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Second Speech for the Defense

See, I have chosen to place myself at the mercy of the misfortune which you have been told that I blame unfairly, and at the mercy of my enemies here; for much as I am alarmed by their wholesale distortion of the facts, I have faith in your judgement and in the true story of my conduct; though if the prosecution deny me even the right of lamenting before you the misfortunes which have beset me, I do not know where to fly for refuge, [2] so utterly startling—or should I say villainous?—are the methods which are being used to misrepresent me. They pretend that they are prosecuting to avenge a murder; yet they defend all the true suspects, and then assert that I am a murderer because they cannot find the criminal. The fact that they are flatly disregarding their appointed duty shows that their object is not so much to punish the murderer as to have me wrongfully put to death. [3] I myself ought simply to be replying to the evidence of the attendant, for I am not here to inform you of the murderers or prove them guilty; I am answering a charge which has been brought against me. However, in order to make it completely clear that the prosecution have designs upon my life and that no suspicion can attach itself to me, I must, quite unnecessarily, go further. [4] I ask only that my misfortune, which is being used to discredit me, may turn to good fortune; and I call upon you to acquit and congratulate me rather than condemn and pity me. According to the prosecution, those who came up during the assault were one and all more likely to inquire exactly who the murderers were and carry the news to the victims' home than to take to their heels and leave them to their fate. [5] But I, for my part, do not believe that there exists a human being so reckless or so brave that, on coming upon men writhing in their death agony in the middle of the night, he would not turn round and run away rather than risk his life by inquiring after the malefactors responsible. Now since it is more likely that the passers-by behaved in a natural manner, you cannot logically continue to treat the footpads who murdered the pair for their clothing as innocent, any more than suspicion can still attach itself to me.1 [6] As to whether or not proclamation of some other outrage was made at the time of the murder, who knows? Nobody felt called upon to inquire and as the question is an open one, it is quite possible to suppose that the malefactors concerned in such an outrage committed the murder. [7] Why, moreover, should the evidence of the slave be thought more trustworthy than that of free men?2 Free men are disfranchised and fined, should their evidence be considered false; whereas this slave, who gave us no opportunity of either cross-examining or torturing him—when can he be punished? Nay, when can he be cross-examined? He could make a statement in perfect safety; so it is only natural that he was induced to lie about me by his masters, who are enemies of mine. On the other hand, it would be nothing short of impious were I put to death by you on evidence which was untrustworthy. [8] According to the prosecution, it is harder to believe that I was absent from the scene of the crime than that I was present at it. But I myself, by using not arguments from probability but facts, will prove that I was not present. All the slaves in my possession, male or female, I hand over to you for torture; and if you find that I was not at home in bed that night, or that I left the house, I agree that I am the murderer. The night can be identified, as the murder was committed during the Diipoleia.3 [9] As regards my wealth, my fears for which are said to have furnished a natural motive for the murder, the facts are precisely the opposite. It is the unfortunate who gain by arbitrary methods, as they expect changes to cause a change in their own sorry plight. It pays the fortunate to safeguard their prosperity by living peaceably, as change turns their good fortune into bad. [10] Again, although the prosecution pretend to base their proof of my guilt on inferences from probability, they assert not that I am the probable, but that I am the actual murderer. Moreover, those inferences4 have in fact been proved to be in my favor rather than theirs—for not only has the witness for the prosecution been proved untrustworthy, but he cannot be cross-examined. Similarly, I have shown that the presumptions5 are in my favor and not in favor of the prosecution and the trail of guilt has been proved to lead not to me, but to those whom the prosecution are treating as innocent. Thus the charges made against me have been shown without exception to be unfounded. But it does not follow that there is no way of convicting criminals, if I am acquitted; it does follow that there is no way of effectively defending persons accused, if I am sentenced. [11] You see how unjustifiably my accusers are attacking me. Yet notwithstanding the fact that it is they who are endeavoring to have me put to death in so impious a fashion, they maintain that they themselves are guiltless; according to them, it is I who am acting impiously—I, who am urging you to show yourselves godfearing men. But as I am innocent of all their charges, I adjure you on my own behalf to respect the righteousness of the guiltless, just as on the dead man's behalf I remind you of his right to vengeance and urge you not to let the guilty escape by punishing the innocent; once I am put to death, no one will continue the search for the criminal. [12] Respect these considerations, and satisfy heaven and justice by acquitting me. Do not wait until remorse proves to you your mistake; remorse in cases such as this has no remedy.

1 Immediately intended as an answer to Antiph. 2.3.2, where it is maintained that if the murder was the work of footpads, the passers-by who appeared on the scene would have obtained information about their identity from the victims. The reply here given is; (a) if a group of footpads had in fact been engaged in the murder, the passers-by would have run away. (b) The passers-by would in that case have been unable to supply information about the identity of the criminals. (c) As no passer-by has come forward with such information, all the passers-by must have run away. (d) It follows from (a) that the murderers must have been a group of footpads. A portentous petitio principii, which of course entirely neglects the fact that passers-by had come forward with very different information.

2 Or “of the free men.” A puzzling sentence which has been treated by some as evidence of the incompleteness of this tetralogy in its present form. No “free men” have given evidence in favor of the defense, and we can hardly suppose that the speaker is referring to himself. I have taken the words in a purely general sense, although I feel it to be unsatisfactory.

3 A festival in honor of Zeus, celebrated in the first week of June.

4 The ἄλλα is answered by τε γὰρ, which explains away the one fact which might have been unfavorable to the defense. The connection of thought is; “The inferences are all in my favor; and, after all, it is only inferences that we have to consider in this case. There can be no question of evidence of fact, as the one possible witness has been proved prejudiced.” The construction is thus elliptical.

5 τεκμήρια are here distinguished from εἰκότα; but the distinction is hardly observed by Antiphon in practice.

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