[1325a]
[1]
that is
one that is well governed, in as much as it is conceivable that a state might be
carried on somewhere in isolation, enjoying good laws, and in such a state the
system of the constitution will not be framed for the purpose of war or of
overpowering its enemies—for we are to suppose everything to do with
war to be excluded. It is evident
therefore that while all military pursuits are to be deemed honorable, they are
not so as being the ultimate end of all things but as means to that end. And it
is the business of the good lawgiver to study how a state, a race of men or any
other community is to partake of the good life and the happiness possible for
them. Some however of the regulations laid down will vary; and in case there
exist any neighbor peoples, it is the business of the legislative art to
consider what sort of exercises should be practised in relation to what sort of
neighbors or how the state is to adopt the regulations that are suitable in
relation to each.But this question of the proper
end for the best constitutions to aim at may receive its due consideration
later.1
We
turn to those who, while agreeing that the life of virtue is the most desirable,
differ about the way in which that life should be pursued. Some disapprove of
holding office in the state, thinking that the life of the free man
[20]
is different from the life of politics and
is the most desirable of any; whereas others think the political life the best
life, for they argue that it is impossible for the man who does nothing to do
well, and doing well and happiness are the same thing.2 To these two parties we must reply that both are partly
right and partly wrong. The former are right in saying that the life of the free
man is better than the life of mastership, for this is true—there is
nothing specially dignified in employing a slave, as a slave, for giving orders
about menial duties has in it nothing of nobility; yet to think that all government is exercising the
authority of a master is a mistake, for there is as wide a difference between
ruling free men and ruling slaves as there is between the natural freeman and
the natural slave themselves. But these things have been adequately decided in
the first discourses.3 But
to praise inaction more highly than action is an error, for happiness is an
activity, and further the actions of the just and temperate have in them the
realization of much that is noble. Yet on the strength of these decisions somebody might perhaps suppose that the
highest good is to be the master of the world, since thus one would have the
power to compass the greatest number and the noblest kind of actions, and
therefore it is not the duty of the man that is capable of ruling to surrender
office to his neighbor, but rather to take it from him, and no account must be
taken by father of sons nor by sons of father nor in general by one friend of
another, and no heed must be paid to them in comparison with this; for the best
thing is the most to be desired, and to do well is the best thing. Now this statement is perhaps true
Aristotle. Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 21, translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1944.
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