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January (search for this): article 1
very opportunity to secure an advantage and leaves his troops to mouldier away with typhoid fever, measles, low spirits, and the revulsion of feeling experienced by all generous youths who come to the field to measure bayonets with the enemy, and find themselves used for no purpose but to dig up dirt, scoop out graves, make coffins, slaughter cattle, sleep on the damp ground, grow sick with hope deferred, die like sheep of the rot, and be barred like dogs without even a sheer around them. One month of campaigning, under a General of this description, will cost more lives than three or four pitched battles. Generals of this description consider it wisdom, circumspection, sagacity, prudence, to slaughter a thousand of their men by inaction, in preference to losing an hundred by fighting. We have been told that a war strictly and absolutely defensive, would be the best policy for us, because it saved Rome against Pyrrhus and Hannibal, and was practiced by the Duke of Wellington in
1812 AD (search for this): article 1
ll slowly back — collected the of the country as he retired — carried them within his --drilled them — and made them efficient soldiers. As Massena retired — after a loss of half his army — he followed him with terrible perseverance — gained a victory at Fuentez d'onoro, and drove him entirely out of Portugal. Had the Portuguese forces been all well disciplined, thus making Wellington greatly superior to Massena, does anybody suppose he would have acted on the defensive when the latter entered into Portugal? The man who thinks thus, must surely overlook the brilliant offensive campaigns of 1812-'13--must have for gotten Badajoz, and Salamanca and Vittoria — must have ceased to remember the advance into France, the battle of Toulouse, and the close of the war. The fact is, Wellingtonacted as any great General would have done. He acted on the defensive when he was too weak to act in any other way. He acted on the offensive as soon as he became strong enough to take the
Hannibal (search for this): article 1
will deny that the structures of Thiers upon the actions of Soult are just and discriminating. Hannibal, the greatest of ancient, and Napoleon, the greatest of modern Generals, have been severely cribsolutely defensive, would be the best policy for us, because it saved Rome against Pyrrhus and Hannibal, and was practiced by the Duke of Wellington in the Peninsula. We deny both the proposition anlanguage of Dr, Arnold, "Rome was bleeding at every pore."--He knew it was vain to contend with Hannibal in the field. He felt that he was not his equal, as indeed who except Napoleon, ever was? He great Carthaginian General, or the Roman cavalry, with the Numidian horsemen. But he saw that Hannibal was two thousand miles from home; that the Romans had command of the sea; that no reinforcementhe dependencies of Rome put together — if the Carthaginian Senate had been pouring in troops to Hannibal at the rate of thirty five thousand per week — would it have been wisdom still to have acted on
Napoleon (search for this): article 1
military movements. Soult was certainly a greater General than Thiers, and yet there are few military men who will deny that the structures of Thiers upon the actions of Soult are just and discriminating. Hannibal, the greatest of ancient, and Napoleon, the greatest of modern Generals, have been severely criticised by men who certainly could never have rivaled their achievements, and the military world are agreed that many of these criticisms are proper. No profession is of a mature so recon r immediately after the battle of Thrasymene, when, to use the strong language of Dr, Arnold, "Rome was bleeding at every pore."--He knew it was vain to contend with Hannibal in the field. He felt that he was not his equal, as indeed who except Napoleon, ever was? He knew that his militia could not contend with the heavy armed African veterans of the great Carthaginian General, or the Roman cavalry, with the Numidian horsemen. But he saw that Hannibal was two thousand miles from home; that th
Arnold (search for this): article 1
t purely on the defensive against Pyrrhus. They fought him almost as soon as he landed at Tarentum, and with so much obstinacy that, though he claimed the victory, he said another such would ruin him. They fought him a second time, and he withdrew from Italy, assigning some other cause for his retreat. Fabius Maximus is always quoted as the great authority in favor of defensive war. He was appointed Dictator immediately after the battle of Thrasymene, when, to use the strong language of Dr, Arnold, "Rome was bleeding at every pore."--He knew it was vain to contend with Hannibal in the field. He felt that he was not his equal, as indeed who except Napoleon, ever was? He knew that his militia could not contend with the heavy armed African veterans of the great Carthaginian General, or the Roman cavalry, with the Numidian horsemen. But he saw that Hannibal was two thousand miles from home; that the Romans had command of the sea; that no reinforcements could reach him that his Gallic a
