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ade without his knowledge and direction, except the capture by General Moore of the entrenched camp of the enemy south of the railroad, which was one of those events of battle which give no time for reference to higher authority, and which illustrate the true genius for war of the executive commander who, as Moore did, seizes the opportunity they offer. It is generally believed that the battle was lost by the inaction of our right wing, which, after the first advance on the morning of the third, made no decided attempt upon the lines in its front. So notable was this inertness that the enemy seems to have considered the attack of that wing merely a feint, which justified him in detaching a large force from his left to reinforce his centre, which had been broken and was in great peril. It is altogether probable that had the attack with the right wing been pressed as it was pressed by the centre and left, Van Dorn would have captured Corinth and the enemy's army. The troops which
e loss of our bravest and best men, then lying upon the slopes of Corinth, we felt how bootless had been their sacrifice, and how different the result would have been had our charge upon the works been supported. The utmost depression prevailed throughout the army, and it was with no elation we heard our dauntless leader, Van Dorn, had determined to make another attack that day on the enemy at Rienzi. The pioneers, preceded by an advance-guard of cavalry, had already, before daylight of the 5th, been sent forward on the road to Rienzi, when Van Dorn was induced by the representations of some of his principal generals as to the condition of their troops to countermand the orders for the Rienzi movement, and to take the route for Ripley via the Tuscumbia and Davis's bridge over the Hatchie. Our wagon train was parked at the Tuscumbia bridge. Wirt Adams's cavalry brigade, with Whitfield's Texas Legion, had been thrown forward across the Hatchie, and guarded the approaches from Boliva
the only Confederate officer killed, ten others, privates, were killed, and this was Lee's whole loss, except thirty-eight wounded. It was about the 22d of December when our little army at Grenada heard of the landing of Sherman's large force before Vicksburg, in our rear. Van Dorn had just gone off on his expedition, and those of us who knew his destination were in the deepest anxiety as to its result. This was relieved by the news of his complete success which reached us next day, the 23d, and on Christmas eve our hearts were gladdened by rumors of Grant's retirement from our front. Christmas day was brightened by the certain intelligence that Grant had fallen back with his whole army, and next day Maury's division marched to reinforce Vicksburg. Our advance entered the town as the last cannon-shots were booming on the battlefield, and we found troops and people in great exultation over Lee's victory, though still anxious for the results of the battle, which would be renewed
ll felt he ought to strike a bold and manly blow for his native State, and did not hesitate to attack the enemy with all the energy and force he could bring to bear upon him. We marched from Baldwin to join Van Dorn at Ripley on the morning of the 27th, and our whole effective force was made up of— Maury's division4,800 muskets. Hebert's division5,000 muskets. Armstrong's cavalry2,000 men. Light artillery42 guns. We reached Ripley on the evening of the 29th. General Van Dorn with his stafion was up, immediately followed by Stevenson's, and by the 30th we were prepared to assume the offensive, when, on that day, about midday, a flag of truce came from Sherman's lines requesting a truce to bury their dead. Three days before, on the 27th, Lee had sent out burial parties to bury Sherman's dead, but they were fired on and driven in by the enemy's pickets, and his dead had, therefore, remained on the field in view of both armies, swelling and festering in the rains and the sun until
ther inclination nor occasion to detract from any of them; their honors in those fights were hard-earned, nor can I blame any of them for the disasters which came upon our army. They were brave men, who devoted all to their country, and among them were commanders of a high order of ability. On the 30th of May, 1862, General Beauregard evacuated Corinth in the presence of Halleck's army, and in June, 1862, his army was lying around Tupelo, cantoned on the Mobile and Ohio railroad. Late in June Van Dorn was detached from command of his corps, known as the Army of the West, and sent to take command at Vicksburg, which was then threatened with attack. You will remember how well he acquitted himself in that command. He repulsed the enemy from Vicksburg and occupied and defended Port Hudson, thus securing to the Confederacy for nearly a year free access to the Trans-Mississippi Department and the unobstructed navigation of Red River, by which vast supplies of meat and grain were cont
