[
399]
toward
Richmond.
Lee followed with equal swiftness along the interior lines.
Days passed in an intermitting, and about equally matched contest of strategy and fighting.
The difference was that
Grant was always advancing and
Lee always retiring.
On May 26,
Grant reported to
Washington:
Lee's army is really whipped.
The prisoners we now take show it, and the action of his army shows it unmistakably.
A battle with them outside of intrenchments cannot be had. Our men feel that they have gained the morale over the enemy, and attack him with confidence.
I may be mistaken, but I feel that our success over Lee's army is already assured.
That same night,
Grant's advance crossed the
Pamunkey River at Hanover Town, and during another week, with a succession of marching, flanking, and fighting,
Grant pushed the
Union army forward to Cold Harbor.
Here
Lee's intrenched army was again between him and
Richmond, and on June 3,
Grant ordered another determined attack in front, to break through that constantly resisting barrier.
But a disastrous repulse was the consequence.
Its effect upon the campaign is best given in
Grant's own letter, written to
Washington on June 5:
My idea from the start has been to beat Lee's army, if possible, north of Richmond; then, after destroying his lines of communication on the north side of the James River, to transfer the army to the south side and besiege Lee in Richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat.
I now find, after over thirty days of trial, the enemy deems it of the first importance to run no risks with the armies they now have.
They act purely on the defensive behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where, in case of repulse, they can instantly retire behind
