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[10] Again, although the prosecution pretend to base their proof of my guilt on inferences from probability, they assert not that I am the probable, but that I am the actual murderer. Moreover, those inferences1 have in fact been proved to be in my favor rather than theirs—for not only has the witness for the prosecution been proved untrustworthy, but he cannot be cross-examined. Similarly, I have shown that the presumptions2 are in my favor and not in favor of the prosecution and the trail of guilt has been proved to lead not to me, but to those whom the prosecution are treating as innocent. Thus the charges made against me have been shown without exception to be unfounded. But it does not follow that there is no way of convicting criminals, if I am acquitted; it does follow that there is no way of effectively defending persons accused, if I am sentenced.
1 The ἄλλα is answered by ὅ τε γὰρ, which explains away the one fact which might have been unfavorable to the defense. The connection of thought is; “The inferences are all in my favor; and, after all, it is only inferences that we have to consider in this case. There can be no question of evidence of fact, as the one possible witness has been proved prejudiced.” The construction is thus elliptical.
2 τεκμήρια are here distinguished from εἰκότα; but the distinction is hardly observed by Antiphon in practice.
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