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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 31. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones). Search the whole document.

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December 27th, 1903 AD (search for this): chapter 1.46
The battle of Shiloh, April 6, 1862. [from the New Orleans, La., Picayune, Dec. 27, 1903, and Jan. 24, 1904.] By Captain James Dinkins. After the surrender of the Southern forces at Fort Donelson, in February, 1862, the Confederates abandoned Kentucky and mobilized at Corinth, Miss. The troops under General Bragg were also drawn from Pensacola, and such, also, as were at New Orleans. This combined force, at the suggestion of General Beauregard, was reorganized into three army corps. The First, commanded by Major-General Polk, 10,000 strong, was made up of two divisions, under Major B. F. Cheatham and Brigadier-General Clarke, respectively, of two brigades each. The Second, under Major-General Bragg, was arranged in two divisions also, commanded by Brigadier-General Withers and Ruggles, with three brigades each, and numbered about fifteen thousand men. The Third Corps, commanded by Major-General Hardee, was formed of three brigades not in division, and three brigades
January 24th, 1904 AD (search for this): chapter 1.46
The battle of Shiloh, April 6, 1862. [from the New Orleans, La., Picayune, Dec. 27, 1903, and Jan. 24, 1904.] By Captain James Dinkins. After the surrender of the Southern forces at Fort Donelson, in February, 1862, the Confederates abandoned Kentucky and mobilized at Corinth, Miss. The troops under General Bragg were also drawn from Pensacola, and such, also, as were at New Orleans. This combined force, at the suggestion of General Beauregard, was reorganized into three army corps. The First, commanded by Major-General Polk, 10,000 strong, was made up of two divisions, under Major B. F. Cheatham and Brigadier-General Clarke, respectively, of two brigades each. The Second, under Major-General Bragg, was arranged in two divisions also, commanded by Brigadier-General Withers and Ruggles, with three brigades each, and numbered about fifteen thousand men. The Third Corps, commanded by Major-General Hardee, was formed of three brigades not in division, and three brigades
January 10th, 1864 AD (search for this): chapter 1.46
erate cavalrymen in superb order, yelling and shouting. They moved so quickly and unexpectedly, they were upon the enemy before they had time to anticipate it. At twenty paces, the boys gave a volley with their shotguns, then rushed on with their pistols. So sudden was the onset that despite their numbers the Yankee cavalry broke in disorder, and rushing back through the woods, ran over their infantry, creating a scene of confusion unequaled probably, save at Brice's Crossroads, on January 10, 1864, when Forrest annihilated Sturges. Numbers of the Federal infantry were mowed down, while others used their bayonets against the horses, and they, falling, threw their riders, bruised, to the ground. Before the infantry could recover, Forrest was upon them, and they broke as well as the cavalry. It is said that men are merciless on some occasions. On this one, the Yankees, fleeing for their lives, were pursued by their eager, excited enemy for some hundred yards, and the loss wa
February, 1862 AD (search for this): chapter 1.46
The battle of Shiloh, April 6, 1862. [from the New Orleans, La., Picayune, Dec. 27, 1903, and Jan. 24, 1904.] By Captain James Dinkins. After the surrender of the Southern forces at Fort Donelson, in February, 1862, the Confederates abandoned Kentucky and mobilized at Corinth, Miss. The troops under General Bragg were also drawn from Pensacola, and such, also, as were at New Orleans. This combined force, at the suggestion of General Beauregard, was reorganized into three army corps. The First, commanded by Major-General Polk, 10,000 strong, was made up of two divisions, under Major B. F. Cheatham and Brigadier-General Clarke, respectively, of two brigades each. The Second, under Major-General Bragg, was arranged in two divisions also, commanded by Brigadier-General Withers and Ruggles, with three brigades each, and numbered about fifteen thousand men. The Third Corps, commanded by Major-General Hardee, was formed of three brigades not in division, and three brigades u
ral army was greatly elated over the success it achieved at Fort Donelson, while the Confederates, painfully reminded of that disaster, were anxious and impatient to efface it from the minds of our people. It was on this day, the afternoon of April 2, that General Johnston decided to attack Grant before Buell, who was moving with all dispatch with five strong divisions, could effect a junction with him. General Johnston determined, if possible to take Grant by surprise and defeat him before . M., at which time the Federals began to advance. In order to present the causes and follow the events, let us begin with the time when the Confederate army was at Corinth. Generals Johnston and Beauregard met at 1 o'clock on the night of April 2, and deliberated over the coming movement. At halfpast 1 o'clock on the morning of the 3d the corps commanders were notified to be in readiness to move at a moment's notice. By noon of that day the whole Confederate army was under arms and rea