tary necessity, while it was our obvious defensive policy to force him across the Ohio, occupy Columbus, and fortify the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers. This policy induced General Bragg to move his army into Kentucky, and Van Dorn felt that he could force the enemy out of West Tennessee and contribute to its success. Corinth was the enemy's strongest and most salient point. Its capture would decide the fate of West Tennessee; and the combined forces of Price and Van Dorn in the month of August could have captured Corinth, and have cleared West Tennessee of all hostile forces. When Van Dorn first invited General Price's co-operation in this enterprise, his command embraced two large divisions under Breckenridge and Lovell, numbering about 12,000 infantry, with over 1,000 cavalry under Jackson; and he expected to receive about 5,000 veteran infantry, just exchanged from the Fort Donelson prisoners, in time for the movement. This force, added to General Price's army, would have g
aordinary epidemic of cholera, which reduced his force to one half its original numbers. As soon as Van Dorn had refitted his forces after this attack, his ever-restless, aggressive spirit drew him up toward the northern line of the State, where Grant commanded a considerable force, occupying Corinth, Bolivar, and other points in West Tennessee, North Mississippi, and Alabama. Van Dorn having superior rank, but not having command over Price, sent Colonel Lindsey Lunsford Lomax early in September to urge upon Price that they should combine their forces and drive the Federals out of Mississippi and West Tennessee. At the time he made the proposition their combined forces would have amounted to about 25,000 infantry, with about 3,000 cavalry. Price replied that he could not comply with this request without departing from his instructions and the objects for which General Bragg had left him where he was. And just here were developed the bad consequences of having these two commander
September 19th (search for this): chapter 18
ce Buell. Therefore to intercept him, or that failing, to join Bragg, Price marched from Tupelo to luka. Tupelo is on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, fifty miles south of Corinth. Iuka is on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, seventeen miles east of Corinth. Our army consisted of Maury's First Division, and Little's Second Division of Infantry, and Armstrong's Cavalry brigade. We numbered in all near 16,000 effectives, viz: about 14,000 infantry and near 2,000 cavalry. On the 19th of September we entered Iuka. Armstrong's cavalry advanced, found the place occupied by a force of the enemy, who retreated toward Corinth, abandoning to us a considerable amount of stores. On the 21st of September I placed the First division on the march, intending to move close up to Burnsville, the station on the Memphis and Charleston railroad between Iuka and Corinth, where we now ascertained the enemy was in strong force. At about 3 P. M. the enemy advanced upon me from Burnsville with so
September 21st (search for this): chapter 18
and Charleston Railroad, seventeen miles east of Corinth. Our army consisted of Maury's First Division, and Little's Second Division of Infantry, and Armstrong's Cavalry brigade. We numbered in all near 16,000 effectives, viz: about 14,000 infantry and near 2,000 cavalry. On the 19th of September we entered Iuka. Armstrong's cavalry advanced, found the place occupied by a force of the enemy, who retreated toward Corinth, abandoning to us a considerable amount of stores. On the 21st of September I placed the First division on the march, intending to move close up to Burnsville, the station on the Memphis and Charleston railroad between Iuka and Corinth, where we now ascertained the enemy was in strong force. At about 3 P. M. the enemy advanced upon me from Burnsville with so much boldness that I believed it to be an attack in force; but deploying three battalions of sharpshooters, forced him back by them alone, and proved him to be merely a reconnoissance in force. It was ha
September 24th (search for this): chapter 18
was handsomely conducted, and was pushed with a boldness not usual in my experience with the Federal troops, so that I formed line of battle and awaited with confident expectation the attack of Grant's whole army. From this time we began to receive such information about Grant's position as indicated that he had moved none of his forces over the Tennessee, but that he still held the line of Corinth; and this conviction was much strengthened in the mind of General Price, when, on the 24th of September, he received by flag of truce a summons from General Ord to surrender. General Ord stated in his letter that recent information showed that McClellan had destroyed Lee's army at Antietam; that, therefore, the rebellion must soon terminate, and that in order to spare the useless effusion of blood, he gave Price this opportunity to lay down his arms. Price replied to Ord that he was glad to be able to inform him that we had late and reliable information which justified the belief that
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