previous next

[257a]

Stranger
Then being itself must also be said to be other than all other things.

Theaetetus
Yes, it must.

Stranger
And we conclude that whatever the number of other things is, just that is the number of the things in relation to which being is not; for not being those things, it is itself one, and again, those other things are not unlimited in number.

Theaetetus
That is not far from the truth.

Stranger
Then we must not be disturbed by this either, since by their nature the classes have participation in one another. But if anyone refuses to accept our present results, let him reckon with our previous arguments and then proceed to reckon with the next step.1

Theaetetus
That is very fair. [257b]

Stranger
Then here is a point to consider.

Theaetetus
What is it?

Stranger
When we say not-being, we speak, I think, not of something that is the opposite of being, but only of something different.

Theaetetus
What do you mean?

Stranger
For instance, when we speak of a thing as not great, do we seem to you to mean by the expression what is small any more than what is of middle size?

Theaetetus
No, of course not.

Stranger
Then when we are told that the negative signifies the opposite, we shall not admit it; we shall admit only that the particle “not”2 indicates something different [257c] from the words to which it is prefixed, or rather from the things denoted by the words that follow the negative.

Theaetetus
Certainly.

Stranger
Let us consider another point and see if you agree with me.

Theaetetus
What is it?

Stranger
It seems to me that the nature of the other is all cut up into little bits, like knowledge.

Theaetetus
What do you mean?

Stranger
Knowledge, like other, is one, but each separate part of it which applies to some particular subject [257d] has a name of its own; hence there are many arts, as they are called, and kinds of knowledge, or sciences.

Theaetetus
Yes, certainly.

Stranger
And the same is true, by their nature, of the parts of the other, though it also is one concept.

Theaetetus
Perhaps; but let us discuss the matter and see how it comes about.

Stranger
Is there a part of the other which is opposed to the beautiful?

Theaetetus
There is.

Stranger
Shall we say that this is nameless or that it has a name?

Theaetetus
That it has one; for that which in each case we call not-beautiful is surely the other of the nature of the beautiful and of nothing else.

Stranger
Now, then, tell me something more. [257e]

Theaetetus
What?

Stranger
Does it not result from this that the not-beautiful is a distinct part of some one class of being and also, again, opposed to some class of being?

Theaetetus
Yes.

Stranger
Then, apparently, it follows that the not-beautiful is a contrast of being with being.

Theaetetus
Quite right.

Stranger
Can we, then, in that case, say that the beautiful is more and the not-beautiful less a part of being?

Theaetetus
Not at all.


1 i.e., if he will not accept our proof that being is not, etc., he must disprove our arguuents respecting the participation of idea in one another, and then proceed to draw his inference.

2 The two particles οὐ and μή in Greek.

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States License.

An XML version of this text is available for download, with the additional restriction that you offer Perseus any modifications you make. Perseus provides credit for all accepted changes, storing new additions in a versioning system.

load focus Greek (1903)
hide Places (automatically extracted)

View a map of the most frequently mentioned places in this document.

Download Pleiades ancient places geospacial dataset for this text.

hide Display Preferences
Greek Display:
Arabic Display:
View by Default:
Browse Bar: