Your search returned 401 results in 206 document sections:

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 ...
Robert Underwood Johnson, Clarence Clough Buell, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. Volume 4., From Gettysburg to the coming of Grant. (search)
generally understood that Warren's movement as a flank operation was to have been upon a much wider scale than it subsequently proved to be. It was thought that he was to make a circuit of perhaps several days' march, cutting Lee off from all communication, and coming in not so much upon his immediate flank as upon his line of communication and his rear, while Meade with the rest of the army moved upon his actual front. Warren's command marched in the night-time. During the next day, November 29th, Sedgwick, holding our right, discovered that the enemy's left flank was unprotected by earth-works, slashings, or abatis, and reported to General Meade that a movement during the night of a strong body of troops, passing them before morning upon the enemy's left, might by a Map of the field of operations of November, 1863. sudden attack at daylight reach his flank and rear and double him up on Warren, who was expected to come in on his extreme right. After some delay and further exa
Robert Underwood Johnson, Clarence Clough Buell, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. Volume 4., chapter 15.100 (search)
act with the enemy until dark. By authority of General Taylor I then withdrew them to Macon and moved by rail to Albany, thence across the country to Thomasville, and from the latter point by rail to Savannah. About one thousand of the command arrived at the latter place at 2 A. M. on the 30th of November. Immediately upon the arrival of the leading train in Savannah, before I had left my seat in the car, an officer of Hardee's staff handed me two orders. The first, dated 10 P. M., November 29th, read: Lieutenant-General Hardee directs that you will proceed at once with the first two trains of your troops which may arrive at Savannah to-night, and in the same cars, to Grahamville and Coosawhatchie, on the Charleston and Savannah Railroad, which places are being threatened by raiding parties of the enemy, and if you find yourself the ranking officer present, that you assume command and drive the enemy back to their gun-boats. The second order was dated one hour later:
bring on battle at Spring Hill, he was unable to get the corps of his Army to attack and co-operate, as desired. He was thus checkmated for two days, and finally lost the battle. Had our immortal Chieftain foreseen the result of this inactivity, he would, doubtless, have ordered and acted differently. Before proceeding further, I will produce additional evidence from Federal sources, in order to make still more manifest the opportunity which was lost to the Confederate arms on the 29th of November, at Spring Hill. Shortly after the war, I met in New Orleans Colonel Fullerton, of the United States Army; he was Schofield's adjutant general at the time of these events, in connection with which he wrote me the following: New Orleans, La., October 20th, 1865. to General Hood. General:--The only body of United States troops on the battlefield of Spring Hill, Tennessee, on the 29th of November, 1864, was the Second Division of the Fourth Army Corps. I think the division was
surface of the stream, already bristling with abatis, infantry parapets, and epaulements for batteries. After careful reconnoissance, an attack directly in front was negatived: so Warren, with the 2d and a division of the 6th corps, was impelled farther to our left (south), with instructions to feel for the enemy's flank and turn it if possible, while each corps commander should more closely examine the ground in his front, and report on the practicability of an assault. The next day Nov. 29. was spent in this reconnoissance — the Rebel defenses being of course strengthened every hour--Gen. Wright, commanding a division of the 6th corps, reporting, at 6 P. M., that he had discovered a point on our extreme right where an assault might be made with a good prospect of cheap and decisive success. Warren soon reported from our left that he had outflanked the enemy's line of defenses, and could easily assault and turn them. Meade thereupon decided to attack at all points next morni
elief of Knoxville. Meantime, Gross's brigade visited the battle-field of Chickamauga and buried the moldering remains of many of our slain, who had been left by Bragg to lie as they fell. Osterhaus took post in the valley of the Chattanooga, while Geary and Cruft returned to their camps in Lookout valley. Granger's corps turned back from the battle-field to Chattanooga, Nov. 25-6. and was impelled directly thence to the relief of Knoxville — Sherman's corps likewise turning back Nov. 29. from Greysville, he assuming command also over Granger, and moving rapidly by Charleston, Athens, and London, to Knoxville; Dec. 6. making the last 84 miles over East Tennessee roads in three December days; thus compelling Longstreet to raise the siege and decamp; then turning at once and marching back to Chattanooga. Grant states our losses in this series of struggles (not including Burnside's at Knoxville) at 757 killed, 4,529 wounded, and 330 missing: total, 5,616; The returns
Colonel Theodore Lyman, With Grant and Meade from the Wilderness to Appomattox (ed. George R. Agassiz), I. First months (search)
