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Is the, ‘Eclectic history of the United States,’ written by Miss Thalheimer and published by Van Antwerp, Bragg & Co., Cincinnati, a fit book to be used in our schools?
Paper no.
I.
We propose to confine ourselves for the present to that part of this so-called ‘History’ which treats of the origin, progress, and results of the late ‘War between the States.’
At some future day we may take occasion to point out some of its ‘sins of omission and commission’ in its account of the Colonial, Revolutionary, and civil history of the country.
We will first give a few illustrations of the
tone and spirit of the book, which its friends claim to be preeminently fair, non-partisan, and non-sectional.
1. Let any one turn to the account given (pp. 265-266) of the
Kansas troubles and he will find that it is entirely one sided and partisan-telling of outrages committed by the pro-slavery party, aided by Missourians, and saying not one word about the ‘Emigrant Aid Societies’ of the
North--the eloquent appeals of
Mr. Beecher to ‘send
Sharp's Rifles to
Kansas instead of Bibles’-or the outrages committed by the Abolition party of
Kansas.
2. The friends of the book think that it (p. 268) tells the truth when it says that
John Brown ‘
had no support’ in his raid, and that therefore the ‘rage of resentment’ through the
South was uncalled for. We would advise them to read up on this question, and they will find that in the Senate of Massachusetts a motion to adjourn on the day of
John Brown's execution in respect to his memory was lost by only three votes—that town bells were tolled, funeral sermons preached, and eulogies pronounced all over the
North—that
John Brown at once took his place in the pantheon of Abolition saints—and that the resentment of the
South was justly aroused, not against this mad fanatic, but against his
supporters, whose vanguard he led in invading the
South to free the negroes whom their Fathers had sold to our Fathers, quietly pocketing the money, and only discovering the ‘crime of slavery’ after they had reaped its full benefits.
3. The book (p. 270) pronounces the firing on the Star of the West at
Charleston ‘
the opening act of the civil war.’
On page 276, speaking of
Lincoln's inaugural address, it says: ‘He threw
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upon the politicians of the
South the whole responsibility of the calamities which must follow the destruction of the
Union, assuring them that there could be no conflict unless they themselves should choose to begin it,’ and (same page, 276,) then proceeds to give the account of the bombardment of
Sumter, without one single hint of the circumstances under which the
Confederates opened fire.
The author ignores the efforts of
Virginia to keep the peace by calling the
Peace Conference—the Crittenden compromise which was a Southern peace measure — the sending by
South Carolina of peace commissioners, who were promised by
Mr. Buchanan that ‘the
status’ in
Charleston harbor should not be disturbed, but who refused to order
Major Anderson back, when, in violation of the compact, he removed by night from
Moultrie to
Sumter—the fact that the Star of the West was attempting to violate again the plain terms of the compact by reinforcing and provisioning
Sumter—the fact that one of the very first acts of the
Confederacy was to send commissioners to
Washington ‘to treat with the
Federal authorities for a peaceful and amicable adjustment upon the principles of equity and justice, of matters pertaining to the common property and public debt’—that
Mr. Seward promised that
Sumter should be evacuated, and assured the commissioners that ‘faith as to
Sumter’ was ‘fully kept’ at the very time that a powerful fleet for its reinforcement, secretly fitted out, was almost within sight of its walls—that this expedition was persisted in, notwithstanding the
Confederate commissioners assured
Mr. Seward that it would be regarded as ‘a declaration of war against the
Confederate States’—and that under all of the circumstances, therefore, the firing on
Sumter was as purely an act of
selfdefence as is to be found in all history.
4. On page 271 the author revives the old slander that secession cabinet officers of
Mr. Buchanan filled Southern arsenals with arms taken from the
North, and scattered the army and navy so that the
South should be better prepared for war than the
North.
Compare the statement given there—that ‘The National Government was paralized.
