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No. 4.
It is not without anxiety that I now approach that part of the campaign in
Kentucky which brought disaster upon our arms.
Hitherto I have had to speak only of success and award well merited praise; but it devolves upon me now to deal with failure, and to try to show wherein lay the causes of it. To ascertain how far defeat is the result of inevitable accident, and how far it comes from errors which should have been avoided, to what extent fortune intervenes to wrest away fruits fairly won, and to what extent they are lost by faults of conception or of execution, requires a knowledge of facts in detail and an accuracy and nice discrimination of judgment not easily attained.
It is natural, therefore, to approach with diffidence and much misgiving the discussion of these grave and difficult questions.
On the 13th of September
General Bragg reached
Glasgow, Ky., and on the 15th advanced on Mumfordsville, a fortified post.
On the afternoon of the 16th an unsuccessful assault was made by
Chalmer's brigade; but during the night the enemy was surrounded, and cannon placed in position on all the commanding eminences, and the following morning the garrison, 4,000 men, surrendered with all their arms and munitions.
These were the first brilliant and auspicious fruits of
General Bragg's rapid march from
Chattanooga.
The hopes of the army, and all the friends of the
Southern cause, were raised to the highest pitch.
The strategy of the campaign was, up to this point, completely successful in all quarters.
Buell, hemmed in at
Bowling Green, would, it was firmly believed, be compelled to give battle on such disadvantageous terms that nothing but defeat and destruction awaited him.
Up to the time of
General Bragg's entry into
Kentucky the two invading armies, pursuing routes widely asunder, and without communication, were entirely distinct.
General Smith held the independent command of the Department of East Tennessee, while
General Bragg had lately superseded
General Beauregard in that of
Mississippi.
It is true that the troops with which
Smith won the
battle of Richmond belonged to
Bragg's army, having been detached by the latter to assist the former in his movement into
Kentucky; but
General Smith had a fine army of his own, more than 20,000 strong, which for months he had been engaged in organizing and disciplining with great care and
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labor, and in which he justly placed great pride and confidence.
The two armies acted in concert, in pursuance of a prearranged plan, but that of
General Smith had not been subject to the orders of
General Bragg.
To whom, if any one man, is due the credit of planning the campaign into
Kentucky it might be difficult to determine, and it is of little consequence to inquire.
But when in
Kentucky it became necessary for the two armies to be united,
General Bragg, of course, assumed command of the whole.
Hitherto, whatever either General had accomplished belonged exclusively to his own reputation; hereafter, in assuming the entire command the entire responsibilities devolve upon
General Bragg.
I do not propose to tire my readers, if ever there should be any, with military or moral dogmas or platitudes, but it is well to remember that, while a commander may be mislead by the advice of subordinate officers, it has never been deemed sufficient excuse for failure, rarely even for palliation, that he received and acted upon false information or the mistaken views of counsellors.
To him belongs all the glory of success, and upon him rests equally all the obloquy of defeat.
When, moreover, after a campaign is concluded, no charges are preferred, no prominent officers relieved of command, it is fair to infer that there has been no treachery, no gross negligence nor disobedience of orders, no flagrant breach of duty.
General Smith had withdrawn his forces from their position in front of
Covington, with the view to cooperate with
General Bragg, when, on the 24th of September, he received information that the
Federal General,
Morgan, had evacuated
Cumberland Gap on the 17th instant, and was seeking an outlet by
Manchester and
West Liberty to the Little Sandy.
Brigadier-General Morgan was at once dispatched to
Irvine, with a regiment of cavalry, with orders to get in the enemy's front, and destroying supplies and felling timber along his line of march, retard his progress as much as possible.
At the same time
General Heth was ordered to
Mount Sterling, whither
General Smith proceeded the next day. There he learned that
Morgan had made his escape, having passed
West Liberty.
From the declarations of many citizens about
Lexington, who professed to know the country well,
General Smith was led to believe that
Morgan would find the route he attempted impracticable, even for infantry, but he succeeded in getting his artillery safely off. This perilous march, with armies equal to his own in numbers and superior in condition in front and rear, reflects great credit upon the
Federal commander.
