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Jackson (Mississippi, United States) (search for this): chapter 53
ng aside all other considerations, subordinating all other operations to this one vital campaign, at a concerted moment we must withdraw from other points a portion of their forces — all, indeed, not absolutely essential for keeping up a show of defence or safety against a coup-de-main--and concentrate in this way every available soldier possible, for operations against General Grant. Such strategic points as Richmond, Weldon, Wilmington, Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, and Meridian, or Jackson, Miss., at the same time, should be fortified, garrisoned, and provisioned, according to their present relative value to the Confederate States, sufficiently to prolong their defence, if attacked or besieged, until troops for their relief could be detached as required from the army in North-western Georgia. I will now state, approximately, what troops may, in my belief, be drawn from the following quarters, and added to the army at or about Dalton, namely: From Alabama and Mississippi10,000
Austria (Austria) (search for this): chapter 53
ust, and the sudden accumulation of troops of all arms, so that he may be able to mould it into a homogeneous mass as early as practicable, and to inaugurate offensive operations without loss of one moment of time that may be obviated; and further, he must be invested with an unrestricted, unembarrassed selection of staff officers, and thoroughly emancipated from the least subordination to the views and control of the heads of bureaus at Richmond — a reproduction, in this war, of that fatal Austrian system with which no eminently successful commander ever had to contend — a pernicious plan of administration which will clog and hamper the highest military genius, whether of a Napoleon or Caesar. I believe the success of the plan of campaign thus sketched, and the utter defeat of the enemy, would be almost certain. The question would next be, whether to pursue the routed enemy with vigor to the banks of the Ohio and Mississippi, or to return to the several sources, whence the army
F. E. Grant (search for this): chapter 53
thdraw from other points a portion of their forces — all, indeed, not absolutely essential for keeping up a show of defence or safety against a coup-de-main--and concentrate in this way every available soldier possible, for operations against General Grant. Such strategic points as Richmond, Weldon, Wilmington, Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, and Meridian, or Jackson, Miss., at the same time, should be fortified, garrisoned, and provisioned, according to their present relative value to the Conth celerity to the force now under Hardee, and including that under Longstreet, and other detachments, would make an army of one hundred thousand men. Let this army take the offensive at once, and, properly handled, it should crush any force that Grant could assemble in time and oppose, scattered, as he evidently is, and unprepared, as he would be, for such an event. To insure the success of a plan of operations, the press must be led to preserve complete silence touching all military movement
James Longstreet (search for this): chapter 53
arranted in assuming that we have under arms two hundred and ten thousand effective men, distributed nearly as follows: In the Trans-Mississippi Department, say40,000 Department of Alabama and Mississippi, say15,000 Under Hardee (including Longstreet), say60,000 Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, say28,000 Department of North Carolina, say7,000 Department of Virginia, say60,000   Total210,000 Looking at a map of the Confederate States, it will be seen that the mosbama and Mississippi10,000 From South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida8,000 From North Carolina2,000 From Virginia20,000   Total40,000 These forty thousand men, added with celerity to the force now under Hardee, and including that under Longstreet, and other detachments, would make an army of one hundred thousand men. Let this army take the offensive at once, and, properly handled, it should crush any force that Grant could assemble in time and oppose, scattered, as he evidently is, and
Doc (search for this): chapter 53
Doc. 53.-Beauregade's letter to Pierre Soule. headquarters Drpartment of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, Charleston, S. C., December 8, 1863. Hon. Pierre Soule, Richmond, Va.: My dear Sir: In compliance with your request made on the eve of your departure for Richmond, I have prepared for you a sketch of certain operations by which we may yet retrieve our late losses, and possibly baffle the immense resources of men and available material of our enemy: 1. The system hitherto followed of keeping in the field separate armies, acting without concert on distant and diverging lines of operations, and thus enabling our adversary to concentrate at convenience his masses against our fractions, must be discontinued as radically contrary to the principles of the art of war, and attended with inevitable results such as our disasters in Mississippi, Tennessee, and Northern Georgia. 2. We must arrange for a sudden and rapid concentration, upon some selected, decisive strategi
Pierre Soule (search for this): chapter 53
