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October 14th (search for this): chapter 6
ctions. I can only repeat what I have so often urged, the importance of your communicating with General Rosecrans' army on the north side of the river, so far as to command the crossing. October 5th.—I can only repeat former instructions, to leave sufficient force in the upper end of the valley to hold Jones in check, and with the remainder to march down on the north side of the Tennessee River, guarding the fords, and connecting with General Rosecrans. I can not make them plainer. October 14th.—I have received no dispatch from you since the 7th until this morning, and have no information of the condition of affairs and the position of your troops. When you were urged to move down the river to General Rosecrans' assistance, that operation was deemed safe and of great importance. The condition of affairs may now be different. You certainly should hold Kingston, and as far below as may seem prudent. Hood will probably send a part of his army to the south-west. Whether to
November 7th, 1863 AD (search for this): chapter 6
stion of supplies may now be regarded as settled. If the rebels give us one week more time I think all danger of losing territory now held by us will have passed away, and preparations may commence for offensive operations. U. S. Grant, Major-General. That General Grant had no doubt of the capacity of General Thomas' troops to fight, is proved by the following telegram dated a week before Sherman arrived in person, and a fortnight before his troops came up: Chattanooga, November 7, 1863, 1:30 P. M. To General Halleck, Washington. * * * * I have ordered Thomas to attack the enemy at the north end of Missionary Ridge, and when that is carried, to threaten or attack the enemy's line of communication between Cleveland and Dalton. This move will be made on Monday morning. I expect Sherman will reach Huntsville to-day. I have repeated orders to him to hurry forward with the Fifteenth Army Corps. U. S. Grant, Major-General. It will be noted that the point of att
n; that it was doubtless designed by the Major-General commanding that I should take part in this movement; so that I would be following his wishes were I to push on to the summit. General Rosecrans was so confident of success that he somewhat scattered his command, say the Memoirs. There was another thing of which General Rosecrans was confident, and which a just or accurate writer should have mentioned when dealing out severe criticism. He had been notified from Washington, early in August, that Burnside would move through East Tennessee with an effective force of twelve thousand men upon his left, and was informed almost daily, before and after the battle of Chickamauga, that he would be on the ground for cooperative movements. The record history of this failure on the part of Burnside, is necessary to any fair review of Rosecrans' campaign against Chattanooga, and enough to show its real bearing will now be presented. The dispatches which follow are from General Halleck
October 10th (search for this): chapter 6
* * * From there you will move by Florence on Athens or Decatur, on the north side of the river, or directly to Decatur, repairing the railroad according as it may be found most practicable or expeditious. Time is all important. The railroad must be kept up and guarded in order to secure the supplies of your army. * * * * Should General Sherman be assigned by General Grant to the command, you will furnish him with this and all other orders. H. W. Halleck, Major-General. On the 10th of October Sherman, then near Corinth, reported the situation to Halleck, and asked: whether I shall give preference to securing this railroad or reaching the neighborhood of Athens with expedition. The latter I can surely accomplish, the former is problematical. The troops from the Army of the Potomac having communicated with General Rosecrans by way of Bridgeport, General. Sherman was instructed on the 14th, by Halleck in reply, to take care of his railroad. General Grant, during all thi
October 24th (search for this): chapter 6
est Virginia. A copy of this is sent to General Grant. October 18th.—General Rosecrans still calls for your cooperation with him at Chattanooga, and again suggests that Kingston should be made your main point of defense. In this I agree with him. If he can not hold Chattanooga, you can not hold East Tennessee, as that place threatens the gateway from Georgia. Why is it that you make no report of your position and movements? We are left entirely in the dark in regard to your army. October 24th.—It now appears pretty certain that Ewell's corps has gone to Tennessee, and its probable object is Abingdon. His force is estimated at from twenty to twenty-five thousand. It is reported that he left Lee's army on Monday last, but did not pass through Richmond. It is therefore most probable that he passed through Lynchburg taking the road to Abingdon. The following telegrams were sent by Mr. Lincoln to General Burnside: Washington, D. C., September 21st., 2 A. M. To Gene
