During the night of the 3d the
Commanding General withdrew the main body to the ridges west of
Gettysburg, and sent word to me to that effect, but his message missed me. I repaired to his headquarters during the latter part of the night, and received instructions as to the new line, and sent in compliance therewith a brigade (
Fitz. Lee's) to Cash Town to protect our trains congregated there.
My cavalry and artillery were somewhat jeopardized before I got back to my command, by the enemy having occupied our late ground before my command could be informed of the change.
None, however, were either lost or captured.
During the 4th, which was quite rainy, written instructions were received from the
Commanding General as to the order of march back to the
Potomac, to be undertaken at nightfall.
In this order, one brigade of cavalry was ordered to move, as heretofore stated, by way of Cash Town, guarding that flank and bringing up the rear on the road via
Greenwood to
Williamsport, which was the route designated for the main portion of the wagon trains and ambulances, under the special charge of
Brigadier-General Imboden, who had a mixed command of artillery, infantry and cavalry.
Previous to these instructions, I had, at the instance of the
Commanding General, instructed
Brigadier-General Robertson, whose two brigades (his own and
Jones') were now on the right near
Fairfield, Pennsylvania, that it was essentially necessary for him to hold the
Jack Mountain passes.
These included two prominent roads, the one north and the other south of
Jack Mountain, which is a sort of peak in the
Blue Ridge chain.
In the order of march (retrogade) one corps (
Hill's) preceded everything through the mountain.
The baggage and prisoners of war, escorted by another corps (
Longstreet's), occupied the centre,
[
66]
and the third (
Ewell's) brought up the rear.
The cavalry was disposed of as follows: two brigades on the Cash Town road, under
General Fitz. Lee, and the remainder (
Jenkins' and
Chambliss' brigades) under my immediate command, was directed to proceed by way of
Emmetsburg, Maryland, so as to guard the other flank.
I dispatched
Captain Blackford, corps engineer, to
General Robertson, to inform him of my movement, and direct his co-operation, as
Emmetsburg was in his immediate front, and was probably occupied by the enemy's cavalry.
It was dark before I had passed the extreme right of our line, and, having to pass through very dense woods, taking by-roads, it soon became so dark that it was impossible to proceed.
We were in danger of losing the command as well as the road.
It was raining also.
We halted for several hours, when, having secured a good guide, and it becoming more light, the march was resumed, and just at dawn we entered
Emmetsburg.
We there learned that a large body of the enemy's cavalry (the citizens said 15,000, which I knew, of course, was exaggerated) had passed that point the afternoon previous, going towards
Monterey, one of the passes designated in my instructions to
General Robertson.
I halted for a short time to procure some rations, and, examining my map, I saw that this force could either attempt to force one of those gaps, or, foiled in that (as I supposed they would be), it would either turn to the right and bear off towards
Fairfield, where it would meet with like repulse from
Hill's or
Longstreet's corps, or, turning to the left before reaching
Monterey, would strike across by Oeiler's Gap towards
Hagerstown, and thus seriously threaten that portion of our trains, which, under
Imboden, would be passing down the
Greencastle pike the next day, and interpose itself between the main body and its baggage.
I did not consider that this force could seriously annoy any other portion of our command, under the order of march prescribed, particularly as it was believed those gaps would be held by
General Robertson till he could be reinforced by the main body.
I therefore determined to adhere to my instructions, and proceed by way of
Cavetown, by which I might intercept the enemy, should he pass through (Eiler's Gap.
In and around
Emmetsburg we captured sixty or seventy prisoners of war, and some valuable hospital stores en route from
Frederick to the army.
The march was resumed on the road to
Frederick, till we reached a small village called
Cooperstown, where our route turned short to the right.
Here I halted the column to feed, as the horses were much fatigued and famished.
The column, after an hour's halt, continued through
Harbaugh valley, by Zion Church, to pass the
Catoctin mountains.
The road separates before debouching from the mountain, one fork leading to the left by
Smithtown, and the other to the right, bearing more towards
Leitersburg.
I divided my command, in order to make the passage more certain,
Colonel Ferguson, commanding
Jenkins' brigade, taking the left route, and
[
67]
Chambliss' brigade, which.
