[374] Gen. Egan, with orders for him to desist from his assault on the bridgeEgan had already done so.
I do not think the enemy comprehended the situation exactly. He pushed rapidly across the ridge, resting his right across the Boydton Plank Road, and, facing south. commenced firing. De Trobriand's Brigade was quickly formed just in front of the Dabney Mill Road, with Kerwin's brigade of dismounted cavalry on its left. Roder's (K) and Beck's batteries were opened on the enemy. Maj. Mitchell, in returning from Gen. Egan, found the enemy in possession of the road. and taking the first Minnesota of Rugg's Brigade, Second Division, opened fire on him. This was, perhaps, the earliest intimation he had of the presence of any considerable force in his rear, and he immediately directed a part of his fire in that direction.
Gen. Egan swept down on the flank of the enemy, . . . . while the line formed along the Dabney Mill Road advanced at the same time. . . . . Some of the new troops faltered, but were speedily re-formed. The general advance of Egan was, however, irresistible. and the enemy was swept from the field with a loss of two colors and several hundred prisoners . . . . The captured guns were retaken, and were soon afterwards drawn off the field. . . . . Almost simultaneously with this attack the enemy commenced pressing our left and rear heavily. . . . The enemy in front had hardly been repulsed, when the fire in rear became so brisk that I was obliged to send Gen. Gregg all of his force I had used to meet the attack in front as well as another of his brigades. The attack on Gregg was made by five brigades of Hampton's cavalry. . . . . Between 6 and 7 P. M. I received a despatch from Gen. Humphreys, stating that Ayres' Division of the Fifth Corps had been ordered to my support, but had halted at Armstrong's Mill, which was as far as it could get. The despatch also authorized me to withdraw that night if I thought proper; but stated that if I could attack successfully in the morning with the aid of Ayres' and Crawford's divisions, the Major-General commanding desired me to do so. Though these reinforcements were offered to me, the question of their getting to me in time, and of getting ammunition up in time to have my own command effective in the morning, was left for me to decide; and I understood that if the principal part of the fighting in the morning would be thrown upon these reinforcements, it was not desired that they should be ordered up. They would at least have been called upon to do the fighting until my own command
