hide Sorting

You can sort these results in two ways:

By entity
Chronological order for dates, alphabetical order for places and people.
By position (current method)
As the entities appear in the document.

You are currently sorting in ascending order. Sort in descending order.

hide Most Frequent Entities

The entities that appear most frequently in this document are shown below.

Entity Max. Freq Min. Freq
United States (United States) 502 0 Browse Search
W. T. Sherman 459 1 Browse Search
Ulysses S. Grant 368 6 Browse Search
Jefferson Davis 352 2 Browse Search
Stonewall Jackson 335 1 Browse Search
Robert E. Lee 328 16 Browse Search
Abraham Lincoln 293 1 Browse Search
Longstreet 288 22 Browse Search
Joseph E. Johnston 278 8 Browse Search
George B. McClellan 276 2 Browse Search
View all entities in this document...

Browsing named entities in a specific section of Edward Alfred Pollard, The lost cause; a new Southern history of the War of the Confederates ... Drawn from official sources and approved by the most distinguished Confederate leaders.. Search the whole document.

Found 83 total hits in 23 results.

1 2 3
1776 AD (search for this): chapter 25
the Southern banks became involved. practical results of their loan to the Government. making money by machinery. sales of Confederate bonds. special occasions for this investment. unequal to relieve the currency. rates of depreciation of the Confederate money.Richmond, the centre of finance and trade. gold not a measure of value in the Confederacy. reasons for its extraordinary appreciation there. comparison of Confederate money with the Continental currency in the Revolution of 1776. two capital causes of the depreciation of the Confederate money. the influence of speculation. how the engrossers managed in Richmond. summary of the mismanagement of the Confederate finances Gettysburg and Vicksburg were twin victories for the Federals-twin disasters for the Confederates. They marked the line where the war turned, and the fortunes of the Southern Confederacy declined. The disaster of Vicksburg was a shock to the whole internal economy of the South; and this period
February, 1779 AD (search for this): chapter 25
he money of the Southern Confederacy, and of the Congress of the first American Confederation. We have already stated the gradual depreciation of the one. The progress of the depreciation in the old Continental money, though somewhat more tardy, was in the same degree. In May, 1777, the Continental paper dollar was worth at the rate of two and two-thirds for one in specie. In December it was worth four for one. In March, 1778, it was worth five for one; in December, six for one. In February, 1779, it was worth ten for one; in June, twenty; in September, twenty-four; in December, thirty-nine. After the year 1779 it seemed to have no value. The total amount of this old Continental money that was issued, was two hundred millions of dollars; and it was worth to those who received it, at the period when paid out by the Government, only thirty-six and a half millions of dollars. A similar scaling of the money of the Confederate Treasury would reduce the cost of the war on the Southe
January, 1863 AD (search for this): chapter 25
A competent agency should have been employed, which should have watched, directed, and controlled the movement from the beginning; an agency clothed with absolute power over the circulation, and endowed with a sufficient capital to ensure a ready sale at reasonable prices of the public bonds. The progress of the depreciation of the Confederate money was at first gradual; but afterwards very rapid. In was worth at the brokers' shops in Richmond one dollar twenty cents in currency. In January 1863, the value varied from twelve to twenty. It afterwards, as we shall see, fell much lower. It must be observed, however, that these brokers' rates, were invariably a long period in advance of the rates acted upon in the interiour. As late as the summer of 1862, Confederate money was taken at par in the settlement of all transactions originating before the war and made the basis of the general transactions of the country at the old rate of prices. The brokers' rates were either unknown
December (search for this): chapter 25
hough somewhat more tardy, was in the same degree. In May, 1777, the Continental paper dollar was worth at the rate of two and two-thirds for one in specie. In December it was worth four for one. In March, 1778, it was worth five for one; in December, six for one. In February, 1779, it was worth ten for one; in June, twenty; iDecember, six for one. In February, 1779, it was worth ten for one; in June, twenty; in September, twenty-four; in December, thirty-nine. After the year 1779 it seemed to have no value. The total amount of this old Continental money that was issued, was two hundred millions of dollars; and it was worth to those who received it, at the period when paid out by the Government, only thirty-six and a half millions of December, thirty-nine. After the year 1779 it seemed to have no value. The total amount of this old Continental money that was issued, was two hundred millions of dollars; and it was worth to those who received it, at the period when paid out by the Government, only thirty-six and a half millions of dollars. A similar scaling of the money of the Confederate Treasury would reduce the cost of the war on the Southern side to less than a thousand millions of dollars. The difference between that sum and the nominal cost measures the aggregate depreciation of the money. The principal cause of the depreciation of this money, i
March, 1863 AD (search for this): chapter 25