I accompanied, the other.
Before reaching the west entrance to this pass, I found it held by the enemy, and had to dismount a large portion of the command and fight from crag to crag of the mountains to dislodge the enemy, already posted.
Our passage was finally forced, and as my column emerged from the mountain it received the fire of the enemy's battery posted to the left on the road to Boonsboroa.
I ascertained, too, about this time, by the firing, that the party on the other route had met with resistance, and sent at once to apprise
Colonel Ferguson of our passage, and directed him, if not already through, to withdraw and come by the same route I had followed.
Our artillery was soon in position, and a few fires drove the enemy from his position.
I was told by a citizen that the party I had just attacked were the cavalry of
Kilpatrick, who had claimed to have captured several thousand prisoners and 400 or 500 wagons from our forces near
Monterey, but I was further informed that not more than 40 wagons accompanied them, and other facts I heard led me to believe the success was far overrated.
About this time
Captain Emack, of the
Maryland cavalry, with his arm in a sling, came to us and reported that he had been in the fight of the night before, and partially confirmed the statement of the citizen, and informed me to my surprise that a large portion of
Ewell's corps trains had preceded the army through the mountains.
It was nearly night.
I felt it of the first importance to open communication with the main army, particularly as I was led to believe that a portion of this force might still be hovering on its flanks.
I sent a trusty and intelligent soldier,
Private Robert W. Goode, First Virginia cavalry, to reach the
Commanding General by a route across the country and relate to him what I knew as well as what he might discover en route, and moved towards
Leitersburg as soon as
Colonel Ferguson came up, who, although his advance had forced the passage of the gap, upon the receipt of my dispatch turned back and came by the same route I had taken, thus making an unnecessary circuit of several miles, and not reaching me till after dark.
Having heard from the
Commanding General, about day-light next morning (July 6) at
Leitersburg, and being satisfied that all of
Kilpatrick's force had gone towards Boonsboroa, I immediately, notwithstanding the march of a greater part of both the preceding nights, set out towards Boonsboroa.
Jones' brigade had now arrived by the route from
Fairfield.
Soon after
Brigadier-General Jones, whose capture had been reported by
Captain Emack, came from the direction of
Williamsport, whither he had gone with the portion of the train which escaped.
The enemy's movements had separated him from his command, and he had made very narrow escapes.
He informed me of
Imboden's arrival at
Williamsport.
Having reached
Cavetown, I directed
General Jones to proceed on the
Boonsborough road a few miles, and thence proceed to
Funkstown, which point I desired him to hold, covering the eastern front of
Hagerstown.
Chambliss' brigade proceeded direct from
[
68]
Leitersburg to
Hagerstown, and
Robertson's took the same router both together being a very small command.
Diverging from
Jones' line of march, at
Cavetown, I proceeded with
Jenkins' brigade by way of Chewsville towards
Hagerstown.
Upon arriving at the former place, it was ascertained that the enemy was nearing
Hagerstown with a large force of cavalry from the direction of Boonsboroa, and
Colonel Chambliss needing reinforcements,
Jenkins' brigade was pushed forward, and arriving before
Hagerstown found the enemy in possession, and made an attack in flank by this road,
Jones coming up further to the left and opening with a few shots of artillery.
A small body of infantry under
Brigadier-General Iverson also held the north edge of the town, aided by the cavalry of
Robertson and
Chambliss.
Our operations were here much embarrassed by our great difficulty in preventing this latter force from mistaking us for the enemy — several shots striking very near our column.
I felt sure that the enemy's designs were directed against
Williamsport, where I was informed by
General Jones our wagons were congregated in a narrow space at the foot of the hill near the river, which was too much swollen to admit their passage to the south bank.
I therefore urged on all sides the most vigorous attack to save our trains at
Williamsport.
Our force was very perceptibly much smaller than the enemy's, but by a bold front and determined attack, with a reliance on that Help which has never failed me, I hoped to raise the seige of
Williamsport, if, as I believed, that was the real object of the enemy's design.
Hagerstown is six miles from
Williamsport, the country between being almost entirely cleared, but intersected by innumerable fences and ditches.
