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March (search for this): chapter 3
Gen. Joseph E. Johnston at this time had organized his army into four divisions, two of four brigades each, commanded by Van Dorn and G. W. Smith; and two of five each, under Longstreet and E. Kirby Smith. These 18 brigades averaged about four regiments, and the regiments averaged about 500 men each. Besides these there were other troops under Jackson in the valley and under Holmes near Acquia. The total effective strength on February 28, 1862, was 47,617, with about 175 guns. Early in March the Federal army was organized into five army corps under McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, Keyes, and Banks. Each corps was generally composed of three divisions, each division of three brigades, and each brigade of four regiments. The regiments were generally fuller than ours, and would average about 700 men. The total effective strength of all arms on February 28, 1862, was 185,420, with 465 field guns, of which 100 were massed in a reserve under the Chief of Artillery. During the winte
March 8th (search for this): chapter 3
ly had stumbled into the key position itself. His army was recalled to Washington by the Executive, against his strong protests and appeals. Johnston fully realized that his inferiority of force left him no recourse but to stand upon the defensive, and watch to take advantage of any blunders his enemy might make. And it was ordered from Richmond, very prudently, that the army should be withdrawn from Manassas before the roads became good. Johnston's movement was accordingly begun on March 8, which was some weeks before it would have been possible for McClellan to move his army. He followed Johnston's withdrawal slowly, for a short distance, but there was no collision. A considerable loss of provisions resulted to the Confederates from the condition of the roads, and the fact that their Commissary Department had established a meat-packing depot on the Manassas Gap Railroad at Thoroughfare Gap, and accumulated there an amount of stores much greater than the railroad could rem
March 23rd (search for this): chapter 3
ion. A considerable loss of provisions resulted to the Confederates from the condition of the roads, and the fact that their Commissary Department had established a meat-packing depot on the Manassas Gap Railroad at Thoroughfare Gap, and accumulated there an amount of stores much greater than the railroad could remove upon short notice. The army paused for a while behind the Rappahannock, but then took a better position behind the Rapidan, where it awaited developments. Meanwhile on March 23, something took place in the Valley. Stonewall Jackson had been in command there of two small brigades through the winter, but had fallen back, about 40 miles south of Winchester, when Johnston's army abandoned Manassas. Banks's Federal Corps had been opposed to him, and it was now ordered to Manassas. Jackson learned of the movement in progress, and, believing that he might surprise its rear, and at least disconcert plans, he made a march of 36 miles in a day and a half, and fell upon
April (search for this): chapter 3
t had small confidence in fortifications without a big army to hold them. So when McClellan proposed to make his next advance upon Richmond, from Fortress Monroe as a base, Mr. Lincoln gave but reluctant consent, as it involved the removal of a large body of troops from their position between the enemy and the capital. At length he agreed that about 73,000 would be enough to keep for the defence of Washington. This would allow McClellan to have about 150,000 at Fortress Monroe. Early in April, however, under some strong political pressure, Mr. Lincoln detached Blenker's division, about 10,000 men, from McClellan's force and sent them to Fremont in West Virginia. Before taking up the history of this campaign, it will be interesting to take a general view of all routes to Richmond which were tried during the war. There were seven campaigns under as many different commanders. First. McDowell set out to follow the Orange and Alexandria Railway, but was defeated at Manassas i
April 4th (search for this): chapter 3
division of three brigades, about 10,000 men. Jackson had upon the field only about 3500. Consequently, when the battle became fully developed, Jackson was driven off with a loss of 455 killed and wounded and 263 captured. Shields lost 568 killed and wounded, and 22 captured. It was a small affair, and apparently a Federal victory, but it was bread cast upon strategic waters. There soon followed a serious development. Jackson's name and aggressiveness, and the fierceness of his attack, all tended to increase Mr. Lincoln's reluctance to see Washington stripped of any force available for its defence. He had already taken Blenker's division of 10,000 men from McClellan, and now, on April 4, he took also McDowell's corps of 37,000, ordering it to report to the Secretary of War. As the result of that order was to keep McDowell out of the Seven Days battles in June, Jackson's battle at Kernstown, though generally reckoned a defeat, was really the first step to Lee's victory in June.
