Alfred Roman, The military operations of General Beauregard in the war between the states, 1861 to 1865

[540] of the Mississippi. At the same time, General Johnston, being at Murfreesboroa, on the march to form junction of his forces with mine, was called on to send at least a brigade by railroad, so that we might hope to fall on and crush the enemy should he attempt an advance from under his gunboats.

The call on General Johnston was promptly complied with. His entire force was also hastened in this direction, and, by the 1st of April, our united forces were concentrated along the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, from Bethel to Corinth, and on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, from Corinth to Iuka.

It was then determined to assume the offensive and strike a sudden blow at the enemy, in position under General Grant, on the west bank of the Tennessee at Pittsburg, and in the direction of Savannah, before he was reinforced by the army under General Buell, then known to be advancing for that purpose by rapid marches from Nashville via Columbia. About the same time, General Johnston was advised that such an operation conformed to the expectations of the President.

By a rapid and vigorous attack on General Grant it was expected he would be beaten back into his transports and the river, or captured, in time to enable us to profit by the victory, and remove to the rear all the stores and munitions that would fall into our hands in such an event, before the arrival of General Buell's army on the scene. It was never contemplated, however, to retain the position thus gained and abandon Corinth, the strategic point of the campaign.

Want of general officers, needful for the proper organization of divisions and brigades of an army brought thus suddenly together, and other difficulties in the way of an effective organization, delayed the movement until the night of the 2d instant; when it was heard from a reliable quarter that the junction of the enemy's armies was near at hand. It was then, at a late hour, determined that the attack should be attempted at once, incomplete and imperfect as were our preparations for such a grave and momentous adventure. Accordingly, that night, at one o'clock A. M., the preliminary orders to the commanders of corps were issued for the movement.

On the following morning the detailed orders of movement, a copy of which is herewith annexed, marked ‘A,’ were issued, and the movement, after some delay, commenced, the troops being in admirable spirit. It was expected we should be able to reach the enemy's lines in time to attack him early on the 5th instant. The men, however, for the most part were unused to marching, the roads, narrow, and traversing a densely wooded country, became almost impassable after a severe rain-storm on the night of the 4th, which drenched the troops in bivouac; hence our forces did not reach the intersection of the roads from Pittsburg and Hamburg, in the immediate vicinity of the enemy, until late Saturday afternoon.

It was then decided that the attack should be made on the next morning at the earliest hour practicable, in accordance with the orders of movement. That is, in three lines of battle, the first and second extending from Owl Creek, on the left, to Lick Creek, on the right, a distance of about three miles, supported by the third and the reserves. The first line, under Major-General Hardee, was constituted of his corps, augmented on his right by Gladden's brigade, of Major-