The two places are connected by a lane and perfectly straight Macadamized road. The enemy's dismounted skirmishers fought from street to street, and some time elapsed before the town was entirely clear, the enemy taking the road first toward
Sharpsburg, but afterwards turned to the
Williamsport road.
Just as the town was cleared, I heard the sound of artillery at
Williamsport.
The cavalry, except the two brigades with
General Fitz. Lee, were now pretty well concentrated at
Hagerstown, and one column under
Colonel Chambliss was pushed directly after the enemy towards
Williamsport, while
Robertson's two regiments and
Jenkins' brigade kept to the left of the road, moving in a parallel direction to
Chambliss.
A portion of the Stuart Horse Artillery also accompanied the movement.
The first charge was gallantly executed by the leading brigade (
Chambliss'), now numbering only a few hundred men, the Ninth and Thirteenth Virginia Cavalry participating with marked gallantry.
The column on the flank was now hurried up to attack the enemy in flank, but the obstacles, such as post and rail fences, delayed its progress so long that the enemy had time to rally along a crest of rocks and fence, from which he opened with artillery, raking the road.
Jenkins' brigade were ordered to dismount and deploy over the difficult ground.
This was done with marked effect and boldness.
Lieutenant-Colonel
[
69]
Witcher, as usual, distinguishing himself by his courage and conduct.
The enemy, thus dislodged, was closely pressed by the mounted cavalry, but made one effort at a counter charge, which was gallantly met and repulsed by
Colonel James B. Gordon, commanding a fragment of the Fifth North Carolina Cavalry, that officer exhibiting under my eye individual prowess deserving special commendation.
The repulse was soon after converted into a rout by
Colonel Lomax's regiment (Eleventh Virginia Cavalry,
Jones' brigade), which now took the road, and, under the gallant leadership of its colonel, with drawn sabres charged down the turnpike under a fearful fire of artillery.
Lieutenant-Colonel Funsten behaved with conspicuous gallantry in this charge, and
Captain Winthrop, a volunteer aid of
Lieutenant-General Longstreet's, also bore himself most gallantly.
The enemy was now very near
Williamsport, and this determined and vigorous attack in rear soon compelled him to raise the siege of that place, and leave in hasty discomfiture by the
Downsville road.
His withdrawal was favored by night, which set in just as we reached the ridge overlooking
Williamsport.
An important auxilliary to this attack was rendered by
Brigadier-General Fitz. Lee, who reached the vicinity of
Williamsport by the
Greencastle road very opportunely, and participated in the attack with his accustomed spirit.
Great credit is due the command for the fearless and determined manner in which they rushed upon the enemy and compelled him to lose his hold upon the main portion of the transportation of the army.
Without this attack, it is certain that our trains would have fallen into the hands of the enemy; for, while some resistance was made by
General Imboden, still the size and nature of his command, the peculiar conformation of the ground — overlooked by hills and approached by six plain roads — go to show conclusively that not even a display of Spartan heroism on the part of his command could have saved those wagons from the torch of the enemy.
I communicated with him after opening the road by a lieutenant whom I met but a short distance from the town.
Officers present with
General Imboden during the attack assure me I am right in the foregoing opinion.
I was apprised, when about midway, that
Lieutenant-General Longstreet had arrived at
Hagerstown.
As a part of the operations of this period, I will here report that about sixty of the wagons belonging to
Lee's brigade, while in the special charge of
General Imboden en route to
Williamsport, near
Mercersburg, were captured by the enemy.
A court of inquiry has been convened to inquire into the circumstances of this capture.
I therefore forbear animadversion on the subject.
My command bivouacked near
Hagerstown, and I took that night position on the road leading from
Hagerstown to Boonsboroa.
The next day, July 7th, I proceeded to
Downsville, establishing there a portion of
Wofford's brigade, sent me for the purpose by
[
70]
Gen. Longstreet, and posted
Jenkins' cavalry brigade on that portion of our front in advance of the infantry.
Robertson's brigade being small, and the enemy being least threatening from that direction, was assigned to the north front of
Hagerstown, connecting with
General Jones on the right on the
Cavetown road.
The
Maryland cavalry was ordered on the
National road and towards
Greencastle on a scout.
