[1295a]
[1]
It remained for us to speak
of tyranny, not because there is much that can be said about it, but in order
that it may receive its part in our inquiry, since we rank this also as one
among the kinds of constitution. The nature of kingship we have defined in our
first discourses,1 in
which we examined the question in relation to the constitution most commonly
denoted by the term ‘kingship,’ whether it is
disadvantageous or an advantage to states, and what person ought to be set up as king, and from what
source, and by what procedure; and in the passage in which we were considering
kingship we distinguished two kinds of tyranny, because their power in a manner
borders upon royalty, because both these forms of rule are in accordance with
law (for among some of the barbarians they elect monarchic rulers with
autocratic powers, and also in old times among the ancient Greeks some men used
to become monarchs of this sort, the rulers called
aesymnetae), but these two forms of tyranny have certain
differences from one another, although they were on the one hand of the nature
of royalty because they were in accordance with law and because they exercised
monarchic rule over willing subjects, and on the other hand of the nature of a
tyranny because they ruled despotically and according to their own judgement.
But there is a third kind of
tyranny which is thought to be tyranny in the fullest degree, being the
counterpart of universal kingship; to this sort of tyranny must necessarily
belong a monarchy
[20]
that exercises
irresponsible rule over subjects all of the same or of a higher class with a
view to its own private interest and not in the interest of the persons ruled.
Hence it is held against the will of the subjects, since no free man willingly
endures such rule.These then are the kinds of
tyranny and such is their number, for the reasons statedBut what is the best
constitution and what is the best mode of life for most cities and most of
mankind, if we do not judge by the standard of a virtue that is above the level
of private citizens or of an education that needs natural gifts and means
supplied by fortune, nor by the standard of the ideal constitution, but of a
mode of life able to be shared by most men and a constitution possible for most
states to attain? For the
constitutions called aristocracies, of which we spoke just now,2
in some cases fall somewhat out of the scope of most states, and in others
approximate to what is called constitutional government, so that it is proper to
speak of these two forms as if they were one. And indeed the decision in regard
to all these questions is based on the same elementary principles. For if it has
been rightly said in theEthics3 that the happy life is the life that is lived without
impediment in accordance with virtue, and that virtue is a middle course, it
necessarily follows that the middle course of life is the best—such a
middle course as it is possible for each class of men to attain. And these same criteria must also
necessarily apply to the goodness and badness of a state, and of a
constitution—for a constitution is a certain mode of life of a state.
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