Introductory Note
In the Introductory Note to Volume IX I tried to
picture with the maximum of simplicity the semianarchy prevailing in the eastern Mediterranean
when Roman armies first showed themselves seriously
in Greece. The Books contained in that volume
give us the record of Rome's first large-scale contacts with the east, her defeat of Philip, the liberation of Greece, and her effort—which seems to me
entirely genuine—to retire from Greece with clean
hands.
There is no pause in Livy's narrative at the end
of Book XXXIV, and no Roman of that time had
the opportunity which I enjoy to recapitulate and
to reflect on the course he was following. Nevertheless, it seems worth while to review the results
of the defeat of Philip. The independent Asiatic
states of Pergamum and Rhodes had co-operated
with Rome but without compensation. Ptolemy
had been friendly to Rome though he had not been
called upon to demonstrate his loyalty in the field.
Antiochus had shown unmistakable signs of his intentions by his attacks on the possessions of Ptolemy
in Asia Minor and on the Greek cities of that region
and by his territorial ambitions in Europe. Philip
had been defeated but had suffered no territorial
losses except in Greece. These were the major
components of the empire of Alexander.
Within Greece there was no longer a pro-Macedonian party in any effective sense. The liberation
of the Greek cities did not prevent attempts to
coerce them into joining the Aetolian and Achaean
Leagues which practically dominated Greece.
Athens at this period relapsed into relative obscurity,
emerging occasionally as a futile peace-maker. The
half-hearted attempt of the Romans to destroy
Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, made him the more ready
to rise to the bait of the Aetolians.
While the Achaeans remained faithful to their
Roman alliance, the Aetolians assumed the leadership
in the effort to unite all the anti-Roman elements.
Dissatisfied with their own meagre gains after
Cynoscephalae and repeatedly offended by Flamininus, who had no disposition to be criticized, their
discontent was generally known, and it was clear
that their best policy was to seek the aid of Antiochus.
The organization of Greece carried out under the
direction of Flamininus had been aristocratic in
character, and the Aetolians had much reason to
count on the economic inequalities which were thus
accentuated and on the violent party-spirit of the
Greeks. They then undertook to fuse into one
organic mass all the diversified elements which for
conflicting reasons wished to end Roman influence
in Greece and the east generally. Nabis and
Antiochus were easily won over; Philip, surprisingly,
would not join them; the Achaean League remained
loyal to Rome, and if there were undercurrents of
party strife within the Greek cities Livy is generally
unconscious of them, and the pro-Roman parties,
with the help of the Romans, were successful in
suppressing their opponents.
A war between the Romans and Antiochus was
probably inevitable even if the Aetolians had not
taken the initiative. Antiochus had been allied
with Philip against Ptolemy; he menaced Rome's
friends in Rhodes and Pergamum; Rhodes was the
potential champion of the Greek cities of Ionia;
Hannibal was numbered among his counsellors.
The most naive reader cannot be surprised that
Antiochus is the protagonist of the drama of this
volume.
Whether Rome was willing to accept the part
thrust upon her is an academic question. I cannot
believe that she realized the possible consequences
of her intervention in the larger eastern world,
and the complexities of personal ambitions and
internal politics made the realization impossible.
Perhaps a disinterested and unambitious conqueror
has at all times been an anachronism.
