[196a]
or victory or defeat in war or some other contest; but what is better among these things for a man to suffer or avoid suffering, can surely be no more for a seer to decide than for anyone else in the world.Laches
Well, I fail to follow him, Socrates, or to see what he is driving at; for he points out that neither a seer nor a doctor nor anybody else is the man he refers to as the courageous, unless perchance he means it is some god. Now it appears to me [196b] that Nicias is unwilling to admit honestly that he has no meaning at all, but dodges this way and that in the hope of concealing his own perplexity. Why, you and I could have dodged in the same way just now, if we wished to avoid the appearance of contradicting ourselves. Of course, if we were arguing in a law-court, there would be some reason for so doing; but here, in a meeting like this of ours, why waste time in adorning oneself with empty words?Socrates
I agree that it is out of place, Laches: but let us see: [196c] perhaps Nicias thinks he does mean something, and is not talking just for the sake of talking. So let us ask him to explain more clearly what is in his mind; and if we find that he means something, we will agree with him; if not, we will instruct him.Laches
Then, Socrates, if you would like to ask him, please do so: I daresay I have done enough asking.Socrates
Well, I see no objection, since the question will be on behalf of us both.Laches
Very well, then.Socrates
Now tell me, Nicias, or rather, tell us—for Laches and I are sharing the argument between us—do you say that courage is knowledge [196d] of what is to be dreaded or dared?Nicias
I do.Socrates
And that it is not every man that knows it, since neither a doctor nor a seer can know it, and cannot be courageous unless he add this particular knowledge to his own? This was your statement, was it not?Nicias
Yes, it was.Socrates
And so in fact this is not a thing which, as the proverb says, “any pig would know”; and thus a pig cannot be courageous.Nicias
I think not. [196e] Socrates
Indeed it is obvious, Nicias, that you at least do not believe that even the Crommyonian sow1 could have been courageous. I say this not in jest, but because I conceive it is necessary for him who states this theory to refuse courage to any wild beast, or else to admit that a beast like a lion or a leopard or even a boar is so wise as to know what only a few men know because it is so hard to perceive. Why, he who subscribes to your account of courage must needs agree that a lion, a stag, a bull, and a monkey have all an equal share of courage in their nature.
Well, I fail to follow him, Socrates, or to see what he is driving at; for he points out that neither a seer nor a doctor nor anybody else is the man he refers to as the courageous, unless perchance he means it is some god. Now it appears to me [196b] that Nicias is unwilling to admit honestly that he has no meaning at all, but dodges this way and that in the hope of concealing his own perplexity. Why, you and I could have dodged in the same way just now, if we wished to avoid the appearance of contradicting ourselves. Of course, if we were arguing in a law-court, there would be some reason for so doing; but here, in a meeting like this of ours, why waste time in adorning oneself with empty words?Socrates
I agree that it is out of place, Laches: but let us see: [196c] perhaps Nicias thinks he does mean something, and is not talking just for the sake of talking. So let us ask him to explain more clearly what is in his mind; and if we find that he means something, we will agree with him; if not, we will instruct him.Laches
Then, Socrates, if you would like to ask him, please do so: I daresay I have done enough asking.Socrates
Well, I see no objection, since the question will be on behalf of us both.Laches
Very well, then.Socrates
Now tell me, Nicias, or rather, tell us—for Laches and I are sharing the argument between us—do you say that courage is knowledge [196d] of what is to be dreaded or dared?Nicias
I do.Socrates
And that it is not every man that knows it, since neither a doctor nor a seer can know it, and cannot be courageous unless he add this particular knowledge to his own? This was your statement, was it not?Nicias
Yes, it was.Socrates
And so in fact this is not a thing which, as the proverb says, “any pig would know”; and thus a pig cannot be courageous.Nicias
I think not. [196e] Socrates
Indeed it is obvious, Nicias, that you at least do not believe that even the Crommyonian sow1 could have been courageous. I say this not in jest, but because I conceive it is necessary for him who states this theory to refuse courage to any wild beast, or else to admit that a beast like a lion or a leopard or even a boar is so wise as to know what only a few men know because it is so hard to perceive. Why, he who subscribes to your account of courage must needs agree that a lion, a stag, a bull, and a monkey have all an equal share of courage in their nature.
