The independence of the Confederate States a fact accomplished.
[From the
London Herald.]
That man must be endowed with an almost American credulity who continues to doubt that the independence of the
Confederate States is an accomplished reality.
If, at the outset,
Mr. Seward himself had been asked how long he demanded for the accomplishment of the enterprise his Government had undertaken, he would certainly have been satisfied with a single year; and would have been content to allow that, if at the end of that period the
Confederates could still keep the field in
Virginia, the
European Powers would be entitled to recognize their independence.
Three years have almost elapsed since the first defeat of the
Federals, and during the whole of that time the
Confederates have fought, not as
Spain fought against
France during the uneasy reign of
Joseph Bonaparte, not as the
Spanish colonies fought against
Spain, not even as our own American colonies fought against the armies of George III., but as
Russia fought
Napoleon in 1815, or as Frederick II.
defended himself against
Austria in the Seven Years War. The war has been waged for the most part on Southern soil; it has, so far, not been a war on equal terms: that the one party has fought for empire and the other only for independence.
But it has in no way partaken of the character of an insurrectionary, as distinguished from an international, war. The Confederate Government has, from first to last, held a position of perfect equality with that of the
Northern States.
It has administered, with undisputed authority, the affairs of its own country; and the
Federal Government has been unable to exercise any other than a military power there, and that only within the territory covered by its own armies.
The State Governments have gone on as regularly as ever; the administration of the civil law is as perfect in the
South as in any
European country; and while in the
Northern States the necessities of an aggressive war have been held to require the exercise of a military authority superior to the law, the civil authorities have never been overridden by martial law in any Southern district not actually invaded or threatened by the enemy.
To deny such a government the status of independence accorded to
Nicaragua, or to
Greece, certainly seems the height of absurdity; and this impression is not weakened when we look to the military operations that have taken place.
It is true that at sea the
Federals have been able to maintain a decided superiority, and that a blockade, efficient enough to impose very serious difficulties in the way of the export of any bulky commodities, has been maintained at every port which has at once so good a harbor and such means of communication with the interior as to be available for commercial purposes; but it is also true that the
Federals have hardly gained a single naval success, and have sustained several naval disasters.
It is true, also, that they have been able to occupy several points on the vast extent of Southern coast which are commanded from the sea, and to obtain the control of a considerable portion of the inland waters of the
South.
They have also penetrated at various points the long and indefensible frontier line, and pushed their armies far into Southern territory.
But they have not been able to conquer a single State; and the chief fruit of three years of warfare, beside the disputed possession of
Tennessee, is a wide-spread devastation and a considerable havoc among the laboring population of the
South.
Hundreds of homes and farms have been destroyed, and thousands of negroes stolen, of whom the majority have been burnt; two or three which lie at the mercy of gunboats have been occupied; and this is all that has been achieved.
The Southern armies have sustained no great disaster in the field; they have inflicted half a score of the most terrible defeats recorded in history.
Their capital, with a sort of bravado, was planted near their most endangered frontier; army after army, to the number of several hundred thousands, has been hurled against it and completely shattered; a quarter of a million of corpses are manuring the plains of
Virginia — and with this result, that
Richmond is now stronger than it ever was, and very much safer than
Washington, and that, instead of asking whether
Grant can take the city, men, both North and South, are expecting to hear that
Lee has taken
Grant's camp, and that a third of the invading army has been left in the hands of the victors.
Sherman has followed up the long and costly march which last year had brought the
Federal army of the West to
Chattanooga; he is not so very far from
Atlanta; but while no one fears for
Atlanta, all the friends of the
North tremble for
Sherman and his army. --
Charleston has been attacked in vain; and after crushing repulses, the
Federal besiegers are driven to amuse themselves by a bombardment which, though it succeed in killing now and then an innocent child, or murdering a bride at the altar, might be continued for a hundred years without bringing the city any nearer to a surrender.
* * * * * * * *
Under these circumstances, it seems perfectly absurd that the policy of European Powers should be influenced by an affectation so palpable as that of uncertainty as to the issue of the war. No sober politician considers that the independence of the
South has yet to be achieved; it is only in diplomatic dispatches that statesmen speak of the
Confederate States as a merely inchoate nationality; but, unhappily, it is by diplomatic language, and not by expressions of personal opinion, that
Europe can influence the feelings or the conduct of
America.
If Lord Russell could speak to the Confederate Government as every one speaks of it, he would secure for
England a warm and faithful ally, whose friendship would do more than an army of fifty thousand men to protect the frontier of
Canada.
If
England and
France would speak through their Governments the opinion of their people — if they would accord to the
Government of
Richmond that recognition which it has received from the public opinion of
Europe — they would do very much to bring the war to a close, and spare the lives of tens of thousands who must otherwise perish before the
North will consent to confess itself beaten.
The ill-will of the
North toward this country is already so bitter that we can hardly exasperate it.
The
United States would go to war with us now if they dared; they will not be the more likely to dare it if we prove our contempt of their menaces by recognizing the
South.
On the other hand, if we wait to recognize the
Confederates till we cannot help it, we shall have no claim on their friendship, and no right to their assistance when the
North does find the courage to quarrel with us. Recognition, then, so far from tending to precipitate war, is the best possible guarantee for permanent peace between ourselves and the
United States; and if either Parliament or the Administration were capable of a courageous and far-sighted policy,
Mr. Lindsay's motion might have a chance of being carried, and of rendering material service to the country and to mankind.
But to submit such a motion to a house which has just approved Lord Russell's betrayal of
Denmark, and in which the authors of our Polish and American policy have an obedient majority of eighteen, is simply to invite defeat, to give an advantage to the
Northern faction in Parliament, and to counteract, by an adverse parliamentary vote, whatever effect may be produced by the manifestation of English feeling out of doors in sympathy with the
South, and in confident expectation of her complete and speedy triumph.