It cannot be denied that the failure to effect his capture rests solely with
General Smith.
It was owing chiefly to the
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unaccountable delay in the transmission of the fact of
Morgan's evacuation.
General Stevenson should have followed more closely; but that officer abandoned the pursuit at
Manchester, and turning abruptly to the left, marched to
Lancaster, deeming, probably, that the cooperation of his division with
Gen. Bragg's forces was of more consequence than the tiresome pursuit of a flying column, which, if it escaped capture, could not be recruited in time to assist
Buell in the stirring events about to transpire in
Kentucky.
From
Mount Sterling,
Heth was sent back to
Georgetown,
Marshall to
Owingsville, to prevent
Morgan from taking that route to
Cincinnati, and
General Smith returned to
Lexington.
In the meantime
Colonel Duke, with a portion of
Morgan's cavalry, had attacked the enemy in the town of
Augusta, on the
Ohio river, and captured his entire force.
In this bloody combat
Duke lost several of his best officers, shot, it was said, from the houses after the town had surrendered.
It was with difficulty that the justly infuriated soldiers could be restrained from executing summary vengeance.
After the surrender of Mumfordsville
General Bragg advanced towards
Cave City and offered
Buell battle.
But the latter would not leave his intrenched position at
Bowling Green, and finding it impossible to procure subsistence in that desolated region,
Bragg retired to
Bardstown.
Buell then left
Bowling Green, and, actuated by a desperate impulse, marched in a direct line for
Louisville, passing immediately in front of
Bragg, exposing his entire flank.
This movement was accomplished without molestation.
It is hardly possible that
General Bragg could have been taken by surprise, and yet it is not a little singular that he should willingly refrain from striking an enemy in a disadvantageous position whom but a few days previously he had been eager to engage on equal terms.
His incomprehensible failure to attack may be explained on the supposition that
Buell's army was much stronger than he had estimated, or that it had been heavily reinforced — opinions in either case which it is now quite certain were incorrect.
Thus the two Federal armies extricated themselves from positions of the greatest peril, and displayed in retreating an amount of audacity, which they had never shown in any attack.
Morgan's escape was considered unfortunate, but
Buell's was universally regarded as a great if not irretrievable disaster.
Now that the prime object of the campaign was lost, the greatest vigor of action and dexterity of conduct were required of
General Bragg--vigor and dexterity which, it is due to truth to say, did not characterize the subsequent operations in
Kentucky.
But perhaps the most lamentable consequence of this failure
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was, that it shook, if it did not destroy, the confidence of the army in
General Bragg-confidence which, up to this time, he possessed completely.
In the latter part of September
General Bragg left his army at
Bardstown and came to
Lexington.
He entered that city on the 2nd of October, and, addressing the citizens from the balcony of the principal hotel, assured them of the security of the
Confederate cause in
Kentucky.
To believe this was a strange infatuation, for it is difficult to see how any one, well informed, could fail to perceive the critical condition of our affairs at this time.
It is more than probable, however, that
Bragg had already begun to regard his retreat from the
State as a contingency by no means improbable, for it was said that at
Bardstown he labored under feelings of despondency in striking contrast with buoyant spirits, in which he entered the
State.
But, a man of variable temperament, subject to the greatest elation at one moment, and equally great depression at the next, it is probable that under the influence of the enthusiastic applause with which he was received by the people of
Lexington, his temporary excitement betrayed the reflections of a soberer moment.
His proclamation issued at this time, declaring Confederate Treasury notes a legal tender, was a violent assumption of power and a direct infraction of the
Constitution of the
Confederacy.
There is little doubt that it would have created great dissatisfaction among the people, and met with the bad success usually attending such measures, had subsequent events permitted its enforcement.
