George H. Gordon, From Brook Farm to Cedar Mountain

[318] well-proven facts of that battle, we shall find a management so inexplicable that both the order given to me and that received by Colonel Andrews can be taken only as fitting parts of this abortive effort. Did not Banks, at five o'clock in the afternoon, in sending his last despatch from the field, speak of the skirmishers approaching each other, without indicating that he expected a general engagement, and without asking for any assistance ;¹ although at four o'clock the cannonade which reached Pope's ears in Culpeper was so heavy and continuous that Pope feared a general engagement was going on, and so hurried forward? Had not Banks with an estimated force of 6,000 troops undertaken to whip Jackson's 25,000 under an impression that he could carry the field? Had he not in entire ignorance of the numbers in his front precipitated Geary's and Crawford's brigades, and six companies of my Third Wisconsin Regiment, against two whole brigades in position, and five of Hill's division in reserve? And then when everything combined to inform him of the many thousands more than his own that were before him, had he not attempted to whip them with the Tenth Maine, singlehanded, on his right? Is it then incredible, when the enemy had poured into the woods in my front a brigade for each one of my small regiments, and two to spare, that Banks, so long as he “feared the opinions of his friends” (as he conceived them) more than “the bayonets of his enemies,” should have hesitated to send me the order I received?

There remains to tell that when Jackson swung his forces around my command, he at the same time ordered Taliaferro's brigade to charge, bearing towards its right (the position of the field of Indian corn) against our left and in front of Early's brigade. At this time General Prince,