On the 8th the cavalry was thrown forward towards Boonsboroa, advancing on the different roads, in order by a bold demonstration to threaten an advance upon the enemy, and thus cover the retrogade of the main body.
The move was successful, the advance under
General Jones encountering the enemy on the Boonsboroa road at
Beaver creek bridge, from which point to the verge of Boonsboroa an animated fight ensued, principally on foot, the ground being entirely too soft from recent rains to operate successfully with cavalry.
This contest was participated in in a very handsome manner by the other brigades (
Fitz. Lee's,
Hampton's, now commanded by
Baker, and
W. H. F. Lee's, commanded by
Chambliss), and the Stuart Horse Artillery.
Prisoners taken assured us that the main cavalry force of the enemy was in our front, which, notwithstanding, their known superiority in numbers and range of fire arms, was driven steadily before us — our braye men, nothing daunted or dispirited by the reverses of the army, maintaining a predominance of pluck over the enemy calculated to excite the pride and admiration of beholders.
Just as we neared the village
Jenkins' brigade, under
Ferguson, moved up on the
Williamsport road, driving the enemy on that flank in such a manner as to cause him to begin his withdrawal from the village to the mountain pass.
His batteries had been driven away from the hill by the Napoleons of
McGregor's battery, which, for close fighting, evinced this day their great superiority over rifle guns of greater number.
About. this time I was informed that the enemy was heavily reinforced and that our ammunition, by this protracted engagement, was nearly exhausted, and despairing of getting possession of the town, which was completely commanded by artillery in the mountain gap, and believing that in compelling the enemy to act upon the defensive all day retreating before us, the desired object had been fully attained, I began to retire towards
Funkstown, except
Jenkins' brigade, which was ordered to its former position on the
Williamsport road.
The enemy observing this from his mountain perch, tried to profit by it with a vigorous movement on our heels, but was foiled.
As the last regiment was crossing the bridge over
Beaver creek, a squadron of the enemy, more bold than its comrades, galloped forward as if to charge.
Steadily a portion of the First North Carolina cavalry awaited their arrival within striking distance, but before reaching their vicinity the enemy veered off across the fields, when a Blakely gun of
Chew's battery, advantageously posted on a point, marked their movement, and although the squadron moved at a gallop, never did sportsman bring down his bird with
[
71]
more unerring shot than did that
Blakely tell upon that squadron.
In vain did it turn to the right and left.
Each shot seemed drawn to the flying target with fatal accuracy, until the enemy, driven by the shots of the
Blakely and followed by the shouts of derision of our cavalry, escaped at full speed far over the plain.
The command moved leisurely to the vicinity of
Funkstown and bivouacked for the night.
The fight of the 8th administred a quietus to the enemy.
On the 9th my command kept the position in front of
Funkstown assigned to it the night before.
The left of our main line of battle now rested just in rear of
Funkstown on the
Antietam, and some infantry and artillery were thrown forward as a support to the cavalry beyond.
The enemy advanced on the 10th on the
Boonsborough road, and our cavalry was engaged dimounted nearly all day.
General Jones was farther to the left on the
Cavetown road, and the infantry was placed in position, covering
Funkstown, with dismounted cavalry on each flank.
The enemy's advance was handsomely repulsed, in which
Lieutenant-Colonel Witcher's cavalry on foot, behind a stone fence immediately on the left of the turnpike, performed a very gallant part, standing their ground with unflinching tenacity.
On the left a portion of
Fitz. Lee's brigade, under
Captain Wool-ridge, Fourth Virginia cavalry, who, handling his skirmishers with great skill and effect, compelled the enemy's infantry to seek cover in a body of woods at some distance from our lines.
In this day's operations the infantry before mentioned participated very creditably indeed in the centre, and I regret exceedingly that I have not the means of knowing the regiments and commanders, so as to mention them with that particularity to which by their gallantry they are entitled; but their conduct has no doubt been duly chronicled by their commander and laid before the
Commanding General, a part of which was under his own eye.
Owing to the great ease with which the position at
Funkstown could be flanked on the right, and by a secret movement at night the troops cut off, it was deemed prudent to withdraw at night to the west side of the
Antietam, which was accordingly done.
