Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America. Vol. 1.
Henry Coppee , LL.D., Ed.

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[557] own side, Johnston and Beauregard, after having conceived a simple plan and explained it to their subordinates, found themselves almost constantly obliged to direct the operations over the limited space of ground they could embrace at a glance; they both displayed great personal bravery.

The errors committed on both sides are easily discernible. Notwithstanding Halleck's instructions, Grant and his generals had neglected to fortify their positions. They aggravated this fault by the carelessness with which they guarded their lines; consequently, the attack was a perfect surprise to them. Moreover, in placing L. Wallace's division so far away as Crump's Landing, Grant neglected to secure easy communications with it, which would have enabled him to bring it upon the field of battle towards the middle of the first day. Buell had marched from Nashville to Columbia with a degree of tardiness that could hardly have been accounted for by those even who knew how much time he required to put a division in motion on the drillfield, if there had not been a cause and an excuse for such tardiness in Halleck's and Grant's despatches. Once beyond Duck River, he accelerated his pace, and one might unhesitatingly praise his promptitude in forwarding part of his army from Savannah to Pittsburg by water if he had not at the same time compelled Nelson to wait four hours, which prevented the latter from reaching the field of battle before evening; by this delay his colleague came near being crushed. Let us add also that if the honor of the victory of the 7th falls mostly upon him, one has good reason to be astonished that he did not follow up that success with more vigor when he clearly saw the design of the enemy to retreat.

The Confederates were unfortunate in the choice of the day for their attack. If they had fought the battle twenty-four hours sooner, they would only have had Grant to cope with; if they had waited a few days longer, the arrival of Van Dorn in their camp would have largely neutralized that of Buell at Pittsburg Landing. They had only themselves to blame for that misfortune; they had hesitated at first, had delayed from day to day, then determined too suddenly to act. It is difficult to conceive why, on the field of battle, they wanted to push their right wing forward. In doing this they brought it closer to the Tennessee, and exposed