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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.). Search the whole document.

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Russian River (Alaska, United States) (search for this): chapter 1
ighborhood of the theatre of war, which supposes a coalition of several great powers against one. 4. You intervene in a struggle already begun, or before the declaration of war. When you intervene only with a moderate contingent, in consequence of stipulated treaties, you are but an accessory, and the operations are directed by the principal power. When you intervene by coalition and with an imposing army, the case is different. The military chances of those wars are various. The Russian army, in the Seven Years War, was, in reality, an auxiliary of Austria and France; it was, however, a principal party in the north, until the occupation of Old Prussia by its troops; but when Generals Fermor and Soltikoff conducted the army into Brandenburg, then it no longer acted but in the Austrian interest; those troops, thrown far from their base, were at the mercy of a good or bad manoeuvre of their allies. Such remote excursions expose to dangers, and are ordinarily very delicate
Konigsberg in Bayern (Bavaria, Germany) (search for this): chapter 1
ntervention under an elevated political point of view. With regard to the military point of view, it is plain that an army, appearing as a third party in a struggle already established, becomes preponderant. Its influence will be all the more decisive, in proportion as its geographical situation shall have importance relatively to the positions of the two armies already at war. Let us cite an example. In the winter of 1807, Napoleon crossed the Vistula, and ventured under the walls of Konigsberg, having Austria in his rear, and the whole mass of the Russian empire before him. If Austria had caused a hundred thousand men to debouch from Bohemia upon the Oder, it would have been finished, in all probability, with the omnipotence of Napoleon; his army would have been too fortunate in opening itself a way to regain the Rhine, and everything leads to the belief that it would not have succeeded. Austria preferred waiting to have its army increased to four hundred thousand men; it took
Vienna (Wien, Austria) (search for this): chapter 1
ubject Spain, aroused against them as one man, would not manoeuvre like two hundred thousand French wishing to march upon Vienna, or any other capital, there to dictate peace (1809); and they would not do the guerillas of Mina the honor to combat the examples, could it be said that the two hundred thousand French of whom we have just spoken, ought equally to march upon Vienna, whatever should be the moral condition of the governments, and of the population between the Rhine and the Inn, and betwble result, which indicates the highest degree of advantages to which the chiefs of a State can aspire. The cabinet of Vienna succeeded all the more surely, as its intervention was not merely of the nature of those mentioned in article 3, that is urn if Prussia had intervened in them; that of the north of Germany in 1807, depended equally as much upon the cabinet of Vienna. Finally, that of Romelia in 1829, assured by measures of a wise and moderate policy, could have had fatal results if ca
Fontenoy (France) (search for this): chapter 1
wish that wars of extermination might be banished from the code of nations, and that the national defences, through a regulated militia, could suffice henceforth, with good political alliances, for assuring the independence of States. As a military man, preferring loyal and chivalric war to organized assassination, I own, that if it were necessary to choose, I should ever prefer the good time when the French and English guards politely invited each other to fire first, as was the case at Fontenoy, to the frightful epoch when the curates, the women and the children organized over the whole soil of Spain, the murder of isolated soldiers. If, in the eyes of General R * * *, this opinion is yet a blasphemy, I shall console myself without difficulty, at the same time acknowledging that there is a mean tern between these two extremes, which answers all wants, and which is precisely the system which has cost me so many unjust criticisms. Article IX: civil and religious wars. I
Turin (Italy) (search for this): chapter 1
mself openly against Charles Fifth, master of Spain, of Italy, and of the Germanic empire; against Charles, victorious over Francis First, and pressing France in his firm grasp. This movement, which transported the war to the heart of the Tyrol, arrested the great man who menaced to swallow up everything. In 1706, the Duke of Savoy, Victor Amedius, declaring against Louis XIV, changes the face of affairs in Italy, and brings back the French army upon the banks of the Adige, to the walls of Turin, where it experienced the bloody catastrophe which immortalized the Prince Eugene. How insignificant statesmen will appear to those who have meditated upon these two events, and upon the great questions to which they apply! We have said enough upon the advantages of these opportune interventions; the number of examples could be multiplied. to infinity, but that could add nothing to the conviction of our readers. Article VI: wars of invasion through a spirit of conquest or other ca
