Titus Livius (Livy), The History of Rome, Book 37
Evan T. Sage, PhD professor of latin and head of the department of classics in the University of Pittsburgh, Ed.

39. After the consul perceived that the enemy declined to fight, he called a council the next day, to consider [2??] what they should do if Antiochus would not give them an opportunity for a battle. [3] Winter, he said, was at hand; either they would have to keep the troops in tents or, if it was decided to withdraw [4??] to winter quarters, the war would have to be postponed to the summer. No enemy was [p. 403]ever held in such contempt by the Romans. [5] The¹ cry from all sides was that he should immediately lead them out and take advantage of the enthusiasm of the soldiers, who, as if their task was, not to fight with so many thousands of the enemy, but [6??] to slaughter the same number of cattle, were ready to attack the camp over ditch, over wall, if the enemy would not come out to fight. [7] Gnaeus Domitius was sent to reconnoitre the route of approach and where they could come up to the enemy's rampart, and when he brought back complete and definite information, it [8??] was decided that on the following day they would move the camp nearer; on the third day the standards were advanced to the centre of the space and the battle-line began to form. [9] Nor did Antiochus think that he should remain longer on the defensive, lest he both diminish the courage of his own [10??] men by declining battle and increase the hopes of [11??] the enemy, and he too led out his forces, advancing so far from the camp that it was clear that he meant to engage.

[12] The Roman battle-line is generally about uniform in its arrangement, both as to number and as to their equipment. [13] There were two Roman legions and two² of allies of the Latin confederacy; each consisted of five thousand four hundred men.³