Harper's Encyclopedia of United States History
Benson Lossing, Ed.

The power of the speaker of the House of Representatives has steadily increased from the First Congress to the present, and in its influence on national legislation is believed by many even to exceed that exerted by the President. Samuel J. Randall, through whom the influence of the speaker was increased more largely than by any other man in this country, once said: “I came to consider that (the speakership) . . . was the highest office within the reach of American citizens; that it was a grand official station, great in the honors which it conferred and still greater in the ability it gave to impress on our history and legislation the stamp of truth, fairness, justice, and right.”

In view of the political struggles in the House of Representatives over the dominating factor of national legislation—the appointment of committees—it is interesting to trace the growth of the speakership from an office scarcely above that of moderator to its present autocratic position as a representative exponent of the policy of the dominant party.

It is important to note that if the House of Representatives at its first session in 1789 did not clothe the speaker with autocratic powers, yet it invested the office with an external dignity of a somewhat Turveydrop character. The House, indeed, saved the dignity of the country by disagreeing to the proposition of the Senate to address the President as “His Highness . . . the Protector of their Liberties,” but when it came to its presiding officer, the earliest rules ordered that “when the House adjourns, the members shall keep their seats until the speaker go forth; and then the members shall follow,” a procedure that was in force for nearly six years, until Nov. 13. 1794.

The House, however, kept its legislative powers in the hands of its members. Business was often done on the motion of a member. The speaker appointed only the minor committees, while the [322] important committees were elected by ballot, a fact that is generally unknown. Committeeships were limited both in power and in tenure of office, service being, as a rule, for a few days only, and never beyond one session.

The first rules for the House of Representatives, April 7, 1789, were reported by Elias Boudinot on behalf of his fellowcommitteemen, Nicholas Gilman, Benjamin Goodhue, Thomas Hartley, Richard Bland Lee, James Madison, Roger Sherman, William Smith, Thomas T. Tucker, and Jeremiah Wadsworth. Among the most important of them were those setting forth the speaker's relation to the committees, as follows:

The speaker shall appoint committees unless it be determined by the House that the committee shall consist of more than three members, in which case the appointment shall be by ballot of the House.

Committees consisting of more than three members shall be balloted for by the House; if upon such ballot the number required shall not be elected by a majority of the votes given, the House shall proceed to a second ballot, in which a plurality of votes shall prevail; and in case a greater number than are required to compose or complete the committee shall have an equal number of votes, the House shall proceed to a further ballot or ballots.

It is to be noticed that all the important committees were named by the House, which in its first session elected nine committees by ballot. While the rules were silent on the subject, yet the tenure was brief, the committee on elections only serving through the session. The policy of the House in 1789 was indicated by the discharge of the committee on ways and means, after less than two months service, and by the intrusting of all matters to special committees whose tenure expired with brief reports speedily rendered. Even the Fourth Congress in 1795 had but two standing committees, and the number in 1805 and in 1815 were but seven and twelve respectively. The Fifty-Fourth Congress, in 1896, on the other hand, had, including three joint committees, no less than fifty-seven standing committees.

The chief officials of the two Houses of Congress evidently viewed with disfavor their restricted powers, and efforts were speedily made to enlarge their scope. Both attempts were along the same lines, to empower the speaker of the House and the president of the Senate to appoint all committees. The Senate, Oct. 31, 1791, on a motion to alter the Senate rule, which provided for the election of committees by ballot, so that the Vice-President should be empowered to nominate committees in future, declined to surrender its powers and to this day elects its committees.

In the House the speaker was more successful. The last committee elected by ballot, if indeed it was elected, was that of Jan. 11, 1790, which was constituted to bring in a bill for the enumeration of the inhabitants of the United States. Under the standing rules of the House, this committee, consisting of one member from each State, should have been elected by ballot. The Annals of Congress, compiled nearly thirty years later, state that this course was pursued, but the official journal of the House states that the committee was appointed. However this may be, the House immediately thereafter reversed its original action and initiated a policy of strengthening the powers of the speakership, which has been followed to the present day.

