General Horace Porter, Campaigning with Grant

[432] of infantry which he expected to be put under his command, he could take the initiative the next morning, and cut off the whole of the force which Lee had detached. He said: “This force is in more danger than I am. If I am cut off from the Army of the Potomac, it is cut off from Lee's army, and not a man in it ought ever be allowed to get back to Lee. We at last have drawn the enemy's infantry out of its fortifications, and this is our chance to attack it.” He begged me to go to General Grant at once, and urge him to send him Wright's corps, because it had been under his command in the valley of Virginia, and was familiar with his way of fighting. I told him, as had been stated to him before, that Wright's corps was next to our extreme right, and that the only corps which could reach him by daylight was Warren's. I returned soon after to headquarters at Dabney's Mill, a distance of about eight miles, reaching there at 7 P. M., and gave the general a full description of Sheridan's operations. He took in the situation in an instant, and at once telegraphed the substance of my report to Meade, and preparations soon began looking to the sending of Warren's corps and Mackenzie's small division of cavalry to report to Sheridan. It was expected that the infantry would reach its destination in ample time to take the offensive about daybreak; but one delay after another was met with, and Grant, Meade, and Sheridan spent a painfully anxious night in hurrying forward the movement. Ayres's division of Warren's corps had to rebuild the bridge over Gravelly Run, which took till 2 A. M. Warren, with his other two divisions, did not get started from their position on the White Oak road till 5 A. M., and the hope of crushing the enemy was hourly growing less. This proved to be one of the busiest nights of the whole campaign. Generals were writing despatches and telegraphing