooker was satisfied that General Lee was on the move, and it was a reasonable presumption that he was trying to turn his flanks, in order to try the issue of battle on the same grounds, and under the same circumstances, that he had defeated General Pope's army at the second Manassas. Accordingly, General Hooker concentrated his army so as to cover Washington, and be prepared to give front to General Lee, let him come from what direction he might. General Lee's army was at this time very much scattered, his advance being over one hundred miles or more from Hill's corps, still at Fredericksburg. But General Hooker, who must have been aware of this, did not attempt to take advantage of the situation. When Hooker withdrew from Hill
Posey (search for this): chapter 2.6
would commence the movement. I was instructed to move simultaneously with Perry's brigade on my right, and informed that Posey's brigade on my left would move forward upon my advancing. About 5 o'clock P. M. the signal was given by Wilcox and Perr was the advanced batteries of the enemy, raking the whole field. Just before reaching this position I had observed that Posey's brigade on my left had not advanced, and fearing that if I proceeded much further with my left flank entirely unprotectd-de-camp, Captain Bell, with a message to Major-General Anderson. To this message he replied, Press on --he had ordered Posey in on my left and would reiterate the order. I immediately charged upon the enemy and drove him in great confusion upon ually given away, and was rapidly falling back to the rear, while on our left we were entirely unsupported — the brigade (Posey's) ordered to our support having failed to advance. My advanced position and the unprotected condition of my flanks invi
Whitelaw Reid (search for this): chapter 2.6
he divisions of Hood and myself, as he was in position to see general results untrammelled by attention to details: Before pursuing this narrative further, I shall say a word or two concerning this assault. I am satisfied that my force, numbering hardly thirteen thousand men, encountered during that three and a half hours of bloody work, not less than sixty-five thousand of the Federals, and yet their charge was not checked nor their line broken until we ordered them to withdraw. Mr. Whitelaw Reid, writing a most excellent account of this charge to the Cincinnati Gazette, says: It was believed from the terrific attack that the whole Rebel army, Ewell's corps included, was massed on our centre and left, and so a single brigade was left to hold the rifle pits on the right and the rest hurried across the little neck of land to strengthen our weakening lines. He describes, too, the haste with which corps after corps was hurried forward to the left to check the advance of my two-thi
Rodes (search for this): chapter 2.6
was a long one, and the perfect co-operation in the attack needed, to prevent General Meade, whose line was a short one, from using the same troops at more than one point, was difficult of attainment. Two of the corps commanders, Hill and Ewell, were new in their places. Longstreet's attack on the Federal left on the 2d was delayed beyond the expected time, and was not promptly seconded by Hill and Ewell when made. Ewell's divisions were not made to act in concert — Johnson, Early, Rodes acting in succession. General Lee always expressed the strongest conviction that had the Confederate corps attacked General Meade simultaneously on either the 2d or 3d, he would have succeeded in overthrowing the Federal army; that he had used every effort to insure concert of action, but had failed. He said that he had consulted Ewell, and told him if he could not carry his part of the line, he would move his corps to the right of Longstreet, and threaten the Federal communications with
Scales (search for this): chapter 2.6
leader of the charge, that noble, chivalrous, fearless, high-toned gentleman and old army officer, General George E. Pickett, and the pride and courage of the Army of Northern Virginia, which made them eager to try to do whatever General Lee ordered. It was a charge upon the enemy's centre, made by Pickett's division and Heth's, advancing in two lines; Pickett on the right, Wilcox's brigade marching in rear of Pickett's to guard that flank, and Heth's division was supported by Lane's and Scales' brigades under General Trimble. I was far in advance of the main Confederate line, and could see along both the advancing Confederates and those of the enemy lying couchant to resist their charge. Our troops moved steadily under a heavy fire, the main attack being against the left centre of the enemy. The enemy's artillery, which had slackened just previous to the charge, now reopened with renewed energy, whilst our batteries slackened theirs because of decreased ammuniton, which enabl
Semmes (search for this): chapter 2.6
my division was ordered. General Kershaw, with his South Carolina brigade, leading, followed by Semmes with his Georgia brigade; then Barksdale, and Wofford last. The two last had been mixed up withs. Coming on at a double quick the whole line as it advanced became heavily engaged, Kershaw and Semmes acting together on the right. These brigades gave mutual assistance, contending against odds whanization and attending the wounded, as I had one Brigadier-General (Barksdale) killed, one (General Semmes) mortally wounded, and many colonels and officers of less rank killed and wounded. The Cht Gettysburg. In the early morning of the 3d my new line was carefully revised. Kershaw and Semmes' brigades towards the Round Top, and the others extending diagonally towards the peach orchard —he right and as far as I could see to my left. General Bryan, who succeeded to the command of Semmes' brigade, has informed me that on the 3d of July himself and General Benning got an order to joi
Sorrel (search for this): chapter 2.6
centre and cover his vacant space as he best could, as I could not spare a brigade. Just after the officer had gone, Colonel Sorrel, General Longstreet's Adjutant-General, rode up, and I proceeded to inform him of General Law's request and my instrun no doubt because of Pickett's repulse, but as there was no pursuit there was no necessity of it. Before concluding, Colonel Sorrel, interrupting, said: General, there is no discretion allowed, the order is for you to retire at once. I rode rapidlet. He apologized, saying that he thought I had been engaged and had been forced to retire, etc. Not long after this Colonel Sorrel came to me and asked if I could retake the position I had just abandoned. I demurred most decidedly to the suggestio Because, he said, General Longstreet had forgotten that he had ordered it, and now disapproved the withdrawal. But, Colonel Sorrel, I said, recollect that you gave me the order. Yes, sir, he said, and General Longstreet gave it to me. I was inf
Sorrell (search for this): chapter 2.6
er had been informed of my withdrawal, neither had General DuBose, and their commands had, in consequence, to run for it to get away, by reason of the sudden advance of the enemy on their flanks after I withdrew. They were under the orders of General Law. As Pickett's repulse ended the battle of Gettysburg, the order for the withdrawal of Longstreet's advance was eminently proper, as otherwise it would have been left in a very precarious position, and it showed military foresight in Colonel Sorrell, even if he had used his own judgment in giving the order. My recollection is that this retreat was made about 2 o'clock P. M. The enemy made no attempt to advance against my part of the line after it had been re-established, and the two armies remained quiet during the remainder of the day — that is, on the right and as far as I could see to my left. General Bryan, who succeeded to the command of Semmes' brigade, has informed me that on the 3d of July himself and General Bennin
J. E. B. Stuart (search for this): chapter 2.6
ments so soon as Hooker could be manoeuvred out of his position. Shortly after our arrival at Culpeper, Hooker's cavalry made such a sudden and unexpected irruption across the Rappahannock, that, though driven back with loss, they captured General Stuart's headquarters with all his orders and correspondence, and forced General Lee to display his infantry or partially to do so. From both these sources General Hooker was satisfied that General Lee was on the move, and it was a reasonable presumnandoah and had just gone into camp on the other side, when a courier or staff officer dashed into my camp with orders for my division to recross the river and hurry back into Ashby's Gap, as the enemy's cavalry, supported by infantry, had driven Stuart's cavalry into the gap and it was apprehended their advance would seize the gap. The fording was deep, up to the arm pits of the shorter men, but the command went forward with great alacrity, and meeting great numbers of the cavalry coming to the
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