July 11th was not characterized by any general engagement, except that
General Fitz. Lee, now on the right towards Dunsville, was compelled to retire upon the main body, and the main body having assumed a shorter line, with its left resting on National road, just west of
Hagerstown,
Chambliss' brigade was sent to that flank, and
General Fitz. Lee's also.
The enemy made no movement on
Jones' front embracing the
Funkstown and Cavetown roads. On the 12th firing began early, and the enemy having advanced on several roads on
Hagerstown, our cavalry forces retired without serious resistance, and massed on the left of the main body, reaching with heavy outposts the Corochocheague on the
National road.
The infantry having already had time to entrench themselves, it was no longer desirable to defer the enemy's attack.
[
72]
The 13th was spent in reconnoitering on the left,
Rodes' division occupying the extreme left of our infantry very near
Hagerstown, a little north of the
National road.
Cavalry pickets were extended beyond the railroad leading to
Chambersburg, and everything put in readness to resist the enemy's attack.
The situation of our communication south of the
Potomac, caused the
Commandering General to desire more cavalry on that side, and accordingly
Brigadier-General Jones' brigade (one of whose regiments--Twelfth Virginia cavalry--had been left in
Jefferson) was detached and sent to cover our communications with
Winchester.
The cavalry on the left consisted now of
Fitz. Lee's,
W. H. F. Lee's,
Baker's and
Roberts' brigades, the latter being a mere handful.
On the 13th skirmishing continued at intervals, but it appeared that the enemy, instead of attacking, was entrenching himself in our front, and the
Commanding General determined to cross the
Potomac.
The night of the 13th was chosen for this move, and the arduous and difficult task of bringing up the rear was, as usual, assigned to the cavalry.
Just before night, which was unusually rainy, the cavalry was disposed from right to left to occupy, dismounted, the trenches of the infantry at dark,
Fitz. Lee's brigade holding the line of
Longstreet's corps,
Baker's, of
Hill's corps, and the remainder of
Ewell's corps.
A pontoon bridge had been constructed at
Falling Waters, some miles below
Williamsport, where
Longstreet's and
Hill's corps were to cross and
Ewell's corps was to ford the river at
Williamsport, in rear of which last, after daylight, the cavalry was also to cross, except that
Fitz. Lee's brigade, should he find the pontoon bridge clear in time, was to cross at the bridge, and otherwise, to cross at the ford at
Williamsport.
The operation was successfully performed by the cavalry.
General Fitz. Lee, finding the bridge would not be clear in time for his command, moved after daylight to the ford, sending two squadrons to cross in rear of the infantry at the bridge.
These squadrons — mistaking
Longstreet's rear for the rear of the army on that route — crossed over in rear of it.
General Hill's troops being notified that these squadrons would follow in their rear, were deceived by some of the enemy's cavalry who approached very near in consequence of this belief that they were our cavalry.
Although this unfortunate mistake deprived us of the lamented
General Pettigrew, whom they mortally wounded, they paid the penalty of their temerity by losing most of their number in killed or wounded, if the accounts of those who witnessed it are to be credited.
The cavalry crossed at the fords without serious molestation, bringing up the rear on that route by 8 A. M. on the 14th.
To
Baker's (late
Hampton's) brigade was assigned the duty of protecting the
Potomac from
Falling Waters to
Hedgesville.
The other brigades were moved back towards
Leetown,
Robertson's being sent to the fords of the
Shenandoah, where he already had a picket, which, under
Captain Johnston of the North Carolina Cavalry,
[
73]
had handsomely repulsed the enemy in their advance on Ashby's Gap, inflicting severe loss with great disparity in numbers.
Harper's Ferry was again in possession of the enemy, and
Colonel Harman, Twelfth Virginia Cavalry, had, in an engagement with the enemy, gained a decided success, but was himself captured by his horse falling.
Upon my arrival at the Bower that afternoon (15th), I learned that a large force of the enemy's cavalry was between
Shepherdstown and
Leetown.
1 determined at once to attack him, in order to defeat any designs he might have in the direction of
Martinsburg.