The House Journal of Jan. 13, 1790, contains the following record: “On motion, ordered, that so much of the standing rules and orders of this House as directs the modes of appointing committees be rescinded; and that hereafter it be a standing rule of the House, that all committees shall be appointed by the speaker, unless otherwise especially directed by the House, in which case they shall be appointed by ballot; and if upon such ballot the number required shall not be elected by a majority of the votes given, the House shall proceed to a second ballot, in which a plurality of votes shall prevail; and in case a greater number than are required to compose or complete the committee shall have an equal number of votes, the House shall proceed to a further ballot or ballots.”

The House Journal and the Annals of Congress are silent as to reasons advanced by Richard Bland Lee, who assisted in formulating the original rules, in moving [323] this change, and also as to the vote on the subject. It was undeniably a thin House, as no less than fourteen out of its sixty-one members had not qualified. It would hardly seem that the change was dictated by the difficulty of elections, for the House consisted of only sixty-one members, and the occasions for elections were infrequent. It may be added that this was the only rule changed by the House during that Congress.

The importance of the committees was obvious at the opening of the Second Congress, when immediately after the qualification of the speaker, clerk, and members, the House “Ordered, that the speaker shall appoint committees until the House shall otherwise determine.”

The next change of rules, Nov. 13, 1794, affected the chairman of the committee of the whole, who, under rules of April 7, 1789, “was to be appointed.” The new rule put the intention of the House beyond doubt by a proviso that the chairman “shall be appointed by the speaker.”

The increased power of the speaker proved displeasing to many members, especially those in the political minority, but no open attack was made upon the speaker's absolute control of committees until the second session of the Eighth Congress, when Nathaniel Macon, of North Carolina, was speaker. It may be added that the persistent and determined attack then made affords the only instance in the history of the House where the power of the speaker has been even ostensibly diminished. I say ostensibly diminished, for the limitation then placed on the speaker and the power then granted to committees of electing a member to a vacant chairmanship has never again been exercised.

On Nov. 6, 1804, the House excused Mr. J. C. Smith, chairman of the committee on claims, from serving thereon, and S. W. Dana, being appointed on the committee in Smith's place, was regarded by a majority of the committee as being its chairman, thus excluding from promotion Mr. Holmes, who was the second person on the original list. Thereupon a new standing rule was submitted as follows:

That each of the committees of this House be empowered to appoint a chairman by plurality of votes in all cases where the first-named member of the committee shall be absent, or excused by the House.

The committee to whom this motion was referred reported in favor of the motion except that the election should be by a majority of the committee. The House, after debate, refused to agree to the resolution by a vote of 50 yeas and 69 nays. Immediately a motion was made that all committees should choose their own chairman, but this with another similar motion failed. But the question would not down, and finally the following standing rule was adopted, Nov. 23, 1804:

That the first-named member of any committee appointed by the speaker of the House shall be the chairman, and, in case of his absence, or being excused by the House, the next named member, and so on, as often as the case shall happen, unless the committee shall, by a majority of their number, elect a chairman.

It does not appear that any chairman has been so elected save in the original case, where the committee was carrying out the wishes of the speaker.

One contingency, however, that of death, was not taken into consideration, but in providing for it in the amendment of the rules, 1888, the power of the speaker was again enhanced by adding the following addition to the rule:

And in the case of the death of a chairman, it shall be the duty of the speaker to appoint another.

On April 21, 1806, Mr. James Sloan, after a bitter attack on John Randolph, moved, “for the purpose hereafter of keeping the business of the House of Representatives within its own power,” that all standing committees shall be appointed by ballot and choose their own chairman. This motion was tabled, and being renewed by Mr. Sloan in the next session was defeated by the very close vote of 42 ayes to 54 noes. The question was revived at the beginning of the next Congress, Oct. 28, 1807, by Thomas Blount, but without success. The attempt was renewed in the following Congress by Mathhew Lyons, who moved, May 23, 1809, that the standing committees be appointed by ballot for the reason that the “course proposed would be more respectful to the nation; and that the [324] person so appointed would feel a greater responsibility to the House.” Mr. Gardiner supported the motion as “consistent with the republican mode of proceeding and thinking proper for this country . . . where the many were as competent as the few or as the one.” The motion was defeated by 67 nays to 41 yeas.