with the public operations shall be impoverished rather than enriched by a state of war, we shall have no occasion to expect the Millennium. The three most conspicuous examples of the abuse of credit for purposes of war, antecedent to those furnished by the two belligerents in the American conflict, were those of Great Britain, France, and Russia. The debt of the British government at the close of the Napoleonic wars, was eight hundred and eighty-five millions of pounds sterling. In March, 1863, after a lapse of nearly half a century, embracing the costly expenditures of the Crimean war, it had been reduced, by dint of resolute taxation, no lower than the amount of seven hundred and eighty million pounds sterling, or about thirty-nine hundred millions of dollars. The amount of Assignats issued by the Revolutionary authorities of France, counting all the different series, reached the enormous amount of forty thousand millions of francs. The statement seems incredible; but i
1779 AD (search for this): chapter 25
gradual depreciation of the one. The progress of the depreciation in the old Continental money, though somewhat more tardy, was in the same degree. In May, 1777, the Continental paper dollar was worth at the rate of two and two-thirds for one in specie. In December it was worth four for one. In March, 1778, it was worth five for one; in December, six for one. In February, 1779, it was worth ten for one; in June, twenty; in September, twenty-four; in December, thirty-nine. After the year 1779 it seemed to have no value. The total amount of this old Continental money that was issued, was two hundred millions of dollars; and it was worth to those who received it, at the period when paid out by the Government, only thirty-six and a half millions of dollars. A similar scaling of the money of the Confederate Treasury would reduce the cost of the war on the Southern side to less than a thousand millions of dollars. The difference between that sum and the nominal cost measures the ag
September (search for this): chapter 25
the first American Confederation. We have already stated the gradual depreciation of the one. The progress of the depreciation in the old Continental money, though somewhat more tardy, was in the same degree. In May, 1777, the Continental paper dollar was worth at the rate of two and two-thirds for one in specie. In December it was worth four for one. In March, 1778, it was worth five for one; in December, six for one. In February, 1779, it was worth ten for one; in June, twenty; in September, twenty-four; in December, thirty-nine. After the year 1779 it seemed to have no value. The total amount of this old Continental money that was issued, was two hundred millions of dollars; and it was worth to those who received it, at the period when paid out by the Government, only thirty-six and a half millions of dollars. A similar scaling of the money of the Confederate Treasury would reduce the cost of the war on the Southern side to less than a thousand millions of dollars. The d
June (search for this): chapter 25
d of the Congress of the first American Confederation. We have already stated the gradual depreciation of the one. The progress of the depreciation in the old Continental money, though somewhat more tardy, was in the same degree. In May, 1777, the Continental paper dollar was worth at the rate of two and two-thirds for one in specie. In December it was worth four for one. In March, 1778, it was worth five for one; in December, six for one. In February, 1779, it was worth ten for one; in June, twenty; in September, twenty-four; in December, thirty-nine. After the year 1779 it seemed to have no value. The total amount of this old Continental money that was issued, was two hundred millions of dollars; and it was worth to those who received it, at the period when paid out by the Government, only thirty-six and a half millions of dollars. A similar scaling of the money of the Confederate Treasury would reduce the cost of the war on the Southern side to less than a thousand millions
1861 AD (search for this): chapter 25
ne abroad through the blockade during the war, as the termination of the struggle revealed a very small portion of the thirty millions, at first held by the banks, as still in their possession. The suspension of the banks early in the winter of 1861-1862 was not from any inability to protect their circulation. This latter had recently gone down very much in amount; and the banks were abundantly able to provide for it. The suspension was resorted to for the purpose of preventing the drain of t of their debts except a percentage upon their circulation. The notes of the different institutions varied in market value according to the accidental circumstances which influenced the original amount of accommodations which they had granted in 1861 to the Confederate Secretary of the Treasury. In the aggregate these accommodations had considerably exceeded the capital stock of the banks. The Confederate Treasury had paid off the accommodation notes due the banks with Treasury notes. The
1862 AD (search for this): chapter 25
road through the blockade during the war, as the termination of the struggle revealed a very small portion of the thirty millions, at first held by the banks, as still in their possession. The suspension of the banks early in the winter of 1861-1862 was not from any inability to protect their circulation. This latter had recently gone down very much in amount; and the banks were abundantly able to provide for it. The suspension was resorted to for the purpose of preventing the drain of specivaried from twelve to twenty. It afterwards, as we shall see, fell much lower. It must be observed, however, that these brokers' rates, were invariably a long period in advance of the rates acted upon in the interiour. As late as the summer of 1862, Confederate money was taken at par in the settlement of all transactions originating before the war and made the basis of the general transactions of the country at the old rate of prices. The brokers' rates were either unknown to the people or
1 2 3