Admiral David D. Porter, The Naval History of the Civil War.

[594] night when the vessels were at anchor and at a disadvantage. That was his only chance of success. As he took upon himself to go out and seek battle, instead of waiting for it to be offered to him, one would naturally suppose that his ship had a resisting power that was only known to himself, and that he, as one of the best sailors afloat, felt himself authorized to attack the whole fleet by daylight. If this was the case, the forces on each side might be considered as about equal, in spite of the disparity of numbers.

One point must not be lost sight of, and that is, that no damage was inflicted on the Tennessee before the Monitors came up, and when they did attack her the battle was soon ended. It is a significant fact in favor of iron-clads, and if the Monitors had possessed more speed they would not have required any assistance from wooden vessels.

In this connection we must mention a very creditable action of Commander Nicholson. The charge for the 15-inch gun, as regulated by the Bureau of Ordnance, was only 35 lbs. of powder, but Captain Nicholson nearly doubled it, using 65 lbs.--taking the responsibility of bursting the gun — but proving, in fact, that it could bear that charge for a limited number of rounds. The result was, that he pierced the armor of the ram, and dispelled the illusion of Buchanan and his crew — that their ship was invulnerable.

There is no doubt that the Tennessee was at that time the most formidable vessel the Confederates had ever built, and they might well feel proud of their great war monster, and believe her to be a match for half a-dozen Monitors. In fact, she might have been more than a match for them if the fight had taken place in the open sea, where her superior speed and long-range guns would have given her a great advantage.

This battle gave the Government a great deal of experience, and demonstrated beyond question that the 9 and 11 inch guns were perfectly useless against six inches of iron, heavily backed, even when fired at close quarters. But, with this lesson before them, the U. S. Government--for twenty years after the war — has held on to these guns, and paraded them about the world in obsolete wooden ships, which all other nations have abolished as unfit for war purposes.

The two great systems of iron-clad construction, which had been introduced on the scene of war by the North and the South respectively, had on this occasion a fair chance of being fully tested, and in a manner admitting of no dispute, and the palm was given to Ericssen's invention. The want of speed and a proper armament are not faults inherent in his system.

The Tennessee was a formidable vessel, and her designers and constructors deserved great credit for the result of their labors. Had she succeeded in winning a victory in Mobile Bay, the world would have been some years longer groping in the dark for the right kind of an iron clad, but would have found it finally in the Ericsson Monitor, which to-day has no superior throughout the world.

This battle rendered Mobile of no value to the Confederacy, for, although owing to shoal water and obstructions, the Navy could not reach the city, it was as hermetically sealed against blockade-runners as if actually surrendered. A few vessels only were kept inside the bay, leaving Farragut at liberty to use his remaining force on the coast of Texas, where General Banks (after his failure up the Red River) had evacuated all the important points which had been captured by the Army and Navy, and thus left the Texan ports open to the blockade-runners.

The work of the Navy seemed to be endless. It had not only to fight the enemy, but to repair the blunders of quasi-military men, who would not even hold the positions which the Navy placed in their hands. Yet the officers and sailors worked on with unwearying activity and bravery to reach the victorious end, and every battle won diminished in an increasing ratio the Confederates' chance of success.

The battle of Mobile Bay proved several things which it is as important to know to-day as it was then. Guns mounted en barbette, even when protected by proper traverses, can be silenced and passed by steamers on their throwing in a heavy and concentrated fire, especially if they carry a large number of guns in broadside. No fort now existing in this country can keep out a fleet unless the channel is thoroughly obstructed.

Up to the present time, ships-of-war are gaining in strength over the forts of this country, and the saying that “one gun on shore is worth three on board-ship” may very properly be reversed. Steam has changed the whole principle of war, and iron-clads with rifled guns are too strong for our walls of stone, brick and mortar.

Note.--As the Tennessee was the most powerful and remarkable vessel the Confederates ever built, the scientific reader may take some interest in the following description of her construction, from the report of a Board of Survey, ordered by Admiral Farragut, after the battle:

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