But moreover, the things that are boldly asserted by
him concerning fantasies or imaginations are very opposite
to Fate. For desiring to show that fantasy is not of itself
a perfect cause of consent, he says, that the Sages will
prejudice us by imprinting false imaginations in our minds,
if fantasies do of themselves absolutely cause consent; for
wise men often make use of falsity against the wicked,
representing a probable imagination,—which is yet not
the cause of consent, for then it would be also a cause of
false apprehension and error. Any one therefore, transferring these things from the wise man to Fate, may say,
that consents are not caused by Fate; for if they were,
false consents and opinions and deceptions would also be
by Fate, and men would be endamaged by Fate. Thus the
reason which exempts the wise man from doing hurt also
demonstrates at the same time that Fate is not the cause of
all things. For if men neither opine nor are prejudiced
by Fate, it is manifest also that they neither act rightly nor
are wise nor remain firm in their sentiments nor have utility by Fate, but that there is an end of Fate's being the
cause of all things. Now if any one shall say that Chrysippus makes not Fate the absolute cause of all things, but
only a
procatarctical (or antecedent) one, he will again
show that he is contradictory to himself, since he excessively praises Homer for saying of Jupiter,
[p. 475]
Receive whatever ill or good
He sends to each of you;
1
as also Euripides for these words,
O Jove, how can I say that wretched we,
Poor mortals, aught do understand? On thee
We all depend, and nothing can transact,
But as thy sacred wisdom shall enact.
2
And himself writes many things agreeable to these. In
fine, he says that nothing, be it never so little, either rests
or is moved otherwise than according to the reason of Jupiter, which is the same thing with Fate. Moreover, the
antecedent cause is weaker than the absolute one, and
attains not to its effect when it is subdued by others that
rise up against it. But he himself, declaring Fate to be an
invincible, unimpeachable, and inflexible cause, calls it
Atropos,
3 Adrasteia,
4 Necessity, and Pepromene (as putting a limit to all things). Whether then shall we say, that
neither consents nor virtues nor vices nor doing well nor
doing ill is in our power? Or shall we affirm, that Fate is
deficient, that terminating destiny is unable to determine,
and that the motions and habits of Jupiter cannot accomplish? For the one of these two consequences will follow
from Fate's being an absolute, the other from its being only
antecedent cause. For if it is an absolute cause, it takes
away our free will and leaves nothing in our power; and
if it is only antecedent, it loses its being unimpeachable
and effectual. For not once or ten times, but everywhere,
especially in his Physics, he has written, that there are
many obstacles and impediments to particular natures and
motions, but none to that of the universe. And how can
the motion of the universe, extending as it does to particular ones, be undisturbed and unimpeached, if these are
stopped and hindered? For neither can the nature of man
[p. 476]
be free from impediment, if that of the foot or hand is not
so; nor can the motion of a ship but be hindered, if there
are any obstacles about the sails or the operation of the
oars.
Besides all this, if the fantasies are not according to Fate,
neither are they causes of consents; but if, because it imprints fantasies leading to consent, the consents are said to
be according to Fate, how is it not contrary to itself, imprinting in the greatest matters different imaginations and
such as draw the understanding contrary ways? For (they
say) those who adhere to one of them, and withhold not
their consent, do amiss: if they yield to obscure things,
they stumble; if to false, they are deceived; if to such as
are not commonly comprehended, they opine. And yet one
of these three is of necessity,—either that every fantasy
is not the work of Fate, or that every receipt and consent
of fantasy is faultless, or that Fate itself is not irreprehensible. For I do not know how it can be blameless, pro
posing to us such fantasies that not the resisting or going
against them, but the following and yielding to them, is
blamable. Moreover, both Chrysippus and Antipater, in
their disputes against the Academics, take not a little pains
to prove that we neither act nor are incited without consent, saying, that they build on fictions and false suppositions who think that, a proper fantasy being presented, we
are presently incited, without having either yielded or consented. Again, Chrysippus says, that God imprints in us
false imaginations, as does also the wise man; not that
they would have us consent or yield to them, but only that
we should act and be incited with regard to that which appears; but we, being evil, do through infirmity consent to
such fantasies. Now the perplexity and discrepancy of
these discourses among themselves are not very difficult to
be discerned. For he that would not have men consent
but only act according to the fantasies which he presents
[p. 477]
unto them—whether he be God or a wise man knows
that the fantasies are sufficient for acting, and that consents
are superfluous. For if, knowing that the imagination
gives us not an instinct to work without consent, he ministers to us false and probable fantasies, he is the voluntary
cause of our falling and erring by assenting to incomprehensible things.
