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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 2. Search the whole document.

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July, 1864 AD (search for this): chapter 1
ng. The most hopeful had become weary, the most determined were depressed and disappointed. It was forgotten that Grant had warned the country he might have to fight all summer on one line; it was not known that he had ordered a siege train when he started from Culpeper, and had arranged for the crossing of the James while he was still north of the Rapidan. Soldiers indeed saw the immense advantages that had been gained, the definite progress made towards the end; During the month of July, 1864, 1 was sent to the North, and had several interviews with the old commander of the army, Lieutenant-General Scott. He expressed the greatest admiration for Grant's achievements, and complete confidence that his operations would result in entire success. I was especially charged by him to congratulate General Grant upon the manoeuvres and tactics of the Wilderness campaign, and on the strategy which employed all the armies constantly against the enemy. This was immediately after Early's
August, 1864 AD (search for this): chapter 1
and West now talk openly and boldly of resisting the draft, and it is believed that the leaders of the Peace branch of the Democratic party are doing all in their power to bring about this result. The evidence of this has increased very much within the last few days. It is probably thought that such a thing will have its effect upon the next election by showing the inability of the present administration to carry on the war with an armed opposition in the loyal states.—Halleck to Grant, August, 1864. and, naturally enough, was dreaded by the government. Grant, however, remained urgent, and on the l3th of September, he wrote to Stanton: We ought to have the whole number of men called for by the President, in the shortest possible time. Prompt action in filling up our armies will have more effect upon the enemy than a victory. They profess to believe, and make their men believe, there is such a party in favor of recognizing Southern independence that the draft cannot be enforced. L
22nd (search for this): chapter 1
into action about twenty-two thousand or twenty-three thousand infantry, and about eight thousand cavalry. See Appendix for remarks on the subject of Sheridan's numbers in this campaign. On the 21st, Early and Anderson advanced, and on the 22nd, Sheridan fell back as far as Halltown. My position, he said, in front of Charlestown at best was a bad one, and so much being dependent on this army, I withdrew . . . and took up a new line in front of Halltown. The rebels pressed forward, and position. At the same time Torbert, with the greater part of the cavalry, was sent up the Luray valley on the left, and ordered to cross the mountains, and intercept the enemy at Newmarket, twenty miles in Early's rear. Before daylight on the 22nd, Crook marched to Little North mountain, the western boundary of the Valley, and massed his troops in the heavy woods along its face. The Sixth and Nineteenth corps were then moved up opposite the rebel centre, while Ricketts's division with Aver
21st (search for this): chapter 1
or twenty-three thousand infantry, and about eight thousand cavalry. See Appendix for remarks on the subject of Sheridan's numbers in this campaign. On the 21st, Early and Anderson advanced, and on the 22nd, Sheridan fell back as far as Halltown. My position, he said, in front of Charlestown at best was a bad one, and so s had a signal station in the mountains, from which every movement of national troops by day could be observed. Crook was therefore concealed in the forest on the 21st, while the main national line moved up in front of the rebel position. At the same time Torbert, with the greater part of the cavalry, was sent up the Luray valleSherman? If not, please telegraph him. Neither did he forget that his forces on the Shenandoah were co-operating with those on the Potomac and the James. On the 21st, he said to Butler: Further news from Sheridan is better than the first we had. In pursuing the enemy up the Valley, they may be induced to detach from here. Put
20th (search for this): chapter 1
s the Weldon road; I shall endeavor to stay there, and employ the enemy so actively that he cannot detach further. On the 20th, Sheridan reported: I can now calculate on bringing into action about twenty-two thousand or twenty-three thousand infantrback in the night as far as Newtown, and next day to Fisher's Hill, four miles south of Strasburg; and at daylight on the 20th, Sheridan moved rapidly up the Valley in pursuit. Fisher's Hill is immediately south of a little stream called Tumbling r himself that his ammunition boxes were taken from the caissons and placed behind the breastworks. On the evening of the 20th, Sheridan went into position on the heights of Strasburg, and at once determined to use Crook as a turning column again, ae propositions to Jefferson Davis from the North. Grant had returned to City Point on the 19th of September, and on the 20th, at two P. M., he telegraphed to Sheridan: I have just received the news of your great victory, and ordered each of the ar