For forty years, until the election of a speaker by a plurality vote in 1849, there were no further efforts to effect a radical reform in the selection of the standing committees, the intervening attempts being confined to single or to special committees.

However, not infrequent charges of partisanship were made against the committee of elections, and in 1813 the effort to set aside as illegal the election of Mr. Hungerford, of Virginia, on a report of the committee of elections to that effect, caused much debate. Finally the committee's report was rejected and Hungerford was confirmed in his seat. Rufus King, of Massachusetts, who voted against the report of the committee, moved, June 14, 1813, that “the committee of elections shall in future be designated by lot, etc.” ; but the motion was defeated. Similar and unsuccessful attempts were made to change the method of electing this committee in 1838 and 1839.

As regards special committees, Mr. Pitkin's efforts failed, April 4, 1810, to have the committee to inquire into the conduct of General Wilkinson appointed by ballot, the vote being 53 ayes to 64 noes.

In one case only has the speaker barely escaped from the election of a special committee by the ballots of the members of the House, March 13, 1832, in connection with the appointment of a special committee on the Bank of the United States, Mr. Stevenson being speaker. The House, after a long debate, voted by 101 yeas to 99 nays on a motion by Erastus Root that the committee shall be appointed by ballot. Before the result was announced Mr. Plummer, of Mississippi, who had voted yea, changed his vote, thus making a tie, whereupon the speaker gave the casting vote in the negative.

In the prolonged contest over the election of the speaker in 1849, when for the first time in the history of the House he was elected by a plurality vote contrary to the standing rules, the general question of the appointment of the committees by the speaker was again raised. This was natural, as the complexion of the committees was a political factor of primary importance. Mr. Sackett, of New York, then moved “that the committees of this House be appointed by the House under a viva voce vote of the members thereof, and that it shall require a majority of those voting to elect.” The speaker ruled the resolution out of order.

In recent years Mr. Gillette's proposition in 1880, to restrict the power of the speaker to appoint until especially authorized by the House, was unsuccessful. Mr. Orth's motion of Jan. 11, 1882, to change the methods of appointing committees, was referred to the committee on rules, of which the speaker was chairman. Mr. Orth claimed that in the present method “the responsibility was too great for any single individual, and that a one-man power is always dangerous and in conflict with republican principles of government.” Several similar but unsuccessful efforts were made later, which need not be dwelt upon.

It may be added that with the increasing power of the speaker the powers of the committees have been likewise augmented.

A brief statement indicating wherein lies the power of the speaker and the committees may not be inappropriate. There is no rule requiring committees to report to the House any bills except general appropriations. Seven committees only have the right to report at any time, and then only on matters especially designated. One committee only, that on rules, of which the speaker is chairman, has a right to have its report considered at any time; to this committee must go all proposed action touching order of business. No proposition, except by unanimous consent, can be considered unless reported by committee. No member can address the House without being recognized by the speaker, who decides which of several members rising together shall speak first. The speaker, without laying them before the House, refers bills, executive reports, etc., to committees, and reports of committees [325] to appropriate calendars, and on such references often depends the fate of a measure.

Until 1861 committeeships expired with each session, but now as regards standing committees the terms are coexistent with the organized life of each Congress. Speaker Colfax, when the power of the House was questioned, decided that “the House of Representatives has the power to instruct any committee which it is authorized to appoint. It is a judicial check upon the power of the speaker in appointing committees.” Such instructions are extremely rare, and the power of each committee over legislation in its particular branch is almost unlimited. It was frequently possible in the early Congresses for individuals to secure at times legislation that had not passed the scrutiny of a committee, but such legislative action is now almost unknown.