e at a certain hour, and over specified roads. From some unexplained cause the First Corps did not cover the distance expected, and therefore did not meet General Johnston's expectations. Moreover, it rained very heavily during the night of the 3d, and Bragg's Corps could not advance beyond Monterey on the second day, which was the 4th of April, whereas Generals Johnston and Beauregard confidently expected that by the night of the 4th the whole army would bivouac near enough to the enemy to confidence. Success, therefore, as we have stated, depended on taking the Federals unawares, before they could fortify their position. It is proper to state again (in some extenuation) that it began to rain very heavily during the night of the 3d, which softened the roads and retarded the movement of the troops. It would seem, however, that the corps commanders, aware of the importance of surprising the enemy, would have used greater efforts to impel the men along. Will anyone believe th
ent to the evidences of the coming tempest. General Johnston depended on being ready to attack on Saturday, and he did so with every show of reason, but Polk's Corps did not reach the point designated until about 2 o'clock in the afternoon of April 5. Bragg's Corps was likewise slow in getting up, although Generals Johnston and Beauregard kept their staff officers busy the entire time urging the troops forward. General Johnston was greatly annoyed that he had been balked in his plans andted that by the night of the 4th the whole army would bivouac near enough to the enemy to be able to attack on the morning of the 5th. General Polk's Corps did not reach the vicinity of the designated point until 2 o'clock Saturday afternoon, April 5. Bragg's Corps was likewise inexplicably slow in arriving. It was known by the corps commanders that General Johnston desired to attack Saturday, the 5th. Instead of being able to attack Saturday, however, General Johnston was confronted with
ld to others as the gospel truth. I have heard these stories told by numerous men who participated in the battle. They believe them. Some said General So-and-so asserted it, therefore it was true. If anyone who desires to know the facts, and will read the reports of the different division, brigade, and regimental commanders, he will find that nearly every command had withdrawn from the fight before the order from General Beauregard reached them. The true reason why this battle of Sunday, April 6, fell short of a complete victory is perfectly plain to anyone who will give the subject careful investigation. Certainly the facts should be stated and the responsibility placed where it belongs. The writer has, during all the intervening years, believed that General Beauregard displayed bad judgment in withdrawing the troops. He has been under the impression that he did so in the midst of rushing columns and victorious yells; but this is not true. To begin with, the Confederate
person to Generals Polk, Bragg and Hardee his plans, and they were directed to put their forces in motion. Nothing could have been more inspiring than the spirit and enthusiasm with which the entire army entered upon the movement. At noon of April 3 the whole army was ready to begin the march. From some cause, however, the First Corps, though ready and anxious, did not move at the hour appointed, and therefore did not bivouac that night as far in advance as General Johnston expected they would do. During the night of April 3 it rained very heavily, and this greatly retarded the movements. Bragg did not advance the second day beyond Monterey, whereas it was expected that by the evening of the 4th the whole army would be near enough the enemy to attack on the morning of tha 5th. It has never been satisfactorily explained why Polk's and Bragg's Corps were so long making the march over the short distance from Corinth to Monterey. A cavalry force was sent in advance to obtain i
a moment's notice. By noon of that day the whole Confederate army was under arms and ready to begin the march. Each corps commander received orders to move at a certain hour, and over specified roads. From some unexplained cause the First Corps did not cover the distance expected, and therefore did not meet General Johnston's expectations. Moreover, it rained very heavily during the night of the 3d, and Bragg's Corps could not advance beyond Monterey on the second day, which was the 4th of April, whereas Generals Johnston and Beauregard confidently expected that by the night of the 4th the whole army would bivouac near enough to the enemy to be able to attack on the morning of the 5th. General Polk's Corps did not reach the vicinity of the designated point until 2 o'clock Saturday afternoon, April 5. Bragg's Corps was likewise inexplicably slow in arriving. It was known by the corps commanders that General Johnston desired to attack Saturday, the 5th. Instead of being able
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