I made dispositions accordingly, concentrating cavalry in his front, and early on the 16th moved
Fitz. Lee's brigade down the turnpike towards
Shepherdstown, supported by
Chambliss, who, though quite ill, with that commendable spirit which has always distinguished him remained at the head of his brigade.
Jenkins' brigade was ordered to advance on the road from
Martinsburg towards
Shepherdstown, so as, by this combination, to expose one of the enemy's flanks, while
Jones, now near
Charleston, was notified of the attack, in order that he might co-operate.
No positive orders were sent him, as his precise locality was not known.
These dispositions having been arranged, I was about to attack, when I received a very urgent message from the
Commanding General to repair at once to his headquarters.
I therefore committed to
Brigadier-General Fitz. Lee the consummation of my plans, and reported at once to the
Commanding General, whom I found at
Bunker Hill.
Returning in.the afternoon, I proceeded to the scene of conflict on the turnpike, and found that
General Fitz. Lee had, with his own and
Chambliss' brigade, driven the enemy steadily to within a mile of
Shepherdstown,
Jenkins' brigade not having yet appeared on the left.
It, however, soon after arrived in
Fitz. Lee's rear, and moved up to his support.
The ground was not practicable for cavalry, and the main body was dismounted and advanced in line of battle.
The enemy retired to a strong position behind stone fences and barricades near
Colonel Boteler's residence, and it being nearly dark, obstinately maintained his ground at this last point till dark, to cover his withdrawal.
Preparations were made to renew the attack vigorously next morning, but daybreak revealed that the enemy had retired towards
Harper's Ferry.
The enemy's loss in killed and wounded was heavy.
We had several killed and wounded, and among the latter,
Colonel James H. Drake, First Virginia Cavalry, was mortally wounded, dying that night (16th), depriving his regiment of a brave and zealous leader, and his country of one of her most patriotic defenders.
The
Commanding General was very desirous of my moving at once into
Loudoun a large portion of my command, but the recent rains had so swollen the
Shenandoah that it was impossible to ford it, and cavalry scouting parties had to swim their horses over.
In the interval of time from the 16th to the 22d of July, the
[
74]
enemy made a demonstration on
Hedgesville, forcing back
Baker's brigade.
Desultory skirmishing was kept up on the front for several days with the enemy, while our infantry was engaged in tearing up the Baltimore and Ohio railroad near
Martinsburg.
Parts of
Jones' brigade were also engaged with the enemy in spirited conflicts, not herein referred to, resulting very creditably to our arms, near
Fairfield, Pennsylvania, and on the
Cavetown road from
Hagerstown, the Sixth and Seventh Virginia Cavalry being particularly distinguished.
Accounts of these will be found in the reports of
Brigadier-General Jones and
Colonel Baker.
It soon became apparent that the enemy was moving upon our right flank, availing himself of the swollen condition of the
Shenandoah to interpose his army, by a march along the east side of the
Blue Ridge, between our present position and
Richmond.
Longstreet's corps having already moved to counteract this effort, enough cavalry was sent under
Brigadier-General Robertson for his advance guard, through
Front Royal and
Chester Gap, while
Baker's brigade was ordered to bring up the rear of
Ewell's corps, which was in rear, and
Jones' brigade was ordered to picket the lower
Shenandoah as long as necessary for the safety of that flank, and then follow the movement of the army.
Fitz. Lee's,
W. H. F. Lee's and
Jenkins' brigades, by a forced march from the vicinity of
Leetown through
Millwood, endeavored to reach Manassas Gap, so as to hold it on the flank of the army, but it was already in possession of the enemy, and the
Shenandoah, still high, in order to be crossed without interfering with the march of the main army, had to be forded below
Front Royal.
The cavalry already mentioned, early on the 23d, by a by path reached
Chester Gap, passing on the army's left, and with great difficulty and a forced march that night bivouacked below
Gaines' cross-roads, holding the
Rockford road and Warrenton turnpike, on which, near
Amissville, the enemy had accumulated a large force of cavalry.
On the 24th, while moving forward to find the locality of the enemy, firing was heard towards
Newby's cross-roads, which was afterwards ascertained to be a portion of the enemy's artillery firing on
Hill's column marching on the
Richmond road.