Inasmuch as the present system of appointments and the scope of power of committees have been the gradual and uninterrupted growth of a century's experience on the part of the House, it is not probable that any radical changes will be made therein in the near future. Such changes, if made at all, would naturally occur under conditions similar to those which caused the election of coalition speakers in 1795 and 1839, or of plurality speakers in 1849 and 1855. Any change would doubtless result in the adoption of strictly American methods, such as those in vogue in the Senate, where committees have always been elected. By the French, German, and Italian methods, committees are elected by ballot through the medium of sections into which their legislative bodies are divided, but Congress would scarcely import these foreign methods.

Great as are the powers of the speaker of the House of Representatives, and potent for good or evil as are the committees appointed by him, it is pessimistic to attribute to either or to both a measure of power detrimental to the future weal of the nation. In continual contact with the people, and observant of the glaring publicity that causes frequent reversals of public opinion, it is safe to say that future Congresses, if they should initiate legislation of an objectionable character, would ultimately enact such laws as will harmonize with the intelligent wishes of the people, and tend to the highest development of the republic.

How the House does business.

Every member of the House represents a large constituency in its relation to national affairs. Each one, therefore, feels that his rights should be commensurate with his duties. In fact and practice, however, there are 356 other gentlemen who represent constituencies just as extensive, and with just as many rights. The problem is how to recognize each one's rights, having also due regard to the rights of all the rest. Obviously, no one has rights to the exclusion of the rights of others. This problem the House has had to meet from its very beginning in 1789, and the methods now in use have been the creation of no one man and of no set of men, but have been the slow growth of a hundred years, changing with the changed circumstances and meeting new conditions as they arose. Why they are what they are can best be understood by considering the duties and obligations and the physical possibilities of an assembly of 360 men, for such is the number of men who compoose the House of Representatives when you include the three territorial delegates, who have the right of speech though not of vote.

It is to be noted at the outset that there are few analogies between the House of Representatives of the United States and the corresponding bodies of the different [326] States. The differences between the two are fundamental and very wide reaching.

When the Constitution was prepared and submitted to the people of the separate States the authors of the Federalist recognized one difference, which has not only lasted to this day, but which has greatly increased. When they undertook to defend the intrusting of two years power to the House they encountered much opposition. The popular sentiment of that time was well expressed in the popular proverb that where annual elections left off tyranny began. All the thirteen colonies then believed that two years power was a dangerous gift, too dangerous even to be intrusted to the representatives of the people themselves. Whether much of the trouble we are having in the States does not arise from the abandonment of that opinion of our forefathers is well worth the consideration of the judicious. However that may be, biennial elections were fiercely assailed, and the defence brought out a fundamental fact as true, or, perhaps, more true to-day than ever before, the fact that we all of us know little of what is thought and believed outside our own locality. Although we are a great nation, united and compact, it is still true that the first government we live under is the government of the State. That first attracts our attention, and, speaking generally, that is about the only part of the government of which we have much knowledge. Of Congress the people get little information; of their own legislatures the people get a great deal. Inasmuch as the newspapers so limit their accounts of congressional action that an absent Congressman can hardly keep track of the proceedings of his own assembly, the individual in private life can hardly expect to have much of an idea of what is going on even in that part of the proceedings which affects him. As for the action of States other than his own the citizen in general has no notion whatever unless some extraordinary action is taken. Our State affairs we take in by absorption.

In Congress every member finds himself at one great disadvantage, which length of service may diminish but can never entirely take away, and that disadvantage arises from the lack of local knowledge as to far-off States. We may be a homogeneous nation, but we are certainly not lacking in diversities.

The broad extent of the country, in more ways, therefore, than one, affects the legislative action of the House, and also its methods of action.

In some of the smaller States all the business which is presented to the legislature is disposed of in some way or other. The committees report all bills and resolutions which are sent to them, and both Assemblies say “yes” or “no” directly or indirectly to them all.