Poland (Poland) (search for this): chapter 1
ons. Publicists have never been agreed as to the right of internal intervention; we shall not dispute with them upon the point of right, but we will say that the fact has often happened. The Romans owed a part of their grandeur to those interventions, and the empire of the English Company in India is no otherwise explained. Interior interventions do not always succeed; Russia owes in part the development of her greatness to that which her sovereigns knew how to bring into the affairs of Poland; Austria, on the contrary, came near being ruined for having attempted to interfere in the affairs of the French revolution. These kinds of combinations are not in our province. Intervention in the external relations of one's neighbors, is more legitimate, more natural and more advantageous perhaps. In fact, doubtful as it is, that a State has the right to meddle with what passes within the interior jurisdiction of its neighbors, equally certain is it that it will be accorded the right
Pyrenees (search for this): chapter 1
om amusing himself with taking places, his army acted conformably to the maxims above mentioned; after having pushed briskly to the Ebro, it was divided here to cut off at their sources, all the elements of the hostile strength, because it well knew that, seconded by a majority of the inhabitants of the country, it could be divided without danger. If it had followed the instructions of the ministry, who prescribed to it to subdue methodically all the country and places situated between the Pyrenees and the Ebro, in order to base itself militarily, it would, perhaps, have failed in its object, or at least, rendered the struggle long and bloody, by rousing the national pride with the idea of an occupation like that of 1807. But, emboldened by the good reception of all the population, it comprehended that it was an operation more political than military, and that it was a question of leading on rapidly to the end. Its conduct, very different from that of the allies in 1793, merits the r
Colchis (search for this): chapter 1
ficulties which will be interposed to its supplies by the maritime route. The nature of the country contributes also a great deal to the facility of a national defense; mountainous countries are always those in which a people is most formidable. After those come countries cut up by vast forests. The struggle of the Swiss against Austria and against the Duke of Burgundy; those of the Catalans in 1712 and in 1809; the difficulties which the Russians experience in subduing the people of Caucasus; finally, the reiterated efforts of the Tyroleans, demonstrated sufficiently that mountain people have always resisted longer than those of the plains, as much through their character and manners, as from the nature of those countries. Defiles and great forests favor, as well as cliffs, this kind of partial defense; and the Bocage of La Vendee, become so justly celebrated, proves that every difficult country, even though it be but intersected with hedges, ditches and canals, produces a lik
Portugal (Portugal) (search for this): chapter 1
ve the same importance. The obstacles which a regular army encounters, in wars of opinion as well as in national wars, are immense and render very difficult the mission of the General charged with conducting it. The events which we have just cited, as also the struggle of the Low Countries against Philip II, and that of the Americans against the English, furnish evident proofs of this: but the much more extraordinary struggle of La Vendee against the victorious Republic; those of Spain, Portugal and the Tyrol against Napoleon; finally those, so desperate of the Morea against the Turks, and of Navarre against the forces of Queen Christine, are examples more striking still. It is especially when the hostile populations are supported by a considerable nucleus of disciplined troops, that such a war offers immense difficulties. Without the assistance of regular disciplined armies, popular risings would always be easily put down; they could procrastinate, like the remnants of La Ve
Mexico (Mexico, Mexico) (search for this): chapter 1
s, defiled by the slopes of the heights which enclosed the valley of the Navia, at a league at most from our columns, without the Marshal knowing a word of it; at the moment when the latter reached Gijon, the army of Romana fell in the midst of the isolated division of Marchand, which, dispersed to guard all Galicia, came near being taken separately, and only escaped by the prompt return of the Marshal to Lugo. The war with Spain offered a thousand scenes as lively as this. All the gold of Mexico would not have sufficed for procuring the French any information, and all that was given them was but a lure to make them fall the more easily into snares. No army, however inured to war it may be, could struggle with success against such a system applied to a great people, unless it were by forces so formidable that it could occupy strongly all the important points of the country, cover its own communications, and still furnish active corps sufficiently large for beating the enemy wherev
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