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Browsing named entities in The Daily Dispatch: December 27, 1862., [Electronic resource].

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Holland (search for this): article 2
hose of Greece and Belgium, he affirms, are not precedents in point at all. The great Powers did not recognize the revolted subjects of the Sultan and the King of Holland: they interfered to create Greece and Belgium, which would never have been created without their assistance. Passing to the stronger and closer parallel affordedeace the Belgium refused them; and instead of enforcing obedience the Powers divided, England and France supporting Belgium, and the other three Powers ending by Holland and their joint award. "Holland defied the five Powers." No such thing; she defied Belgium, and defeated the Belgians over and over but when England and France Holland defied the five Powers." No such thing; she defied Belgium, and defeated the Belgians over and over but when England and France interfered, though she had Russia, Austria, and Prussia on her side, she withdrew from the contest. We do not expect from Mr. Lincoln the singular good sense and moderation which distinguish the Princes of the House of Orange. But so far as precedents go, those just discussed establish the right of intervention beyond dispute, wh
Historians (search for this): article 2
olicy, or an explanation of the views of the Americanizing section of the Cabinet. The only documents that do seem to express their opinions and defend their action as they would have it defended are two letters that have appeared in the Times from the p n of a gentleman actually connected with Ministerial families, and formerly reputed to be the author of some of the bitterest and most brilliant essays that won the first place among weekly journals for the paper in which they appeared. Historians as it pleases him to be called, is a special pleader of no mean capacity; and if a case can be made cut for his clients, we may be sure that it is contained in the long and able articles in which he endeavors to demonstrate the wrongfulness of recognition and the impossibility of Intervention. His first argument is directed to dispose of the precedents alleged in favor of recognition. Those of Greece and Belgium, he affirms, are not precedents in point at all. The great Powers did no
Russia (Russia) (search for this): article 2
ore destructive, far more effectual, and therefore far shorter than it was a quarter of a century before. The Crimean war, which thoroughly humbled the pride of Russia, and broke the heart of the Czar, did not last longer than the American war has already lasted. The campaign which deprived the Austrians of Lombardy lasted but olland defied the five Powers." No such thing; she defied Belgium, and defeated the Belgians over and over but when England and France interfered, though she had Russia, Austria, and Prussia on her side, she withdrew from the contest. We do not expect from Mr. Lincoln the singular good sense and moderation which distinguish the ce of opinion could well arise. Where is the difficulty of arranging a basis of agreement on the third which could be jointly recommended by England, France, and Russia? The presence of a few Federal garrisons on Southern soil does not affect the question, as may be clearly seen by the precedents of Greece and Belgium. There ar
England (United Kingdom) (search for this): article 2
drew the sword for national existence. Historicus next brings forward a precedent of his own adverse to recognition. He says that when the Government of Louis XVI. made a treaty of commerce with the Government of our revolted colonies, Great Britain that act, involving as it did the recognition of the revolt, an act of hostility, and made it the ground for a declaration of war. Further, he asserts that the King of France knew that he was committing a hostile act, in as much as he made a secret treaty of offensive and defensive alliance with the Congress. Of course such treaties are never really secret. Great Britain knew that France was preparing for war; she knew that France had all along given aid and comfort to her enemies, and she chose her own time to strike, not because the considered the recognition of the colonies a casus but because that recognition was the symptom and signal of a conspiracy which had been long at work, and which she was undeniably entitled to pu
Alabama (Alabama, United States) (search for this): article 2
. Passing to the stronger and closer parallel afforded by the case of the Spanish colonies, he points out that we did not recognize all of these, but only those in which Spain had practically ceased to keep up the war, omitting all mention of Peru, in which a Spanish army still asserted the right of the mother country. But the presence of that army in Peru created just the same danger to the other colonies that the presence of a Federal army of 200,000 men in Virginia creates for Georgia, Alabama, and the Carolinas. If Peru had been conquered, that army would have passed on to attack the other revolted possessions of Spain, and in fact, the plan of attacking them in detail was the only one which afforded any solid chance of success. The real equivalent, in the case of North America, for the action we took in the matter of the Spanish colonies, would be the recognition of the Confederate Government, waiving, as of course we should waive, the question of the frontier line. But, say