Doc. 53.-Beauregade's letter to Pierre Soule. headquarters Drpartment of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, Charleston, S. C., December 8, 1863. Hon. Pierre Soule, Richmond, Va.: My dear Sir: In compliance with your request made on the eve of your departure for Richmond, I have prepared for you a sketch of certain operations by which we may yet retrieve our late losses, and possibly baffle the immense resources of men and available material of our enemy: 1. The system hitherto fHon. Pierre Soule, Richmond, Va.: My dear Sir: In compliance with your request made on the eve of your departure for Richmond, I have prepared for you a sketch of certain operations by which we may yet retrieve our late losses, and possibly baffle the immense resources of men and available material of our enemy: 1. The system hitherto followed of keeping in the field separate armies, acting without concert on distant and diverging lines of operations, and thus enabling our adversary to concentrate at convenience his masses against our fractions, must be discontinued as radically contrary to the principles of the art of war, and attended with inevitable results such as our disasters in Mississippi, Tennessee, and Northern Georgia. 2. We must arrange for a sudden and rapid concentration, upon some selected, decisive strategi
W. J. Hardee (search for this): chapter 53
But I believe I am warranted in assuming that we have under arms two hundred and ten thousand effective men, distributed nearly as follows: In the Trans-Mississippi Department, say40,000 Department of Alabama and Mississippi, say15,000 Under Hardee (including Longstreet), say60,000 Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, say28,000 Department of North Carolina, say7,000 Department of Virginia, say60,000   Total210,000 Looking at a map of the Confederate States, it will r about Dalton, namely: From Alabama and Mississippi10,000 From South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida8,000 From North Carolina2,000 From Virginia20,000   Total40,000 These forty thousand men, added with celerity to the force now under Hardee, and including that under Longstreet, and other detachments, would make an army of one hundred thousand men. Let this army take the offensive at once, and, properly handled, it should crush any force that Grant could assemble in time and oppose,
G. T. Beauregaud (search for this): chapter 53
n your enemy can there oppose to you. These conditions, I sincerely believe, may be filled by very much such a plan as the one which I have hurriedly placed before you. Of course my views must be subject to such modification as my want of precise information relative to the number and location of our troops may render necessary. The hour is critical and grave-- The enemy increaseth every day, We, at the height, are ready to decline. I am filled with intense anxiety lest golden opportunities shall be lost — lost forever. In no theatre of human actions is it so true as in war-- There is a tide in the affairs of men, Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune Omitted, all the voyage of their life Is bound in shallows and in miseries. * * * * * * And we must take the current where it serves, Or lose our ventures. It is concentration and immediate mobility that are indispensable to save us. Yours, sincerely, G. T. Beauregaud. Official: A. Terry, A. A. General.
Caesar (search for this): chapter 53
moment of time that may be obviated; and further, he must be invested with an unrestricted, unembarrassed selection of staff officers, and thoroughly emancipated from the least subordination to the views and control of the heads of bureaus at Richmond — a reproduction, in this war, of that fatal Austrian system with which no eminently successful commander ever had to contend — a pernicious plan of administration which will clog and hamper the highest military genius, whether of a Napoleon or Caesar. I believe the success of the plan of campaign thus sketched, and the utter defeat of the enemy, would be almost certain. The question would next be, whether to pursue the routed enemy with vigor to the banks of the Ohio and Mississippi, or to return to the several sources, whence the army was gathered, their respective detachments or quotas for the campaign. This should be left, however, to be determined by the nature of the enemy's operations at the time. I must finally remark th
Napoleon (search for this): chapter 53
ark that, were it possible to concentrate, with sufficient expedition, at or about Knoxville, such an army as I have indicated, that would be the better point whence to take the offensive into Middle Tennessee than Dalton — that is, according the principles of the art, would promise more decisive results; for it is evident we should thus threaten the enemy's communications without exposing our own. (Principle II., Art of War), Le secret de la guerre est dans le secret dess communications. --Napoleon. By a movement from Knoxville, we should be doing what is taught in connection with the Third Maxim (Art of War), to wit: That part of the base of operations is the most advantageous to break out from into the theatre of war which conducts the most directly on the enemy's flank or rear. There may be, how ever, such practical difficulties in the way of the execution of such a movement on that line as may not make it advisable to adopt it. The whole science of war, it has been well said, ma
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