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Rebellion Record: a Diary of American Events: Documents and Narratives, Volume 8. (ed. Frank Moore)

lf-way reconnaissance. The next reliable information we had of the enemy's movements was when Rosser suddenly attacked one of our trains while on its way from New-Creek to Petersburgh. It is now known to be a fact that the eight hundred men sent as a guard with the train were disgracefully remiss in the discharge of their duty.gh, etc., to reach the Romney region at the expected time. As soon as it was known the railroad had been cut, Colonel Mulligan's forces moved forward from the New-Creek region and attacked the enemy. We were successful in making the enemy fall back. Our movements toward the enemy's rear of course hastened his departure from a defeated Early's designs, which were to seriously injure the line of the railroad and capture the garrison at Petersburgh. He has been defeated in getting into New-Creek or Cumberland, failed to interrupt the running of the railroad trains beyond a few hours, and failed to get off with any large portion of his prisoners or plunde

several hours to communicate with or get in supporting distance of Colonel Mulligan. While Fitzsimmons's and Thompson's troops were marching toward Romney, a cavalry force was despatched to look after rebel movements in the neighborhood of Leesburgh and in the Loudon County district, it having been rumored that a rebel force was moving and operating in that neighborhood. On Saturday night, the thirtieth, Colonel Thoburn, finding the enemy about to attack him in force at Petersburgh, Hardy County, evacuated his position there, and escaped to Ridgeville, where he joined a detachment of Colonel Mulligan's troops, and afterward moved with Mulligan to attack Early, near Moorfield. How Thoburn outwitted the enemy, who thought he had Thoburn penned in, has been partially explained in a previous despatch to the Herald. Let it suffice that I now say he got away with better success than we anticipated, and that his strategic movement over the mountains and far away is looked upon in the l

y injuring another one. How soon the damage was repaired and how trivial it was, you have already learned. The enemy succeeded in reaching the railroad and in partially safely getting away, only in consequence of the columns from Martinsburgh and Harper's Ferry having defeated General Kelly's calculation by failing to reach Romney at six P. M. on the evening of the second. It was calculated that this column would be at Romney as stated, and that any rebel force which moved in by way of Springfield or Frankfort would be cut off by Fitzsimmons's, Thompson's, or Mulligan's forces, and kept from doing any great injury to the railroad by the troops stationed at Cumberland and elsewhere within easy supporting distances. This was not all the plan of operation, but that portion which the enemy knew about, as well as ourselves; and hence I can see no indiscretion in now publishing it. Yet while all did their duty in the best possible manner, (and here I feel constrained to assure the reade

a junction with Fitzsimmons. These united columns then moved across the country toward Romney, going by way of Wardensville. Their march was a rough and rapid one, and, although conducted in the best possible manner, failed by several hours to communicate with or get in supporting distance of Colonel Mulligan. While Fitzsimmons's and Thompson's troops were marching toward Romney, a cavalry force was despatched to look after rebel movements in the neighborhood of Leesburgh and in the Loudon County district, it having been rumored that a rebel force was moving and operating in that neighborhood. On Saturday night, the thirtieth, Colonel Thoburn, finding the enemy about to attack him in force at Petersburgh, Hardy County, evacuated his position there, and escaped to Ridgeville, where he joined a detachment of Colonel Mulligan's troops, and afterward moved with Mulligan to attack Early, near Moorfield. How Thoburn outwitted the enemy, who thought he had Thoburn penned in, has bee

ched to look after rebel movements in the neighborhood of Leesburgh and in the Loudon County district, it having been rumored that a rebel force was moving and operating in that neighborhood. On Saturday night, the thirtieth, Colonel Thoburn, finding the enemy about to attack him in force at Petersburgh, Hardy County, evacuated his position there, and escaped to Ridgeville, where he joined a detachment of Colonel Mulligan's troops, and afterward moved with Mulligan to attack Early, near Moorfield. How Thoburn outwitted the enemy, who thought he had Thoburn penned in, has been partially explained in a previous despatch to the Herald. Let it suffice that I now say he got away with better success than we anticipated, and that his strategic movement over the mountains and far away is looked upon in the light of a very commendable feat. Having got Thoburn all right, our forces moving on Romney. another small force out watching from the neighborhood of Cumberland, we slowly fell bac

Doc. 70.-operations in West-Virginia. A national account. in the field, West-Virginia, February 5, 1864. The operations of the last seven days, although at times extremely varied in their character, have at last terminated in a series of successes that at once dispel the darksome clouds of temporary rebel prosperity, and open a bright vista to our true interests. The operations on both sides have been conducted with great rapidity, considering the mountainous condition of the cWest-Virginia, February 5, 1864. The operations of the last seven days, although at times extremely varied in their character, have at last terminated in a series of successes that at once dispel the darksome clouds of temporary rebel prosperity, and open a bright vista to our true interests. The operations on both sides have been conducted with great rapidity, considering the mountainous condition of the country, the bad state of the roads, the time it requires to concentrate and move columns of troops, and the usual necessary features attendant upon a raiding and the repelling of a raid campaign. For some time past we had been in possession of information to the effect that General Early was concentrating troops and being reenforced in the neighborhood of Harrisonburgh, with a view to again attempting the capture of the garrison at Petersburgh, and then making another raid on the line of the

ther one. How soon the damage was repaired and how trivial it was, you have already learned. The enemy succeeded in reaching the railroad and in partially safely getting away, only in consequence of the columns from Martinsburgh and Harper's Ferry having defeated General Kelly's calculation by failing to reach Romney at six P. M. on the evening of the second. It was calculated that this column would be at Romney as stated, and that any rebel force which moved in by way of Springfield or Frankfort would be cut off by Fitzsimmons's, Thompson's, or Mulligan's forces, and kept from doing any great injury to the railroad by the troops stationed at Cumberland and elsewhere within easy supporting distances. This was not all the plan of operation, but that portion which the enemy knew about, as well as ourselves; and hence I can see no indiscretion in now publishing it. Yet while all did their duty in the best possible manner, (and here I feel constrained to assure the reader that, no mat

d displays evidences of progress and refinement not observable in other portions of this region of country. About three miles from the town of Moorefield, following the Moorefield and Romney turnpike road, you cross the south branch of the Potomac River at what is known as McNeil's Ford. It was here that Colonel Mulligan on Thursday, in pursuing the enemy, had a fight. Rosser's command disputed the passage of the river. The lands of this neighborhood are almost of a dead level, but the riown, when he made another stand. More fighting ensued, and in the course of three hours we drove him from his last position to and through the town and beyond it. Early's forces then fell back toward the south fork of the south branch of the Potomac River, Mulligan all the time keeping close upon the enemy's rear, by aid of his cavalry force. The enemy took the south fork road, which runs through a branch valley of the great Moorefield valley. This South-Branch valley is quite a narrow one,

ast we had been in possession of information to the effect that General Early was concentrating troops and being reenforced in the neighborhoder on that subject. Hardly had this been done when we got news of Early having moved on Friday, January twenty-ninth. Of course it was tooonel Mulligan's troops, and afterward moved with Mulligan to attack Early, near Moorfield. How Thoburn outwitted the enemy, who thought he htened to come into our lines. From these deserters we learned that Early had been reenforced heavily, and that it was true he had been makinment. At the time when Mulligan first engaged Rosser at the ford — Early was at Moorefield (behind Rosser) with a heavy force of infantry anas the South-Fork of the South-Branch. Rosser undertook to protect Early's rear. The narrowness of the valley alone prevented us from drivibeen successful, and that it is beyond doubt we have again defeated Early's designs, which were to seriously injure the line of the railroad