Before the cavalry could reach the scene of action, the enemy had been driven off by the infantry, and on the 25th the march was continued, and the line of the
Rappahannock was resumed.
In taking a retrospect of this campaign, it is necessary, in order to appreciate the value of the services of the cavalry, to correctly estimate the amount of labor to be performed, the difficulties to be encountered, and the very extended sphere of operations, mainly in the enemy's country.
In the exercise of the discretion vested in me by the
Commanding General, it was deemed practicable to move entirely in the enemy's rear, intercepting his communications with his base —
Washington — and inflicting damage upon his rear, to rejoin the army in
Pennsylvania, in time to participate in its actual conflicts.
The
[
75]
result abundantly confirms my judgement as to the practicability, as well as utility, of the move.
The main army, I was advised by the
Commanding General, would move in two columns for the
Susquehanna —
Early commanded the advance of that one of these columns to the eastward, and I was directed to communicate with him as early as practicable after crossing the
Potomac, and place my command on his right flank.
It was expected I would find him in
York.
The newspapers of the enemy, my only source of information, chronicled his arrival there and at
Wrightsville, on the
Susquehanna, with great particularity.
I therefore moved to join him in that vicinity.
The enemy's army was moving in a direction nearly parallel to me. I was apprized of its arrival at
Taneytown, when I was near
Hanover, Pennsylvania, but believing from the lapse of time that our army was already in
York or at
Harrisburg, where it could choose its battleground with the enemy, I hastened to place my command with it. It is believed that had the corps of
Hill and
Longstreet moved on instead of halting near
Chambersburg, that
York could have been the place of concentration instead of
Gettysburg.
This move of my command between the enemy's seat of Government and the army charged with its defence, involved serious loss to the enemy in material and men, over one thousand prisoners having been captured, and spread terror and consternation to the very gates of the
Capital.
The streets were barricaded for defence, as also was done in
Baltimore on the day following.
This move drew the enemy's overwelming force of cavalry from its aggressive attitude towards our flank, near
Williamsport and
Hagerstown, to the defence of its own communications now at my mercy.
The entire Sixth Army Corps in addition was also sent to intercept me at
Westminster, arriving there the morning I left, which in the result prevented its participation in the first two days fight at
Gettysburg.
Our trains in transit were thus not only secured, but it was done in a way that at the same time seriously injured the enemy.
General Meade also detached 4,000 troops, under
General French, to escort public property to
Washington from
Frederick, a step which certainly would have been unnecessary but for my presence in his rear, thus weakening his army to that extent.
In fact, although in his own country, he had to make large detachments to protect his rear and baggage.
General Meade also complains that his movements were delayed by the detention of his cavalry in his rear.
He might truthfully have added by the movement in his rear of a large force of Confederate cavalry, capturing his trains and cutting all his communications with
Washington.
It is not to be supposed such delay in his operations could have been so effectually caused by any other disposition of the cavalry.
Moreover, considering
York as the point of junction, as I had every reason to believe it would be, the route I took was quite as direct and more expeditious than the alternate one proposed, and there is reason to believe that on that route my command would have been divided
[
76]
up in the different gaps of
South Mountain, covering our flank, while the enemy by concentration upon any one could have greatly endangered our baggage and ordnance trains without exposing his own.
It was thought by many that my command could have rendered more service had it been in advance of the army the first day at
Gettysburg, and the
Commanding General complains of a want of cavalry on that occasion; but it must be remembered that the cavalry (
Jenkins' brigade) specially selected for advance guard to the army by the
Commanding General on account of its geographical location, at the time was available for this purpose, and had two batteries of horse artillery serving with it. If; therefore, the peculiar functions of cavalry with the army were not satisfactorily performed, in the absence of my command, it should rather be attributed to the fact that
Jenkins' brigade was not as efficient as it ought to have been, and as its numbers (3,800) on leaving
Virginia warranted us in expecting.
Even at that time by its reduction incident to the campaign it numbered far more than the cavalry which successfully covered
Jackson's flank movement at
Chancellorsville, turned back
Stoneman from the
James, and drove 3,500 cavalry under
Averill across the
Rappahannock.
