George H. Gordon, From Brook Farm to Cedar Mountain

[336] refer to the fact that the remnant of Banks's corps fell back behind a line of battle thus posted, when Pope came up, and with new troops established a new line, the right of which was at the position I had occupied until I was ordered forward to the stubble-field.¹

Our right never was attacked, it was too strong; but, alas! it was too evident that Banks did not know where the right of his line was. With all these facts (which cannot be disputed) before us, I read, with the same amazement that fills me whenever I investigate any of Banks's military efforts, that “the enemy had massed his forces on our right, and was moving forward and begun an attack upon us. My force encountered him about five o'clock, which is the usual time for them to make an attack. They made a desperate attack on our right: of course we had to strengthen that with all our force.” ² Now every one but Banks and Crawford knows that the enemy made at this time (five o'clock) no attack at all on our right, the right of our line. If Banks had not sent four regiments over the wheat-field to attack Jackson, and then sent me from the right over half a mile to the front after the enemy had used up these regiments, this whole force would have been saved to meet Jackson's attack, if he had made one; and had it been upon the right, we could have held the enemy at bay until night, or McDowell and Siegel had come. There is no room for controversy here: the weak and unhappy conference with Crawford is marked with blunders, which would be comedies if they were not crimes.

Bearing in mind that Banks moved his line forward at