September 1st (search for this): chapter 1
nk the lines ran parallel with the rebel works across Bermuda Hundred, from the James to the Appomattox river. Beyond the Appomattox, starting at a point opposite the rebel left, they followed the defences of Petersburg, and until they struck the Jerusalem plank road, ran extremely close to the enemy's works, approaching at times within a few hundred yards. At the Jerusalem road they diverged to the left, and the distance between the entrenchments widened to more than two miles. On the 1st of September, the national left rested on the Weldon railroad, Warren's skirmishers reaching to the Vaughan and Squirrel level roads; but before long the main works extended to these roads; then running south about a mile and a half, they turned to the east and completely encircled the national camps, striking the Blackwater river, in the rear of Meade's right wing. There were also strong entrenched works at City Point, to protect the base of the army, and batteries were established at intervals on
19th (search for this): chapter 1
hting first the two divisions left near Winchester, and then the two that had been moved to Martinsburg. Accordingly, on the afternoon of the 18th, his whole army marched from Berryville towards the Opequan. But at Martinsburg Early learned that Grant had been with Sheridan, and anticipating some movement of importance, he at once set out to return. At Martinsburg . . I learned that Grant was with Sheridan that day, and I expected an early move.—Early's Memoir, page 84. At daylight on the 19th, there was one rebel division immediately in front of Sheridan, and another only five miles to the north, while two, still nearer, were marching rapidly up on the road from Martinsburg. Sheridan was promptly informed of these dispositions of the enemy, and understood that he now must fight the entire command of Early. His plan was to attack the rebels with the Sixth and Nineteenth corps, holding Crook's division in reserve, to be used as a turning column when the crisis of the battle occu
18th (search for this): chapter 1
two divisions of infantry and a large force of cavalry, to Martinsburg, twenty-two miles away, to do what damage he could to the railroad, leaving the remainder of his force in front of Winchester. Sheridan at once detected the blunder of his antagonist, and instead of moving to Newtown, as he had intended, determined to attack the enemy in detail, fighting first the two divisions left near Winchester, and then the two that had been moved to Martinsburg. Accordingly, on the afternoon of the 18th, his whole army marched from Berryville towards the Opequan. But at Martinsburg Early learned that Grant had been with Sheridan, and anticipating some movement of importance, he at once set out to return. At Martinsburg . . I learned that Grant was with Sheridan that day, and I expected an early move.—Early's Memoir, page 84. At daylight on the 19th, there was one rebel division immediately in front of Sheridan, and another only five miles to the north, while two, still nearer, were marchi
September 3rd (search for this): chapter 1
d then, with his usual spirit, he added: I believe no troops have yet left the Valley, but I believe they will, and that it will be their last campaign in the Shenandoah. They came to invade, and have failed. They must leave, or cross the Potomac. The next day he said: If Early has detached troops for Richmond, I will attack him vigorously. It was with words like these that the chief and the subaltern inspired each other: they were evidently made of similar stuff. At last, on the 3rd of September, Anderson started for Richmond; but towards night he blundered upon Sheridan's lines, and was vigorously attacked, and driven back towards the Opequan after dark. For a while he was in imminent danger, and the next day Early came up to his support. The rebels, however, had no idea of attacking Sheridan, and the whole command executed a rapid retreat to the west bank of the Opequan; but had Sheridan been aware of Anderson's intention, he would doubtless have facilitated, rather than i
17th (search for this): chapter 1
e made for a combined attack on Sheridan. A plan of battle was actually arranged. But Sheridan had been already warned: for Grant's opportune despatch of the 12th had arrived, announcing the addition to the enemy's force; See Vol. II., pp. 507 and 510. The receipt of this despatch was very important to me, as I possibly would have remained in uncertainty as to the character of the force coming in on my flank and rear, until it attacked the cavalry.—Sheridan's Official Report. and on the 17th, when the two rebel columns advanced, the national troops had retired. Sheridan fell back as far as Berryville, and the enemy's forces were united at Winchester, only five miles off. At this time, if ever, the rebels should have pressed Sheridan across the Potomac, or crossing the river themselves, have either compelled him to follow, or forced Grant to despatch still further reinforcements from the James. The strength of Early and Anderson combined was at least equal to that of Sherida
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