The objections which they bring from the two kinds
of discourse, one of which is mental, the other expressed
in words or interpretative of the former, are so stale and
pedantical, that they are best answered by laughter or
silence; and we merely quote the old saying, ‘I knew
[p. 372]
this before Theognis was born.’ However, thus much
shall be said, that the end of them both is friendship,—in the first case with ourselves, in the second case with
another. For he that hath attained to virtue by the
methods of philosophy hath his mind all in tune and
good temper; he is not struck with those reproaches of
conscience, which cause the acutest sense of pain and are
the natural punishments of our follies; but he enjoys (the
great prerogative of a good man) to be always easy and
in amity with himself.
No factious lusts reason's just power control,
Nor kindle civil discord in his soul.
His passion does not stand in defiance to his reason, nor
do his reasonings cross and thwart one the other, but
he is always consistent with himself. But the very joys
of wicked men are tumultuary and confused, like those
who dwell in the borders of two great empires at variance, always insecure, and in perpetual alarms; whilst a
good man enjoys an uninterrupted peace and serenity of
mind, which excels the other not only in duration, but in
sense of pleasure too. As for the other sort of discourse,
that which consists in expression of itself to others, Pindar says very well, that it was not mercenary in old time,
nor indeed is it so now; but by the baseness and ambition of a few it is made use of to serve their poor secular
interests. For if the poets represent Venus herself as
much offended with those who make a trade and traffic
of the passion of love, how much more reasonably may
we suppose that Urania and Clio and Calliope have an
indignation against those who set learning and philosophy
to sale? Certainly the gifts and endowments of the Muses
ought to be privileged from such mean considerations.
If indeed some have made fame and reputation one of
the ends of their studies, they used it only as an instrument
to get friends; since we find by common observation that
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men praise only those whom they love. If they sought its
own praise, they were as much mistaken as Ixion when he
embraced a cloud instead of Juno; for there is nothing so
fleeting, so changeable, and so inconstant as popular applause; it is but a pompous shadow, and hath no manner
of solidity and duration in it. But a wise man, if he design to engage in business and matters of state, will so far
aim at fame and popularity as that he may be better enabled to benefit others; for it is a difficult and very unpleasant task to do good to those who are disaffected to our
persons. It is the good opinion men have of us which
disposes men to give credit to our doctrine. As light is a
greater good to those who see others by it than to those
who only are seen, so is honor of a greater benefit to those
who behold it than to those whose glory is beheld. But
even one who withdraws himself from the noise of the
world, who loves privacy and indulges his own thoughts,
will show that respect to the good word of the people which
Hippolytus did to Venus,—though he abstain from her
mysteries, he will pay his devotions at a distance;
1 but he
will not be so cynical and sullen as not to hear with gladness the commendations of virtuous men like himself; he
will neither engage himself in a restless pursuit of wealth,
interest, or honor, nor will he on the other hand be so rustic
and insensible as to refuse them in a moderate degree,
when they fairly come in his way; in like manner he will
not court and follow handsome and beautiful youth, but
will rather choose such as are of a teachable disposition,
of a gentle behavior, and lovers of learning. The charms
and graces of youth will not make a philosopher shy of
their conversation, when the endowments of their minds
are answerable to the features of their bodies. The case
is the same when greatness of place and fortune concur
with a well-disposed mind in the same person; he will not
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therefore forbear loving and respecting such a one, nor be
afraid of the name of a courtier, nor think it a curse that
such attendance and dependence should be his fate.
They that strive most Dame Venus to eschew
Do fault as much as they who her pursue.
2
The application is easy to the matter in hand.
A philosopher therefore, if he is of a retired humor, will
not shun such persons; while one who generously designs
his studies for the public advantage will cheerfully embrace
their advances of friendship, will not force them after a
troublesome manner to hear him, will lay aside his scholastical terms and distinctions, and will rejoice to discourse and
pass his time with them when they are willing and disposed.