In Congress neither House attempts to do anything of the kind. The pigeonholes of all of the committees which are fortunate enough to have any business at all are found, at the end of the session and of Congress, full of bills undisposed of. Thousands also of the bills reported are left on the calendars without even the poor formality of being discussed, or even of being called up. In a word, Congress, when it gets ready, adjourns, leaving the dead bills by the way-side.

In assemblies where all the business is transacted, where the dockets and calendars are cleared, it is only a question of the time when a proposition shall be heard, and never a question whether it shall be heard at all.

In order to state the situation in the House of Representatives in more concrete form, and therefore to bring it nearer to general comprehension, the facts relating to the business of the House and Senate of the Fifty-fourth Congress now last past will be very useful. Both sessions of this Congress were short. The number of bills introduced into the House and Senate was 14,114. The number of resolutions was 470, making a total of 14,584 bills and resolutions. When we adjourned there had been passed of these, 948 acts and resolves. On the calendars of the House were more than 2,000 bills and resolutions not acted upon, and the rest were in the pigeon-holes of the committees undisturbed, or at least unreported. It will, therefore, be seen that the House did only 6 1/2 per cent. of the business laid before it. Out of 14,584 a selection of 948 was made. The question which naturally arises is how was this selection made, how did it happen that these particular bills were [327] passed upon and not the others. A detailed statement may help to make this clear. Among the bills passed were those which raised, or attempted to raise, revenue, bond bills, all the bills carrying the great appropriations for the support of the government, bridge bills, railroad right-of-way bills, private bills, and public bills of all descriptions.

Among those bills which were not passed were many which without the sanction of law or precedent proposed to pay large sums. Added to these were private claims, pension claims, individual schemes, and propositions to increase the salaries of our civil servants while we were borrowing money for the necessities of life.

To have passed the bills which were passed and all those which were presented would have been a task which could not have been accomplished even if the House had worked day and night for the whole period of two years.

Obviously, there are some things which have to be done. There are bills which must be passed. Unless revenue is furnished, even the ordinary function of government would be at an end. So also if the revenues were not properly appropriated according to law, the government could not go on, for its continuance costs money. Hence, under the rules of the House, the committee of ways and means having charge of bills raising revenue, and the committees on appropriations obliged to provide for the expenditure of revenue, have a right of way which is thorough and complete. Whenever the House desires to take up such bills there is neither let nor hinderance. The country, therefore, can be sure that its necessities are provided for.

Besides these pressing necessities which cannot be denied, there are others which ought not to be denied. So far as the bills of this character carry money and require its expenditure, the rules do not offer very great facilities, and indeed could not. But if there be a pressing emergency calling for expenditures, the committee on rules has the right to submit to the House a proposition to consider the measure calculated to meet the emergency. If the House so desires the measure is then considered.

In this way were considered in the last Congress the bill to regulate immigration, the bankruptcy bill, the labor commission bill, the postal bill relating to second-class mail, the Pacific Railroad bill, and various others.

There are a great many measures which it would be impossible to treat in that special way, and for these the morning hour is provided, and now that the House has got used to this period the rule has worked well and every measure not involving any appropriation and which was of a public character was passed upon in the last House. Some of the bills on the House calendar to which this morning hour applies were not acted upon, but that was simply because the committee reporting did not care to urge them.

This morning hour was the invention of the Fifty-first Congress. The old morning hour was sixty minutes only, and no committee was allowed more than two days, and the very smallest kind of a filibuster would kill a bill which the great majority of the whole House might be desirous of making law. The new morning hour can be sixty minutes only, or, if the House chooses, may continue all day, and when a bill is once brought up it cannot be killed by mere indirection. During this period of time all, or about all, the work of the judiciary committee, which has charge of the changes of federal law, a portion of the work of the inter-State and foreign commerce committee, which has charge of the transportation interests of the country, and of various other committees to a lesser degree, can and do receive consideration, and are disposed of. All the bridge bills and right-of-way bills are passed at this time.

After the Fifty-first Congress this rule, which has thus shown its value, was, owing to the high state of party feeling, changed back to the old death-trap which existed prior to 1890. It was then deemed necessary to obliterate every possible trace of the Fifty-first Congress.

