E. M. Cope, Commentary on the Rhetoric of Aristotle

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‘Compound words, epithets’ (including descriptive additions of more than one word) ‘more than one (several), and strange (foreign, unusual) words, are most appropriate to the language of emotion: an angry man may be forgiven (excused) for saying a wrong heaven-high, or for calling it colossal’. I have translated κακόν ‘wrong’, on the supposition that the speaker is a complainant in a court of justice, and that the ‘evil’ at which he is so indignant is some injustice or wrong done to him by the defendant, against whom he is inveighing.

οὐρανόμηκες] is an example of a διπλοῦν ὄνομα, πελώριον of a ξένον. Comp. III 3. 2, where πέλωρος (the alternative form) is cited as an instance of a γλῶττα, an antiquated or barbarous term that requires explanation. Isocrates, περὶ ἀντιδόσεως § 134, has used the former word quite in cold blood, τὸ δὲ κατορθωθὲν οὐρανόμηκες ποιήσουσιν, ‘your success they will exalt as high as heaven’. Aristophanes has it as an epithet of φωνή, Nub. 357, and again of κλέος, 459, in a chorus. Herod., II. 138, of excessively tall trees, and so Hom., Od. v. 239, of a pine. Aesch., Agam. 92, of the beacon-light, in the πάροδος of the chorus.

With ὀργιζομένῳ κ.τ.λ. comp. III 11. 16, where ὑπερβολαί, the figure hyperbole, or any excess or extravagance, is said to be most used by men in anger, and is illustrated by two quotations from Homer. Also Hermog., περὶ ἰδεῶν ά. (Rhet. Gr. Spengel, II 302. 3) περὶ σφοδρότητος (vehemence), quotes a number of instances of this exaggerated language and long compound words from Demosthenes when he was affecting indignation, ἰαμβειοφάγος, de Cor. § 139, γραμματοκύφων, Ib. 209. “Nearly the whole of the speech against Aristogeiton,” he says, “is a specimen of this vehement language”: and then proceeds to illustrate it from his other writings: [the speeches against Aristogeiton are, however, undoubtedly spurious.]

‘And also (this kind of language may be used) when (the speaker) has fairly’ (lit. already, by this time, then and not till then: on this use of ἤδη, οὔπω, οὐκέτι, see note on I 1.7) ‘overmastered (got into his power) his audience, and worked them up into a fit (raised them to the height) of enthusiasm, either by praise or blame or indignation, or love (which he has assumed towards them); as Isocrates also (as well as others, καὶ) does in his Panegyric, at the end: φήμη δὲ καὶ γνώμη’.

This is, as usual, a misquotation; Isocrates wrote, Paneg. § 186, φήμην δὲ καὶ μνήμην (Aristotle ought not to have forgotten this, for it is a striking case of ὁμοιοτέλευτον, or rhyming termination, one of the new figures introduced into Rhetoric by Gorgias and his school): φήμην δὲ καὶ μνήμην καὶ δόξαν πόσην τινὰ χρὴ νομίζειν ἢ ζῶντας ἕξειν ἢ τελευτήσαντας καταλείψειν τοὺς ἐν τοιούτοις τοῖς ἔργοις ἀριστεύσαντας; It is in fact a finely written sentence.

‘And again, οἵ τινες ἔτλησαν κ.τ.λ. (Paneg. § 96, another striking sen tence): for men (in general) give utterance to such language in their enthusiasm (the language of inspiration), and therefore (the audience) also being themselves in a similar state of feeling (having been brought thereto by the orator) are plainly ready to accept and approve of it’.

[It is worth noticing that ἔτλησαν, ‘in that they brooked to &c.’, is characteristic of poetic usage, and is rare in Attic prose: though found in Xenophon, Cyrop. III 1. 2, οὐκέτι ἔτλη εἰς χεῖρας ἐλθεῖν. The corresponding prose form is ἐτόλμησαν, which indeed is the manuscript reading in Isocrates l. c. and is corrected by the editors from the present passage and Dionysius Halic. de adm. vi dicendi in Dem. c. 40.]

ἔχῃ] Comp. Ernesti, Lex. Techn. Gr. s.v. “τοὺς ἀκροατάς, auditores occupatos tenere, obsedisse oratione. Ar. Rhet. III 7, ubi permutat cum τῷ ἐνθουσιάσαι, extra se rapere.” [Cicero, Orator § 210, id autem (numerosa oratio) tum valet cum is qui audit ab oratore iam obsessus est ac tenetur; and (for ὅταν ποιήσῃ ἐνθουσιάσαι) compare ib. § 99, si is non praeparatis auribus inflammare rem coepit; furere apud sanos et quasi inter sobrios bacchari vinolentus videtur.]

