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Metz (France) (search for this): chapter 8
the close of the war, and displayed superior ability as a corps commander whilst in the Army of Tennessee. A forcible example of the difference in the mode of handling troops — as illustrated by General Lee, and those generals who constantly resort to the use of fortifications — is afforded in the recent war between France and Prussia, and also in that between Turkey and Russia. One hundred and fifty thousand of Louis Napoleon's Army, under Bazaine, shut themselves up in the stronghold of Metz; allowed a much larger number of Germans to surround them; to construct works almost as formidable as their own, and quietly await their surrender for want of provisions. The Turks committed a similar blunder at Plevna, in allowing a fine army to be entrapped and the remainder of their forces to become demoralized by the natural effect of this gross error, in lieu of holding their troops well in hand, taking some general line upon which to retard and cripple the enemy as much as possible,
Maryland (Maryland, United States) (search for this): chapter 8
ner in which General Lee handled his troops. After the battle of Sharpsburg, or Antietam, McClellan followed him south of the Potomac; instead of forming line of battle, and throwing up entrenchments upon every suitable hill he could find, from Maryland to the Rapidan, for the purpose of skirmishing, and delaying the enemy — which work he properly left to the cavalry — he threw his colors to the breeze, and, with martial music, marched to the line of Gordonsville and Fredericksburg. A few montresults might have ensued. In view of General Johnston's now avowed intention to have made a stand at Atlanta, it would certainly have been more judicious to have marched direct to the line he had resolved to defendas General Lee marched out of Maryland and Pennsylvania to the Rapidan; to have thus reserved the twenty-five thousand (25,000) effective men and nineteen thousand (19,000) muskets, lost on our retreat through Georgia, and have used these trained soldiers and good muskets on the side
Edgefield (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 8
peaks thus : Johnston's Narrative, page 275. I can see no other mode of taking the offensive here than to beat the enemy when he advances, and then move forward. In response to General Bragg's letter of March 12th, proffering fully eighty thousand (80,000) men, as an inducement to assume the offensive, and to which letter I have already referred, General Johnston dispatched the following telegram: Johnston's Narrative, page 294. Your letter by Colonel Sale received. Grant is at Nashville. Where Grant is we must expect the great Federal effort. We ought, therefore, to be prepared to beat him here --at Dalton. In his written reply to the same, he says: Johnston's Narrative, page 295. We cannot estimate the time he (the enemy) will require for preparation, and should, consequently, put ourselves in condition for successful resistance as soon as possible by assembling here the troops you enumerate. Again, Johnston's Narrative, page 296. I would have the troops assemb
Spottsylvania (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 8
he same commander, they would have proved soldiers of equal merit With these premises, I shall proceed to show in brief the cause of difference between these brother-soldiers of opposite schools. General Lee never made use of entrenchments, except for the purpose of holding a part of his line with a small force, whilst he assailed the enemy with the main body of his Army — as, for instance, around Richmond at the time of the battle of Gaines's Mills — and save en dernier resort, as at Spottsylvania, to and around Petersburg, toward the close of the war. He well knew that the constant use of breastworks would teach his soldiers to look and depend upon such protection as an indispensable source of strength; would imperil that spirit of devil-me-care independence and self-reliance which was one of their secret sources of power, and would, finally, impair the morale of his Army. A soldier cannot fight for a period of one or two months constantly behind breastworks, with the training t
Chattahoochee River, Ga. (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 8
m success in their engagements with the enemy. At the date of my transfer to the West, I, still under the influence of the teaching of Lee, Jackson, and Longstreet, could not but recognize a marked difference, after the crossing of the Chattahoochee river, between the troops of the Army of Tennessee and those of Virginia. My long experience and service with the latter, who formed, their limited numbers notwithstanding, one of the most powerful as well as renowned Armies the world has produwhen he should have made his attack. By the pursuance of this policy, he would have been able to engage Sherman with over seventy thousand (70,000) effective men, instead of fifty thousand (50,000) he claims to have had after crossing the Chattahoochee river. In lieu thereof, a course was pursued which entailed a loss of twenty-five thousand (25,000) men, without a single general battle having been fought, and which seriously demoralized the next to the largest and proudest Army assembled in
