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[253]
the city of Savannah from an impending danger, which, had it not thus been averted, would have necessitated its immediate evacuation.’
As Sherman's army on November 29 was about Louisville, Ga., threatening Augusta, it would seem now that if our movements had been delayed a week, when Sherman was near Savannah, Hardee's whole army might have been captured, as the enemy then would not have dared to detach against Foster, and our force could have cut the railroad, thus preventing escape of the Confederates by the only available route.
It would seem with the light of the present that our position was as strong for us to hold as was the enemy's. This granted, the natural criticism is, Would not the battle have been better fought to have held the position with a portion of our troops and pushed out the main body well on one flank or the other, drawing the enemy from his work to fight us and preserve his communications?
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