The inauguration of
Captain Hawes, a respectable old gentleman, but not fitted, in vigor or reputation, to hold the reins of power in these tumultuous times, as
Provisional Governor of
Kentucky, by the
General of a free Republic, was also an anomalous act.
The enemy were already reported advancing in considerable strength from
Louisville; but it was believed to be only a
reconnoissance en force.
General Smith repaired to
Frankfort on the afternoon of the 2nd of October, and concentrated his army there.
Stevenson, with 11,000 men, arrived that night.
Heth, with 7,000 men, came up from
Georgetown almost at the same time.
Brigadier-General Davis had been stationed at
Frankfort, with two regiments, for some time.
Gracie, with one regiment and a battalion, was at
Lexington, while
Humphrey Marshall, with his brigade, 4,500 men, was ordered from
Owingsville, and
Cleburne, retiring from
Shelbyville before the overwhelming forces of the enemy, fell back to
Frankfort.
Thus, in a very short time, three and twenty thousand veteran soldiers were collected at
Frankford, with
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5,000 more within supporting distance.
General Bragg's army, 22,000 strong, was still at
Bardstown.
The enemy emerged from
Louisville in three coloumns; one in the direction of
Bardstown, another by
Shelbyville, on
Frankfort, and a third upon
Taylorsville, apparently for the purpose of interrupting communication between our armies.
Perceiving this,
General Smith suggested to
General Polk, commanding the right wing of
Bragg's army, the necessity of defeating it, to which that officer responded promptly, and began manoeuvring with his right for that purpose.
On the afternoon of the 3d of October
General Bragg came from
Lexington to
Frankfort, and the following day inaugurated
Mr. Hawes Provisional Governor of
Kentucky.
This idle pageant was not imposing in ceremony, nor likely to be useful in results, while it was conducted to the sound of the enemy's guns, which boomed at intervals eight miles from the town.
That keen, but solemn excitement, which among veteran troops precedes an impending battle, pervaded every rank of the army.
I believe that, at this moment, not a soldier or subordinate officer dreamed of retreating.
Early in the morning
Cleburne's division had been sent in the direction of
Taylorsville, but the twenty thousand splendid soldiers who remained ought to have been a match for any force the enemy could bring against this point at this time.
But
General Bragg thought otherwise, and determining to concentrate his army before risking a battle, early in the afternoon ordered an immediate and rapid retreat.
At sunset the bridge over the
Kentucky river was fired, and the army took up its line of march for
Versailles.
It cannot be denied that our forces were too widely separated, which, however, was equally true of the enemy's, and that in manoeuvering to concentrate,
General Bragg acted upon the soundest military principle; but it may be questioned if the same object could not have been better gained by using the opportunity offered of defeating the enemy's left wing, while it was quite certain that by retreating he was given the great advantage of taking the initiative, while at the same time that portion of the
State was abandoned, in which there were abundant supplies, for another in which there was less.
It permitted the
Federal commander to develop his attack at his leisure, and in his own way — enabling him to mask his real purposes and heaviest movements, which alone, as will be seen, proved fatal to us — and inspired his new levies with the confidence and
elan of a pursuing and apparently successful army.
Its effect upon our friends in
Kentucky was very lamentable.
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fell among them, literally, like a thunderbolt from a cloudless sky. In vain we assured them, at
Versailles and elsewhere along our route, that it was only a strategic movement, and that we would soon return with overwhelming power.
With that unerring prescience of coming and inevitable evil, which sometimes exhibits itself as a mysterious attribute of human nature, these poor people, better than ourselves, divined the real results of all these movements, and were sunk in despondency.
At
Versailles,
General Smith stopped at the house of
Mr. Porter, an ex-Lieutenant Governor of the
State--a gentleman of cultivated intellect, possessing considerable property in lands and negroes, and devoted to the
Southern cause.
With less prudence than many others, he had not refrained from showing his warm sympathies with us, and, consequently could hope for little mercy from the
Federal army when it re-occupied the
State.
The probability was, that he would be sent to Camp Chase, and his property destroyed by the brutality of the common soldiers, or seized and confiscated by the higher authorities.
