[4]
This thing also, O Caius Caesar, at times disturbs me; which, however, I
cease to fear when I come to a complete recollection of your disposition.
For in principle it is an unjust thing, but by your wisdom it becomes a most
just one. For it is a serious business (if you consider the matter by
itself) to speak concerning a crime before that man against whose life you
are accused of having meditated that crime; for there is hardly anybody who,
when he is a judge in any matter in which his own safety is at stake, does
not act with more partiality towards himself than towards the accused
person; but, O Caius Caesar, your admirable and extraordinary natural virtue
to a great extent releases me from this fear. For I am not so much afraid
what you may wish to decide with respect to king Deiotarus, as I am sure
what you wish to decide in all other cases.
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