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h to hear from General Smith, but hearing nothing whatever, and having utterly destroyed the railroads in andaround that junction, I ordered General McPherson to move back slowly toward Canton. With Winslow's cavalry and Hurlbut's infantry I turned north to Marion, and thence to a place called Union, whence I dispatched the cavalry farther north to Philadelphia and Louisville, to feel as it were for General Smith, and then turned all the infantry columns toward Canton, Mississippi. On the 26th we all reached Canton, but we had not heard a word of General Smith, nor was it until sometime after (at Vicksburg) that I learned the whole truth of General Smith's movement and of his failure. Of course I did not, and could not, approve of his conduct, and I know that he yet chafes under the censure. I had set so much store on his part of the project that I was disappointed, and so reported officially to General Grant. General Smith never regained my confidence as a soldier, though I stil
January 15th, 1864 AD (search for this): chapter 7
ksburg, on his return, February 26th: Much more had been expected at the North from the preparations made for the movement, and the statements circulated as to its object. It was the general belief that the expedition was to penetrate as far east as Selma, one of the interior points of greatest value to the enemy, and also turn upon Mobile. This impression was current at General Grant's headquarters and at Washington, and General Grant himself had written to Halleck, under date of January 15th, 1864, in the same letter which unfolded his plan for the general Spring campaign as follows: I shall direct Sherman, therefore, to move out to Meridian with his spare force—the cavalry going from Corinth, and destroy the railroads east and south of there so effectually that the enemy will not attempt to rebuild them during the rebellion. He will then return, unless the opportunity of going into Mobile with the force he has, appears perfectly plain. And writing on the same subject
o the 11th of February, when his orders contemplated his being at Meridian on the 10th, and when he knew I was marching from Vicksburg is unpardonable, and the mode and manner of his return to Memphis was not what I expected from an intended bold cavalry movement. * * * * I returned (to Canton) from Vicksburg, on the 6th inst., found all my army in, and learned that General Smith had not started from Memphis at all till the 11th of February, had only reached West Point, and turned back on the 22d, the march back to Memphis being too rapid for a good effect. Nevertheless, on the whole, we accomplished all I undertook. General Smith, at the time of this expedition, was Grant's chief of cavalry, and when he was temporarily placed under the orders of Sherman for the Meridian campaign, he was engaged, in conjunction with other troops, in watching and operating against Forrest's command. He made full report to General Grant of his operations under Sherman, and was commended for wh
. This was dated eight days after the time mentioned for a union of the forces there, and declares that all the objects of the expedition had been fully attained: [special field orders no. 20.] headquarters Department of the Tennessee, Meridian, Miss., February 18th, 1864. 1. Having fulfilled, and well, all the objects of the expedition, the troops will return to the Mississippi River to embark in another equally important movement. 2. * * * * The march will begin on the 20th instant, and the corps commanders will not pass Union and Decatur until they have communicated with each other by couriers across at these points. * * * * 4. The march should be conducted slow; about fifteen miles per day, and in good order. * * * * There is no seeming danger, but every precaution should be taken against cavalry dashes at our trains. * * * * By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman, L. M. Dayton, Aid-de-Camp. From General Smith's report, it appears that Warring's bri
January 19th (search for this): chapter 7
ded his plan for the general Spring campaign as follows: I shall direct Sherman, therefore, to move out to Meridian with his spare force—the cavalry going from Corinth, and destroy the railroads east and south of there so effectually that the enemy will not attempt to rebuild them during the rebellion. He will then return, unless the opportunity of going into Mobile with the force he has, appears perfectly plain. And writing on the same subject to Thomas at Chattanooga, on the 19th of January, he said: He (Sherman) will proceed eastward as far as Meridian at least, and will thoroughly destroy the roads east and south from there, and, if possible, will throw troops as far east as Selma; or, if he finds Mobile so far unguarded as to make his force sufficient for the enterprise, will go there. To cooperate with this movement you want to keep up appearances of preparation of an advance from Chattanooga. It may be necessary even to move a column as far as Lafayette.