Lombardy (Italy) (search for this): article 2
y should be denied the privileges to which their achievements entitle them? It must be remembered that within the last ten years modern science has rendered war far more costly, far more destructive, far more effectual, and therefore far shorter than it was a quarter of a century before. The Crimean war, which thoroughly humbled the pride of Russia, and broke the heart of the Czar, did not last longer than the American war has already lasted. The campaign which deprived the Austrians of Lombardy lasted but a few weeks; a few months sufficed for the conquest of Raples and Sicily. The Indian mutiny began, wrested nearly the whole of Bengal and the Northwest from our hands, and was utterly trampled out within a twelvemonth. Two years of such a war as that which the Federal Government is waging against the Confederate States are of far more account than twenty years of such a war as Spain waged against her revolted colonies; and to have sustained the burdens, the losses, the perils
Hungary (Hungary) (search for this): article 2
omfort to her enemies, and she chose her own time to strike, not because the considered the recognition of the colonies a casus but because that recognition was the symptom and signal of a conspiracy which had been long at work, and which she was undeniably entitled to punish by force of arms. But a later case most foolishly by the Ministerial advocate, disposes of all argument on this point. The American Government recognized (or rather offered to recognize) the short-lived Republic of Hungary. This was says Historicus, a breach of international law — an act of hostility against Austria Be it so. But the American Government and American affirm that it was not so; and by their own rations and by their own act they are estopped from all complaint if any European Power shall tomorrow recognize the Government at Richmond Say, if on January 1st, 1861, England had recognized South Carolina, we cannot see how, on its own showing, the Federal Government could have claimed a right to r
Delaware (Delaware, United States) (search for this): article 2
y be clearly seen by the precedents of Greece and Belgium. There are two or three distinct principles on which a frontier line might be drawn. We might recognize the acts of individual States, and confine the Southern Confederacy to those which have actually and formally become members thereof--Virginia, Tennessee, Arkansas, and the States south of them, with the territory of New Mexico. Or we might recognize the sovereign rights of the people, and allow Missouri, Kentucky, Maryland, and Delaware to decide their own fate Tuscany, the Legations, and the Duchies. Or we might undertake ourselves to draw a frontier line, giving to the North these districts which are Northern by sympathy, and to the South those which desire to be Southern. There could be few cases in which it would be easier to decide on a common basis of action; few in which the power of the mediators to enforce their decimation could be less doubtful. The South is ready to accept any fair terms of peace; if the Nor
Georgia (Georgia, United States) (search for this): article 2
ssistance. Passing to the stronger and closer parallel afforded by the case of the Spanish colonies, he points out that we did not recognize all of these, but only those in which Spain had practically ceased to keep up the war, omitting all mention of Peru, in which a Spanish army still asserted the right of the mother country. But the presence of that army in Peru created just the same danger to the other colonies that the presence of a Federal army of 200,000 men in Virginia creates for Georgia, Alabama, and the Carolinas. If Peru had been conquered, that army would have passed on to attack the other revolted possessions of Spain, and in fact, the plan of attacking them in detail was the only one which afforded any solid chance of success. The real equivalent, in the case of North America, for the action we took in the matter of the Spanish colonies, would be the recognition of the Confederate Government, waiving, as of course we should waive, the question of the frontier line.
Maryland (Maryland, United States) (search for this): article 2
uestion, as may be clearly seen by the precedents of Greece and Belgium. There are two or three distinct principles on which a frontier line might be drawn. We might recognize the acts of individual States, and confine the Southern Confederacy to those which have actually and formally become members thereof--Virginia, Tennessee, Arkansas, and the States south of them, with the territory of New Mexico. Or we might recognize the sovereign rights of the people, and allow Missouri, Kentucky, Maryland, and Delaware to decide their own fate Tuscany, the Legations, and the Duchies. Or we might undertake ourselves to draw a frontier line, giving to the North these districts which are Northern by sympathy, and to the South those which desire to be Southern. There could be few cases in which it would be easier to decide on a common basis of action; few in which the power of the mediators to enforce their decimation could be less doubtful. The South is ready to accept any fair terms of pea
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