Properly handled, such a command should have done everything requisite, and left nothing to detract, by the remotest implication, from the brilliant exploits of their comrades, achieved under circumstances of great hardship and danger.
Arriving at
York I found
General Early had gone. * * * * * * * I still believed that most of our army was before
Harrisburg, and justly regarded a march to
Carlisle as the most likely to place me in communication with the main army; besides, as a place for rationing my command, now entirely out, I believed it desirable.
The cavalry suffered much in this march day and night from loss of sleep, and the horses from fatigue, and while in
Fairfax, for want of forage, not even grass being attainable.
In
Fauquier the rough character of the roads and lack of facilities for shoeing, added to the casualties of every day's battle, and constant wear and tear of men and horse, reduced the command very much in numbers.
In this way some regiments were reduced to less than 100 men; yet when my command arrived at
Gettysburg, with the accessions which it received from the weak horses left to follow the army, it took its place in line of battle with a stoutness of heart and firmness of tread, impressing one with the confidence of victory which was astounding, considering the hardness of the march lately endured.
With an aggregate loss of about--hundred killed, wounded and missing, we inflicted a loss on the enemy's cavalry of confessedly near 5,000.
Some of the reports of subordinate commanders are herewith forwarded; others will follow, and it is to be hoped they will do justice to that individual prowess for which Confederate soldiery is
[
77]
most noted, and which the limits of personal observation and the length of this report deprive me of the power of doing.
Appended will be found a statement of casualties and map; also a list of non-commissioned officers and privates whose conduct as bearers of dispatches and otherwise entitle them to favorable mention.
The bravery, heroism, fortitude and devotion of my command is commended to the special attention of the
Commanding General, and is worthy of the gratitude of their countrymen.
I desire to mention among the
brigadier-generals one whose enlarged comprehension of the functions of cavalry, whose diligent attention to the preservation of its efficiency and intelligent appreciation, faithful performance of the duties confided to him, point to him as one of the first cavalry leaders on the continent, and richly entitle him to promotion — I allude to
Brigadier-General Fitz. Lee.
I cannot here particularize the conduct of the many officers who derserve special mention, of less rank than brigadier-general, without extending my remarks more than would be proper.
To my staff collectively, however, I feel at liberty to express thus officially my grateful appreciation for the zeal, fidelity and ability with which they discharged their several duties and labored to promote the success of the command.
Major Heros Von Borcke, A. A. and I.
G., that gallant officer from
Prussia, who so early espoused our cause, was disabled in
Fauquier, so as to deprive me of his valuable services on the expedition, but it is hoped that the command will not long be deprived of his inspiring presence on the field.
Major Henry B. McClellan, my adjutant-general, was constantly at my side, and with his intelligence, ready pen and quick comprehension, greatly facilitated the discharge of my duties.
The untiring energy, force of character and devotion to duty of
Major A. R. Venable, my
Inspector-General, and
Lieutenant Ryals, C. S. A.,
Provost-Marshal, deserve my special gratitude and praise.
The same qualities, united to a thorough knowledge of much of the country, are ascribable to
Captain B. S. White, C. S. A., who, though still suffering from a severe wound received at
Fleetwood, accompanied the command, and his services proclaim him an officer of merit and distinction.
Chief Surgeon Eliason,
Captain Blackford, Engineer;
Captain Cooke, Ordnance Officer;
Lieutenant Dabney, A. D. C., and
Cadet Hulliher, C. S. A., all performed their duties with commendable zeal and credit.
Major Fitzhugh,
Chief, and
Captain J. N. Hanger,
Assistant Quartermaster, and
Major W. J. Johnson,
Chief Commissary, discharged their arduous duties in their usually highly satisfactory manner.
First Lieutenant R. B. Kennon, P. A. C. S., temporarily attached on two different occasions, was entrusted with duties attended with great peril, which he performed in a highly successful and creditable manner, once in testing experimentally at night an
[
78]
unknown ford on the
Potomac, and again in bearing a dispatch to the
Commanding General from Emmettsburg.
Grateful to the Giver of all Good for the attainment of such results with such small comparative losses, I have the honor to be
Most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