February 26th (search for this): chapter 7
he line of the Mississippi to penetrate the interior, and so break up railroads, and paralyze the rebel forces in that section, as to release a large body of troops for the coming campaign from Chattanooga. Marching from Vicksburg February 3d, 1864, his columns reached Meridian on the 14th, remained there till the 20th, causing much destruction of roads, rolling-stock, stores, and manufacturing establishments of value to the enemy, and arrived at Canton, near Vicksburg, on his return, February 26th: Much more had been expected at the North from the preparations made for the movement, and the statements circulated as to its object. It was the general belief that the expedition was to penetrate as far east as Selma, one of the interior points of greatest value to the enemy, and also turn upon Mobile. This impression was current at General Grant's headquarters and at Washington, and General Grant himself had written to Halleck, under date of January 15th, 1864, in the same letter
The Meridian campaign unjust Arraignment of General W. Sooy Smith. General Sherman relates that in the Winter following the battle of Chattanooga, he conceived the idea of a movement eastward from the line of the Mississippi to penetrate the interior, and so break up railroads, and paralyze the rebel forces in that section, as to release a large body of troops for the coming campaign from Chattanooga. Marching from Vicksburg February 3d, 1864, his columns reached Meridian on the 14th, remained there till the 20th, causing much destruction of roads, rolling-stock, stores, and manufacturing establishments of value to the enemy, and arrived at Canton, near Vicksburg, on his return, February 26th: Much more had been expected at the North from the preparations made for the movement, and the statements circulated as to its object. It was the general belief that the expedition was to penetrate as far east as Selma, one of the interior points of greatest value to the enemy, a
February 18th, 1864 AD (search for this): chapter 7
lry from Memphis. And this is shown to have been General Sherman's view, when he himself reached Meridian four days after the date he had fixed for his own and General Smith's arrival at that point, by the order he then issued. This was dated eight days after the time mentioned for a union of the forces there, and declares that all the objects of the expedition had been fully attained: [special field orders no. 20.] headquarters Department of the Tennessee, Meridian, Miss., February 18th, 1864. 1. Having fulfilled, and well, all the objects of the expedition, the troops will return to the Mississippi River to embark in another equally important movement. 2. * * * * The march will begin on the 20th instant, and the corps commanders will not pass Union and Decatur until they have communicated with each other by couriers across at these points. * * * * 4. The march should be conducted slow; about fifteen miles per day, and in good order. * * * * There is no seeming
January 27th (search for this): chapter 7
ons in Memphis, being satisfied that the cavalry force would be ready to start by the 1st of February, and having seen General Hurlbut with his two divisions embark in steamers for Vicksburg, I also reembarked for the same destination on the 27th of January. * * * * The object of the Meridian expedition was to strike the roads inland, so to paralyze the rebel forces, that we could take from the defense of the Mississippi River the equivalent of a corps of twenty thousand men, to be used in the and the river above, as well as our routes of supply in Middle Tennessee. In this we failed utterly, because General W. Sooy Smith did not fulfill his orders, which were clear and specific, as contained in my letter of instructions to him of January 27th, at Memphis, and my personal explanations to him at the same time. Instead of starting at the date ordered, February 1st, he did not leave Memphis till the 11th, waiting for some regiment that was ice bound near Columbus, Kentucky; and then,
sand. General Sherman in his report of the Meridian expedition, made a few days after his return to Vicksburg, maintained that he had accomplished all he undertook, notwithstanding the delay in General Smith's movements. This portion of his report is as follows: I inclose herewith my instructions to General Smith, with a copy of his report, and must say it is unsatisfactory. The delay in his starting to the 11th of February, when his orders contemplated his being at Meridian on the 10th, and when he knew I was marching from Vicksburg is unpardonable, and the mode and manner of his return to Memphis was not what I expected from an intended bold cavalry movement. * * * * I returned (to Canton) from Vicksburg, on the 6th inst., found all my army in, and learned that General Smith had not started from Memphis at all till the 11th of February, had only reached West Point, and turned back on the 22d, the march back to Memphis being too rapid for a good effect. Nevertheless, on
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