Wellington (search for this): article 1
, would be the best policy for us, because it saved Rome against Pyrrhus and Hannibal, and was practiced by the Duke of Wellington in the Peninsula. We deny both the proposition and the inference, and if both were true, it has nothing to do with thi seem to as to overlook altogether the influence of circumstances in directing the conduct of leaders. The Duke of Wellington's Spanish campaigns were anything else than Fabian, as they have sometimes been called. He commenced them by dislodginntez d'onoro, and drove him entirely out of Portugal. Had the Portuguese forces been all well disciplined, thus making Wellington greatly superior to Massena, does anybody suppose he would have acted on the defensive when the latter entered into Por — must have ceased to remember the advance into France, the battle of Toulouse, and the close of the war. The fact is, Wellingtonacted as any great General would have done. He acted on the defensive when he was too weak to act in any other way. He
Soult (search for this): article 1
e voice of Jenny Lind.--It is not requisite that a man should be capable of commanding an army in order that he should form a just ception of military movements. Soult was certainly a greater General than Thiers, and yet there are few military men who will deny that the structures of Thiers upon the actions of Soult are just and Soult are just and discriminating. Hannibal, the greatest of ancient, and Napoleon, the greatest of modern Generals, have been severely criticised by men who certainly could never have rivaled their achievements, and the military world are agreed that many of these criticisms are proper. No profession is of a mature so recon e that none but the inict of leaders. The Duke of Wellington's Spanish campaigns were anything else than Fabian, as they have sometimes been called. He commenced them by dislodging Soult from Oporto--one of the most daring offensive operations recorded in military history. He followed it up by marching two hundred miles up the valley of the Tagus,
Massena (search for this): article 1
Vedras. Put as the host approached, he met them at the frontier fought the bloody battle of Bunaco — fell slowly back — collected the of the country as he retired — carried them within his --drilled them — and made them efficient soldiers. As Massena retired — after a loss of half his army — he followed him with terrible perseverance — gained a victory at Fuentez d'onoro, and drove him entirely out of Portugal. Had the Portuguese forces been all well disciplined, thus making Wellington greatly superior to Massena, does anybody suppose he would have acted on the defensive when the latter entered into Portugal? The man who thinks thus, must surely overlook the brilliant offensive campaigns of 1812-'13--must have for gotten Badajoz, and Salamanca and Vittoria — must have ceased to remember the advance into France, the battle of Toulouse, and the close of the war. The fact is, Wellingtonacted as any great General would have done. He acted on the defensive when he was too w
Fabian (search for this): article 1
s of Rome put together — if the Carthaginian Senate had been pouring in troops to Hannibal at the rate of thirty five thousand per week — would it have been wisdom still to have acted on the defensive? to have waited until he had made Capua so strong that it would have been madness to attack? Men who reason in this way seem to as to overlook altogether the influence of circumstances in directing the conduct of leaders. The Duke of Wellington's Spanish campaigns were anything else than Fabian, as they have sometimes been called. He commenced them by dislodging Soult from Oporto--one of the most daring offensive operations recorded in military history. He followed it up by marching two hundred miles up the valley of the Tagus, uniting with Cuesta, and fighting the desperate battle of Talavera. It is true, that when he learned the intention of the French to invade Portugal with an army two strong for him to resist, he constructed the lines of Torres Vedras. Put as the host appr
Pyrrhus (search for this): article 1
city, prudence, to slaughter a thousand of their men by inaction, in preference to losing an hundred by fighting. We have been told that a war strictly and absolutely defensive, would be the best policy for us, because it saved Rome against Pyrrhus and Hannibal, and was practiced by the Duke of Wellington in the Peninsula. We deny both the proposition and the inference, and if both were true, it has nothing to do with this question, which presents a case altogether different from any of these three. The Romans did not act purely on the defensive against Pyrrhus. They fought him almost as soon as he landed at Tarentum, and with so much obstinacy that, though he claimed the victory, he said another such would ruin him. They fought him a second time, and he withdrew from Italy, assigning some other cause for his retreat. Fabius Maximus is always quoted as the great authority in favor of defensive war. He was appointed Dictator immediately after the battle of Thrasymene, when, to
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