Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America. Vol. 3.
Henry Coppee , LL.D., Ed.

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[733] in the enemy's ranks. In fact, Heth, after having recalled the rest of his troops and requested a few pieces of artillery from Hill in order to cope with those of the enemy's cavalry has received from his chief the imperative order to fall back. The bridge is free, and it is necessary to pass on. Whatever may be the losses which the rear-guard may sustain while retreating, they will be less than they would be if they allowed themselves to be trifled with on the left bank. While entrusting to Lane's brigade the care of covering the dangerous movement which he is performing, Heth orders the remainder of his troops to march to the bridge at Falling Waters. Kilpatrick immediately takes the offensive with his two brigades, and closely presses the Confederates near the road. Buford, who has at last found and followed the track of the enemy, arrives just in time to fall on their right flank, and causes Brockenbrough's brigade to sustain serious losses. The Federal cavalry gather up a large number of stragglers and capture small detachments, but they are not able to break through the Southern infantry, Lane's soldiers not allowing them to approach the bridge. When the remainder of Heth's troops have crossed the river that valiant brigade at length treads upon the narrow floor which trembles beneath their footsteps, and at the very moment in which Kilpatrick arrives to take possession of it the bridge is hauled up on the right bank. It is one o'clock in the afternoon. The last tie which bound the Confederate army to the soil of Maryland, so eagerly coveted, is finally broken.

If the Confederate generals had committed faults before and during the battle of Gettysburg, they had since well redeemed them. During those ten days of retreat the army, under the most difficult circumstances, had been led with precision and judgment. Lee could not foresee the inundation which nearly caused the loss of his trains; Stuart was able to prevent this disaster. Brought to a standstill at the Potomac, the generalin-chief of the Confederates had but fifty thousand men, infantry and artillery, to oppose Meade. In order to conceal his passage it was necessary to keep the enemy from the river, and with his reduced forces he did not fear to occupy a line of nearly eleven miles in length. While intimidating his adversary, he could,