The former result he intended to elude by leaving the
State with us, the latter there was no escaping.
These people in
Kentucky were very much worse off than those on the southern coast who had been driven from their estates.
Unlike them, they had no friendly back country to retire into with all their movable property, but were separated from the
South by the nearly impassable barrier of the mountains, infested by a savage Union population.
The cruel reverses of fortune which they suffered — reduced from luxurious competence to absolute indigence in a single week — must always be regarded as one of the most lamentable results of the
Kentucky campaign, and commend these people to our commiseration and active assistance.
The following morning
General Smith moved to the
Kentucky river, and placed his headquarters at the house of
a Mr. Thornton, near McCown's Ferry.
Mr. Thornton had lived fourteen years in
Mississippi, in the employment, as an overseer, of
General Zachary Taylor.
Nothwithstanding these antecedents, he frankly confessed himself an Union man, while his wife, an excellent woman, was as staunch in her sympathies with the
Southern cause.
When I expressed my astonishment to
Mr. Thornton that he, an owner of slaves, should continue to be an Union man after
President Lincoln's emancipation proclamation, he enquired, with an incredulous air, if
Lincoln had really issued that proclamation, stating that his neighbors said it was a Rebel hoax.
The monstrous system of downright falsification (to use a mild term)
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which the
Federal Government has established, and which is endorsed and acted upon by its highest officers, civil and military, in all serious and trivial affairs, ought to be regarded as one of the wonders, and most disgusting moral deformities of this war; but it is not more wonderful than the credulity of the people who, for so long a time, continue to receive its statements with perfect faith, while they treat everything opposed to them with contemptuous disbelief.
The processes of the old despotisms of
Europe, by which the people are deluded and held in subjection, are easily and readily adopted by this “Free Government,” and, apparently, with equal success; and the reports of generals, big and small, and penny-a-liners for the press, imitate and surpass, with the coolest indifference to truth, the exaggerated bulletins of the great
Napoleon.
Our kindly demeanor gained upon the confidence of
Mr. Thornton, and, coming to put some trust in our assurance, he declared that the emancipation proclamation was more than Kentuckians would bear, and that for himself, although he had always been an Union man, he was one no longer.
It is probable that this desperate measure of the
Federal Administration would have produced effects favorable to the
Confederate cause, had its army been able to remain in the
State for a time longer; but it is extremely doubtful withal, if a majority of the Kentuckians could be induced to declare openly for the
South by any thing short of the complete overthrow of the
Federal power.
As a people, they no longer possess the high qualities for which they were once famous.
The sturdy woodsmen, who drove the Indians from the
State, and rendered her gallantry conspicuous on many battle-field, have ceased to exist.
The rocky bluffs of the
Kentucky river, illustrious since the days of
Daniel Boone, do not now echo the crack of the rifle and the savage war-whoop.
The country has grown rich and populous.
The indefatigable
Yankee has overrun the land, and petty farmers and horse-traders have succeeded the hunters of Yore.
This class constituting the bulk of the population in the wealthier districts, like the same class everywhere, are guided more by their apparent interests than by the higher influence of principle, honor and patriotism.
There are others, descendants principally of the Old Virginia settlers, and those from the more Southerly States, who are brave, intelligent, courteous and hospitable, not possessing perhaps the high polish to be found along the
Atlantic coast, but compensating for it by the genial vivacity of their manners, and frank and manly bearing.
They are, almost without exception, either in the
Southern army, or declared adherents of that cause.
A distinct people, already mentioned,
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are to be found among the mountains in the South-eastern section of the
State, who are scarcely one step removed from savages.
They are fiercely and blindly devoted to the
Union, and, being under the operation of universal suffrage, the peers at the ballot-box, of the highest in the land, give preponderance to the
Northern party.
1 It will be impossible ever to overcome their prejudices; and should
Kentucky ultimately come with the
South, great dissatisfaction will not cease to exist among these people until the present generation at least has passed away.