June (search for this): chapter 3
tended to increase Mr. Lincoln's reluctance to see Washington stripped of any force available for its defence. He had already taken Blenker's division of 10,000 men from McClellan, and now, on April 4, he took also McDowell's corps of 37,000, ordering it to report to the Secretary of War. As the result of that order was to keep McDowell out of the Seven Days battles in June, Jackson's battle at Kernstown, though generally reckoned a defeat, was really the first step to Lee's victory in June. tended to increase Mr. Lincoln's reluctance to see Washington stripped of any force available for its defence. He had already taken Blenker's division of 10,000 men from McClellan, and now, on April 4, he took also McDowell's corps of 37,000, ordering it to report to the Secretary of War. As the result of that order was to keep McDowell out of the Seven Days battles in June, Jackson's battle at Kernstown, though generally reckoned a defeat, was really the first step to Lee's victory in June.
August (search for this): chapter 3
imony which they could use in place of fulminate of mercury; and we collected all the turpentine and apple-brandy stills in the country and sent them to Richmond to be cut up and rerolled into copper strips. From this copper and the above chemical mixture all the caps were made which we used during the last year of the war, but at its close the copper stills were exhausted. It is hard to imagine what we would then have done had not the surrender at Appomattox relieved the quandary. In August our line of pickets was advanced within five miles of the Potomac, opposite Washington, and it included two hills, Munson's and Mason's, from which many houses in Washington were plainly visible. This suggested opening a line of secret signals from a window in one of these houses to an observation room on the top of a residence on Mason's Hill. A powerful telescope was borrowed from Charleston, and an intelligent signal employee, E. P. Bryan, of Maryland, was sent in disguise to Washingto
September (search for this): chapter 3
strength to the army at Manassas to enable it to take the offensive. As it was, the new troops sent were little more than enough to make good the losses from sickness which befell the army in the summer of 1861. The entire country about Bull Run was malarial, and the troops were badly equipped and ignorant about sanitary measures. All our new regiments from country districts were great sufferers from measles, which often reduced their effective force one-half. In the latter part of Sept., feeling that the opportunity was about to pass, President Davis was induced to visit Johnston, Beauregard, and Smith at Manassas, and this matter was discussed. The three generals asked for 10,000 or 20,000 more men than the 40,000 they had. With this addition to their numbers they proposed to cross the Potomac and make an offensive campaign in Maryland. Mr. Davis seemed greatly disappointed to find so few troops available. He acknowledged the force of the argument for the offensive, but
October (search for this): chapter 3
s very poorly drilled and wretchedly equipped, and it had, practically, no intrenchments whatever. And although it numbered able officers among its generals, it was badly commanded, in that it was not organized into divisions, and could not have been well handled either on a march or in action. McClellan, though unfit to command in battle, had no superior in organizing an army to take the field as a thoroughly fit machine, able to concentrate its energies wherever needed. By the end of October he might easily have advanced upon the Confederates with a force three to one in numbers and twice better armed and organized. Public opinion would have forced McClellan into making an attack, but for the moral effect of the imaginary battalions which Pinkerton's Bureau had conjured into existence and drilled and equipped so easily. And as so good a fighting machine of American soldiers would do hard fighting, even without a general at their head, as was abundantly shown by McClellan's
October 19th (search for this): chapter 3
available. He acknowledged the force of the argument for the offensive, but he could not see his way to taking troops from other points, and he could not provide more men until he could procure more arms. On Oct. 21 an accidental affair took place at Ball's Bluff, near Leesburg, Virginia, which greatly elated the Confederates. Evans's brigade, of four regiments and a battery, was held at Leesburg in observation of the Potomac, and of a force under Gen. Stone on the Maryland shore. On Oct. 19, McClellan had sent out a strong reconnaissance toward Leesburg from his main body covering Washington. The reconnaissance was scarcely extended half-way to Leesburg, but McClellan thought that it might alarm Evans and cause him to fall back nearer to Manassas; so on Oct. 20 he wired Stone, suggesting a demonstration on his part. Stone made it by crossing the river at two points, Edward's Ferry and Ball's Bluff, about three miles apart. Both parties crossed without opposition, but the Ba
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