The careless introduction of the superfluous τε after φθέγγονται, repeated infra c. 11. 7, τό τε γὰρ τὴν ἀρχήν κ.τ.λ., is abundantly illustrated by Shilleto, Dem. de F. L., critical note on § 176, τήν τε γὰρ εἰρήνην κ.τ.λ., including this passage amongst his instances. [See Bonitz, Zeitschrift f. Oest. Gymn. 1867, pp. 672—682, quoted in Index Aristotelicus s.v. τε, ad fin., where, amongst other passages, a reference is given to Pol. VII 14 § 6, 1333 a 1, τόν τε γὰρ μέλλοντα καλῶς ἄρχειν ἀρχθῆναί φασι δεῖν πρῶτον.]

‘This also accounts for the fitness of this kind of language for poetry, because poetry is inspired. It must therefore (be used) either in the way above described, or with irony, as Gorgias did, and (in) the passages of Plato's Phaedrus’. The ‘passages’ referred to are 231 D, ἐὰν ἄρα πολλάκις νυμφόληπτος...γένωμαι, μὴ θαυμάσῃς: τὰ νῦν γὰρ οὐκέτι πόῤῥω διθυράμβων φθέγγομαι, alluding to the exaggerated and enthusiastic expressions with which Socrates had been inspired by the local influence; in particular to the rhapsody at the conclusion of his speech, ἐῤῥωμένως ῥωσθεῖσα νικήσασα ἀγωγῇ κ.τ.λ., and 241 E, οὐκ ᾔσθου... ὅτι ἤδη ἔπη φθέγγομαι, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκέτι διθυράμβους, καὶ ταῦτα ψέγων; ἐὰν δ̓ ἐπαινεῖν τὸν ἕτερον ἄρξωμαι, τί με οἴειποιήσειν; ἆῤ οἶσθ̓ ὅτι ὑπὸ τῶν Νυμφῶν... σαφῶς ἐνθουσιάσω;

A specimen of Gorgias' irony is found in Ar. Pol. III 2, 1275 b 26, Γοργίας μὲν οὖν ὁ Λεοντῖνος, τὰ μὲν ἴσως ἀπορῶν τὰ δ᾽ εἰρωνευόμενος, ἔφη, καθάπερ ὅλμους εἶναι τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ὁλμοποιῶν πεποιημένους, οὕτω καὶ Λαρισσαίους τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν δημιουργῶν πεποιημένους: εἶναι γάρ τινας λαρισσαιοποιούς, so read, with Schneider, for λαρισσοποιούς retained by Bekker. “Aristotle refers to an ingenious evasion of an awkward question. Whilst Gorgias was in Thessaly, where he seems to have spent a considerable time at Larissa, some Thessalian, who had no doubt heard his boast that he was able and ready to answer any question upon any subject, took him at his word, and asked him what constituted a citizen.—This is the constitutional question which gives occasion to Aristotle's quotation.—Partly in jest, and partly because he was really at a loss, he replied, that citizens were made by citizen-manufacturers: as the vessels made by mortarmanufacturers were mortars, so those made by the Larissaean-manufacturers were Larissaean citizens or Larissaeans: for there were such people as Λαρισσαιοποιοί. Λάρισσα, besides the Thessalian city, denotes also some kind of kettle or other cooking-utensil. The reply is much the same as if some one being asked, What makes a citizen of the town of Sandwich? were to answer, ‘a cook, for he is a sandwich-maker’; and is no bad specimen of the way in which Gorgias most likely fulfilled his promise of solving any problem whatsoever that was proposed to him. It may be doubted whether, as Schneider supposes, there is also an ambiguity in δημιουργῶν: the word bears also the sense of a magistrate, as the grammarians tell us, especially in Doric states. Larissa was not a Doric state: but we learn from K. O. Müller, Dor. Bk. III ch. 8. 5; from Thuc. V 17, ἐν Μαντινείᾳ οἱ δημιουργοὶ καὶ ἡ βουλή...ἐν Ἤλιδι οἱ δημ. καὶ οἱ τὰ τέλη ἔχοντες, and from a (doubtful) letter of Philip, Dem. de Cor. § 157, Πελοποννησίων τοῖς δημ.; that the use of the term was not confined to these, and Aristotle applies it to ‘magistrates’ in general, Pol. VI (IV), 4, 1291 a 34. See further on this subject, Müller's Dorians, u. s.” From a note in Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil. Vol. III No. VII p. 80, with additions [see also p. 180 of Thompson's edition of the Gorgias].