Time and experience, however, have shown the value of the changes which were made in those troublous times, and I may perhaps venture to say that many gentlemen who had been opposed in the Fifty-first Congress were not hostile in the Fifty-fourth Congress to the most efficient measures to give the majority control of the House. Among other [328] things, we adopted, with hardly a word of dispute, the rule proposed sixteen years ago by Mr. Randolph Tucker, which will probably be found effective to secure a quorum at all times.

Besides these bills, the nature of which has been indicated, there are private bills which deal in the main with the personal claims of individual citizens. They are divided into money claims and pension claims, including removal of charges of desertion. The pension claims have Friday evening of each week set apart for their special consideration and other days by special order from the committee on rules. Friday itself is set apart for other claims.

Besides the business which pertains to the States and the congressional districts, the Congress has another class of business of great importance to the Territory interested. Besides being the legislative body for the whole Union, Congress is also the municipal council for the District of Columbia and city of Washington. Local self-government does not exist there, and whatever is done for the district is done by Congress. Much legislation gets into the District of Columbia appropriation bills. Nevertheless there is much to be done for the city of Washington, as much perhaps as for any similar city. This necessity is met under the rules of the House by setting apart two Mondays in each month, the second and fourth, or so much as is found necessary. The committee on the district on these days calls up such bills as it deems proper for consideration, and the bills are considered by the House or by the committee of the whole House on the state of the Union as determined by the nature of the bill. In this way all the matured and needful legislation is passed which the district requires.

It will be evident from the summary thus given that all the necessities of the government are promptly and thoroughly attended to and that, whatever happens to the wishes of individuals, the welfare of the great mass of the people is in the hands of their own chosen representatives.

The rest of the business indicated by the bills introduced comprises those bills of a private nature which are lost for lack of time and other bills which cannot be brought up because they are not in order from being too far down the list.

The greater number by far are private bills, or those which, like public building bills, are for the benefit of particular localities. So few, however, of these private bills can be disposed of even at the expense of one-sixth of the time of Congress that out of that and out of other private and public exigencies the custom has grown up at certain times to ask unanimous consent to take up one and another of these bills and also other bills to expend money. Under this system any one member can object and stop any action by the House. Each member has complete control and may object and defeat the bill or may help pass it. Without experience one would suppose that such a system was amply safeguarded and if a bill was so satisfactory that no one could object to it, there could be no danger in letting it be presented for passage. But, alas! the weakness of poor human nature, though of course not often prevalent, does certainly lurk in even celestial and congressional minds. If a member objects he may be the subject of reprisals and his own bill may go to the tomb of the Capulets. Moreover, he hopes some one else will bear the burden, and while he hesitates he is lost and the bill is gained. The liberum veto might do in Poland, but it is bad in Congress. However, the custom has been so established that it must be yielded to.

Now as to the method. If the presiding officer were simply to put down the names in the order of application all sorts of things would be presented without even one man knowing anything about them, and as soon as the list reached fair proportions all interest in it would cease, for it would only be superseding one list by another, and when that was done the special emergency idea would entirely disappear. It would not be possible, therefore, to adopt this plan, for it would wreck itself. Various expedients have been tried at various times with results not at all satisfactory. One House, that of the Forty-seventh Congress, I think, adopted a rule devoting an hour of sixty minutes of each day to such lists, one for [329] each committee in order. Under this arrangement bills were called up with a provision for five minutes for explanation, and if five members objected the bill was not considered. If five members did not object, then five minutes on a side were allowed for discussion and the proposition was then voted upon. Under this method, however, very few bills were passed. Objections were many and the hour was soon consumed. On two days during the second session of the Forty-seventh Congress five bills only ran the gantlet. The system in the general opinion was far from being successful, and was not long continued. The speaker then under the present system has to make the selection, and an exceedingly troublesome task it is, requiring much labor and exciting not a little feeling. However, it is only just to the members to say that the trouble arises not so much from them, for they are in position to understand the speaker's difficulties, as from the constituents who cannot understand them. The speaker is also a member of the House. When he refuses to submit for unanimous consent, he is only exercising his right to object, a right which belongs to him in common with all the other members of the assembly. He has to make more frequent objection because he has to know what the bills proposed or to be proposed are about and what their provisions mean. He has opportunities to examine them, and indeed must examine them to do his duty.