Gordonsville (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 8
shall consider, for a moment, the manner in which General Lee handled his troops. After the battle of Sharpsburg, or Antietam, McClellan followed him south of the Potomac; instead of forming line of battle, and throwing up entrenchments upon every suitable hill he could find, from Maryland to the Rapidan, for the purpose of skirmishing, and delaying the enemy — which work he properly left to the cavalry — he threw his colors to the breeze, and, with martial music, marched to the line of Gordonsville and Fredericksburg. A few months later, when the Federals appeared in his front, he marshaled his forces, which, refreshed by their long rest, were anxious for battle; he at once attacked, defeated the enemy, and pursued him to the Potomac. He thus drove back, successively, Pope, Burnside, and Hooker. After the battle of Gettysburg, Meade likewise followed Lee south of the Potomac. Again, he marched to the line of the Rapidan, as in the first instance, leaving his cavalry to observe
Kingston, Ga. (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 8
nor the force to repair them. If General Johnston considered Atlanta so especially adapted to his purposes, inasmuch as it was too extensive to be invested and too strong to be carried by assault, I am at a loss to divine the reason why he did not take a radius equal to that of Atlanta, and describe a circle from a given centre, within the mountains of Georgia; throw up entrenchments, and declare to the world the impregnability of his position and his intention to hold it forever. Trees of the forest would certainly have been of as much or more service to him than buildings proved to me in Atlanta, or to General Lee in Petersburg, and Richmond. No more decided advantage was to be derived from the junction of railways, at Atlanta, than was afforded at Kingston, or any other point on the railway line below Dalton, because of our poverty in resources towards the close of hostilities and consequent inability to reconstruct at the same time two or three roads when seriously damaged.
Macon (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 8
the dawn of day, promulgated the order that night to the troops, and by dark, the next evening, he was journeying towards Macon with all speed possible. Had he remained with the Army, at my urgent solicitation, he would undoubtedly, have gained theous campaign, the abandonment of the mountain fastnesses, and the foreshadowed intention of our commander to fall back to Macon? I shall now glance at his two plans for the defence of Atlanta, one of which was to insure the security of that city ack the enemy as they crossed Peach Tree creek. Within thirty-six hours, almost before he had time to select quarters in Macon after his departure on the evening of the 18th of July, General Thomas was crossing Peach Tree creek, whilst McPherson anmy's left was across the Augusta Railroad, southeast of the town, and moving rapidly southwest to destroy the railroad to Macon. Your views upon this important subject, I should be pleased to have at your earliest convenience. Yours truly, J.
Seven Pines (West Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 8
f General Johnston be correct in his assertion that no reason exists why Atlanta should not have been held forever, a heavy responsibility rests upon the Confederate authorities who relieved him of the command of the Army of Tennessee. Heavier still is the responsibility assumed by them, when they refused to dismiss General Lee from the command of the Army of Northern Virginia, and to re-assign General Johnston to that position, after his recovery from a wound received at the battle of Seven Pines. He states, in addition, Johnston's Narrative, page 358. that his Army had a place of refuge in Atlanta, too strong to be taken by assault, and too extensive to be invested. According to his theory, Richmond, which was larger than Atlanta, should also have been too extensive to be invested; and its defences, which I am certain any council of competent officers would pronounce more tenable than those of its sister city, should also have been too strong to be carried by assault. It
Peach Tree Creek (Mississippi, United States) (search for this): chapter 8
, he hoped to attack the enemy as they crossed Peach Tree creek. Within thirty-six hours, almost before he ha the 18th of July, General Thomas was crossing Peach Tree creek, whilst McPherson and Schofield were moving to man the works of Atlanta, on the side towards Peach Tree creek, with the Georgia State troops; and. upon the advantage while they were divided in crossing Peach Tree creek, trusting to General Wheeler's vigilance for tto man the works of Atlanta on the side toward Peach Tree creek with those troops, and leisurely fall back witich that place was the object. The passage of Peach Tree creek may not have given an opportunity to attack; bg a line of breastworks as that on the side of Peach Tree creek, which embraced the front of General Sherman'scussion of this character. The side towards Peach Tree creek embraced about the entire front of General She soldiers and good muskets on the side towards Peach Tree creek, instead of General Gustavus W. Smith's five t
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