October, 1863 AD (search for this): chapter 6
rcements from Virginia were so near that point on the 15th it was resolved to march back toward Chattanooga and attack Rosecrans wherever found. A part of Longstreet's Virginia troops under Hood arrived at Dalton on the 18th, and participated in the first day's fight at Chickamauga, but Longstreet himself, with the rest of his command, did not arrive till midnight after the first day's battle. A brief extract from his official report is pertinent: headquarters near Chattanooga, October, 1863. Our train reached Catoosa platform, near Ringgold. about two o'clock in the afternoon of the 19th of September. As soon as our horses came up, about four o'clock, I started with Colonel Sorrel and Colonel Manning of my staff to find the headquarters of the Commanding General. We missed our way and did not report until near eleven o'clock at night. * * * * As soon as the day of the 20th had dawned, I rode to the front to find my troops. The line was arranged from right to left a
October 18th (search for this): chapter 6
hat operation was deemed safe and of great importance. The condition of affairs may now be different. You certainly should hold Kingston, and as far below as may seem prudent. Hood will probably send a part of his army to the south-west. Whether to Bragg or by Abingdon is uncertain. I think your available force at Kingston and above should be held in readiness to move up the valley, should the enemy appear in force in south-west Virginia. A copy of this is sent to General Grant. October 18th.—General Rosecrans still calls for your cooperation with him at Chattanooga, and again suggests that Kingston should be made your main point of defense. In this I agree with him. If he can not hold Chattanooga, you can not hold East Tennessee, as that place threatens the gateway from Georgia. Why is it that you make no report of your position and movements? We are left entirely in the dark in regard to your army. October 24th.—It now appears pretty certain that Ewell's corps has go
October 26th, 1863 AD (search for this): chapter 6
here on November 14th, and a conversation with General Grant the next day, represents the latter as informing him that forage and provisions were then extremely scarce, and that he feared Thomas' troops could not be drawn out of the trenches for a fight. That General Grant could not have made such a statement about supplies is evident from the following dispatches sent more than two weeks before Sherman's arrival: headquarters Military division of the Mississippi, Chattanooga, October 26, 1863. Major-General Halleck, Washington. * * * * General Thomas had also set on foot, before my arrival, a plan for getting possession of the river from a point below Lookout Mountain to Bridgeport. If successful, and I think it will be, the question of supplies will be fully settled. * * * * U. S. Grant, Major-General. Chattanooga, October 28, 1863. Major-General Halleck, Washington. General Thomas' plan for securing the river and Southside road hence to Bridgeport has proved
October 28th, 1863 AD (search for this): chapter 6
dispatches sent more than two weeks before Sherman's arrival: headquarters Military division of the Mississippi, Chattanooga, October 26, 1863. Major-General Halleck, Washington. * * * * General Thomas had also set on foot, before my arrival, a plan for getting possession of the river from a point below Lookout Mountain to Bridgeport. If successful, and I think it will be, the question of supplies will be fully settled. * * * * U. S. Grant, Major-General. Chattanooga, October 28, 1863. Major-General Halleck, Washington. General Thomas' plan for securing the river and Southside road hence to Bridgeport has proved eminently successful. The question of supplies may now be regarded as settled. If the rebels give us one week more time I think all danger of losing territory now held by us will have passed away, and preparations may commence for offensive operations. U. S. Grant, Major-General. That General Grant had no doubt of the capacity of General Thomas'
October 26th (search for this): chapter 6
of his railroad. General Grant, during all this time, had been absent in New Orleans. He reached Memphis on his return October 5th, proceeded to Cairo, and thence to Louisville to receive orders, where he was directed to take command at Chattanooga, relieving Rosecrans by Thomas. He started at once for the front, and shortly after his arrival, ordered Sherman to drop every thing on the railroad, and come on with dispatch. He thus reported his action to Halleck: Chattanooga, October 26, 2 P. M. Major-General Halleck. General-in-chief: I have sent orders to General Sherman to move east toward Stevenson, leaving every thing unguarded, except by way of the Army of the Cumberland east of Bear Creek. The possibility of the enemy breaking through our lines east of this, and the present inability to follow him from here if he should, is the cause of this order. Sherman's forces are the only troops I could throw in to head such a move. U. S. Grant, Major-General.
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