in the narrow wood-roads, deep with mud; and occupied fully the whole day. If you consider that the men must often move by fours, then a division of 4000 men, closed up, would occupy in marching some 1000 yards, and, by adding the space for pack horses, and the usual gaps and intervals, it would be nearer a mile; so you see how an army would string out, even with no artillery. You must remember also that these long columns cannot move over two miles in an hour; often not so much . . . . November 29 I rode to and along our front to see the enemy's position, which is a fearfully strong one. Within about a mile of our position, there runs a high, gradually sloping ridge, which trends in a northerly and southerly direction, and crosses the turnpike at right angles, where it is naked, though to the right and left it is wooded in some parts. Between this and a parallel high ground, occupied by us, is a shallow ravine, in which was a small stream, Mine Run. Along their ridge the Rebe
Doc. 203. the siege of Lexington, Mo. Speech of Col. Mulligan. at the reception given to Colonel Mulligan in Detroit, Mich., on the 29th of Nov., the Colonel delivered the following speech: ladies and gentlemen: It is with no ordinary pleasure that I appear before you this night. It is with a peculiar pride that I stand in Detroit, so sacred to the memories of the past — in the home of that statesman (Cass) whose life has been devoted to his country — that monument of a man living and embodying the history of the nation. God grant that he may live to see our country again united! (Applause.) It is with pleasure that I stand here in the home of that man whose blood has baptized our great cause, for which he lies this night confined in a hostile dungeon. When I utter these words of bravery and patriotism, you know I embody the name of Wilcox, of Michigan. (Prolonged cheers.) And I trust that the time is not far distant, when he shall again stand by the side of Corcoran,
William Tecumseh Sherman, Memoirs of General William T. Sherman ., volume 1, Chapter 8: from the battle of Bull Run to Paducah--Kentucky and Missouri. 1861-1862. (search)
e whole of his men into one camp on the La Mine River, near Georgetown, to put them into brigades and divisions, so as to be ready to be handled, and I gave some preliminary orders looking to that end. But the newspapers kept harping on my insanity and paralyzed my efforts. In spite of myself, they tortured from me some words and acts of imprudence. General Halleck telegraphed me on November 26th: Unless telegraph-lines are interrupted, make no movement of troops without orders; and on November 29th: No forward movement of troops on Osceola will be made; only strong reconnoitring-parties will be sent out in the supposed direction of the enemy; the bulk of the troops being held in position till more reliable information is obtained. About the same time I received the following dispatch: headquarters, St. Louis, Missouri, November 28, 1861. Brigadier-General Sherman, Sedalia: Mrs. Sherman is here. General Halleck is satisfied, from reports of scouts received here, that no
William Tecumseh Sherman, Memoirs of General William T. Sherman ., volume 1, chapter 15 (search)
ecially of forage, he consented that, instead of going back, I might keep out in the country; for in motion I could pick up some forage and food, especially on the Hiawassee River, whereas none remained in Chattanooga. Accordingly, on the 29th of November, my several columns marched to Cleveland, and the next day we reached the Hiawassee at Charleston, where the Chattanooga & Knoxville Railroad crosses it. The railroad-bridge was partially damaged by the enemy in retreating, but we found soment, coming to Graysville, con sented that, instead of returning direct to Chattanooga, I might send back all my artillery-wagons and impediments, and make a circuit by the north as far as the Hiawassee River. Accordingly, on the morning of November 29th, General Howard moved from Parker's Gap to Cleveland, General Davis by way of McDaniel's Gap, and General Blair with two divisions of the Fifteenth Corps by way of Julien's Gap, all meeting at Cleveland that night. Here another good break wa
William Tecumseh Sherman, Memoirs of General William T. Sherman ., volume 2, chapter 22 (search)
ction of Waynesboroa, turning Schofield's position at Pulaski. The latter at once sent his trains to the rear, and on the 21st fell back to Columbia, Tennessee. General Hood followed up this movement, skirmished lightly with Schofield at Columbia, began the passage of Duck River, below the town, and Cheatham's corps reached the vicinity of Spring Hill, whither General Schofield had sent General Stanley, with two of his divisions, to cover the movement of his trains. During the night of November 29th General Schofield passed Spring Hill with his trains and army, and took post at Franklin, on the south side of Harpeth River. General Hood now attaches serious blame to General Cheatham for not attacking General Schofield in flank while in motion at Spring Hill, for he was bivouacked within eight hundred yards of the road at the time of the passage of our army. General Schofield reached Franklin on the morning of November 30th, and posted his army in front of the town, where some rifle-
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 ...