Another method of breaking the regular order, and one which unlike unanimous consent is sanctioned by the rules of the House, is the method under “suspension of the rules.” Some years ago the right to move to suspend the rules and pass a bill or resolution prevailed every Monday. In exciting political times all sorts of questions and abstract propositions which were presented to entrap members and put them in the wrong were presented on Monday. Some of them were so ingeniously drawn that the enemy were caught whichever way they voted. As no amendment was permitted and but little debate, only fifteen minutes on either side, there was often much trepidation among those who were liable to be impaled on at least one horn of the dilemma. The ordeal through which we had to pass got to be so annoying that when the rules were modified and classified in the Forty-sixth Congress, the power to entertain motions to suspend the rules was confined to two Monday in the month, the first Monday and the third; committees had the right of way on the third and individual members on the first. Here, however, selections have to be made by the speaker, and he has some of the same troubles to afflict him which present themselves on the propositions for unanimous consent. On the last six days also of a session rules, may be suspended, but as the Houses in the first session seldom determine until very late the day of final adjournment the last six days of the first session are not so dreadful as those of the last session, where the House on the verge of dissolution has its last chance to enact the measure so dear to the member. At that time the struggle has driven many a speaker to the verge of distraction. He can satisfy not 5 per cent. of his applicants, and, therefore, welcomes the final adjournment as the saint ought to welcome death and paradise.

In the proceedings of the English House of Commons there seems to be an entire absence of a large class of bills which clog our calendars and make miserable the lives of members. There are no private pension bills, because there each claimant is left to the administration of the general law, nor do there seem to be any claim bills at all. Parliament is not called upon to adjudicate questions of damages resulting from the dealings of the government with its citizens. Almost all their private bills are those which, under our system of government, belong to the State and other local authorities, our work in that direction being mostly confined to bridges over navigable waters over which the nation has control.

Notwithstanding, however, this immunity from that which worries us most of all, and notwithstanding Parliament sits longer than we do, Sir Albert Rollit declared in 1894 that “business in the House of Commons had become more and more congested,” and that in the case of nonofficial members 309 bills had been introduced, of which only twenty-three were [330] passed, and the ministers had hardly better fortune, for as he said of them, “The list of promises was long, of performances extremely short.”

It is curious to notice how tremendous has been the increase in the presentation of bills by members of the House. In 1863-64 in the Thirty-eighth Congress the number was only 813. Such a number could be dealt with and all of them passed upon and decided. But who could dare to attempt to struggle with 10,378?

Perhaps a knowledge of the facts in this article may cause more reasonable feeling on the part of constituents as to the business which they intrust to their members and enable them to judge more justly of the difficulties in the way of their wishes. All human instrumentalities are imperfect, and while they can be improved they can never meet the wishes of all. Indeed, if they meet the wishes of the majority they will be fortunate.

Nothing has been said of the loss of time which might be utilized by action which owes its origin to the desire to address not the House, but the constituency; for that seems to be inevitable. It is the same in all countries, and has been the same in all ages. Undoubtedly it serves other purposes than display, and is part of the education of a free people. Still there are times when business propositions being numerous and the days few, one wishes that eloquence and speaking bore a closer resemblance to reasoning and deliberation.

It might as well be admitted at once that the faults of legislative bodies are not the faults of legislators alone, but in some degree of the people themselves. So long as we rate oratory too high and wisdom too low and gauge our representatives by the number of times they get into newspapers and not by what we ourselves know of their characters and abilities, so long we shall continue the desire for opportunities for display and fail to create the desire for opportunities to do service.

Speakers of the House of Congress.