Its navy was scattered to the most distant seas, and a great part of its cannon, rifles, and military stores were in Southern forts and arsenals, which were taken almost without exception by the authorities of the
Confederate States’—with the statement in paragraph 497, pages 279-280, that the
South ‘had begun the war with abundant supplies of money and material,’ [notice that the author here refers back to paragraph 484 for proof], and it seems perfectly clear that the book means to teach that secession ‘leaders
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in the cabinet of
Mr. Buchanan’ had stripped Northern arsenals to supply the
South with arms, had scattered the navy in order to paralize the ‘National Government,’ and had really brought it about that the
South was better prepared for the war than the
North.
This is a favorite theory with Northern writers, it is fully brought out in such books as
Greely,
Draper,
Lossing,
Moore's Rebellion Record and
Badeau, which the author advises our children to read, and we are not surprised that she adopts it.
This theory is, of course, utterly untrue, and would seem to need no labored refutation; but if any one desires to go into the matter more fully, let him read the article on Confederate Ordnance, by the able and accomplished chief of the Department,
General J. Gorgas, published in the January-February, ‘84, number of our Southern his-Torical Society papers, and they will find a thorough refutation of this slander, a precise statement of the very small number of arms with which the
Confederacy begun the war, and a clear account of how we were not only without arms, but without arsenals, armories, founderies, percussion cap manufactories, machinery, powder mills, material, or even skilled workmen.
And when it is remembered that the white population upon which the
Confederacy could draw was even nominally but a little more than 7,000,000—but really only 5,000,000—while the
Northern Government had a white population of more than 20,000,000, with the rest of the world as their recruiting ground, that the
North was the great manufacturing region, and that the
Northwest was accustomed to furnish the cotton States with the bulk of their provisions, it seems amazing for any one to argue that the
South was in any respect better prepared for war than the
North, save in the
morale of her soldiers and the patriotic devotion of her noble women.
5. We insist that it is untrue as stated (p. 277) that
Missouri,
Kentucky and
Maryland ‘
refused to secede,’ in the light of
General Lyon's operations in
Missouri, the arrest and imprisonment of the secession members of the Maryland Legislature, and the pinning of
Kentucky to the
Union by Federal bayonets.
6. All of the ingenious twisting possible cannot make the account of the
Baltimore riot (p. 277) fair, in view of the well-established facts that the troops fired first on the citizens, in response to their jeers and the throwing of several stones from the crowd, and that the attempt to make this
Massachusetts regiment the representatives of the patriots who were fired on by British soldiers at
Lexington in 1775, exactly reverses and falsifies the truth of history.
These
Massachusetts
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soldiers were the invaders, and the unarmed citizens of
Baltimore (nine of whom were killed and a number wounded, while only two soldiers were killed and several wounded) were the patriotic defenders of their homes; the soldiers were the representatives of despotic power, and the citizens of patriots struggling for independence.
7. The statement (p. 278) that ‘a majority of the people’ of
West Virginia ‘were attached to the
Union’ is utterly untrue, in view of the fact that only 20,000 votes were cast against secession in the whole limits of old
Virginia.
And certainly our children should not be taught, even by implication, that this infamous division of
Virginia territory—this ‘political rape’—was in any sense justifiable.
8. We call attention to the outrage, at the bottom of page 281, of teaching our children that in the death of
Abraham Lincoln ‘The South felt that it had lost its best friend;’ . . . . . and that ‘his name is fitly coupled with that of
Washington, and the martyred
President will ever remain
sacred in the memory of the
American people.’
This is in the same spirit as the statement (p. 309) that
Phil. Sheridan was ‘the most able cavalry leader of the war’—that
Sherman's ‘march to the sea’ (p. 310) was ‘one of the most celebrated events of history’—that, ‘considering his surroundings and the place of his birth,
Geo. H. Thomas's adherence to the
Union (p. 303) is remarkable’—that ‘the characteristics of
E. M. Stanton's administration (p. 327) were integrity, energy, determination, singleness of purpose, and the power to comprehend the magnitude of the rebellion and the labor and cost in blood and treasure involved in suppressing it’—that
Grant's ‘generalship at
Chattanooga is considered by military authorities the masterpiece of the war,’ and the horrible sacrifice of his men in the campaign of 1864 justifiable, and that
President Hayes, in making his appointments, (p. 339) consulted ‘the service of the public rather than that of the politicians,’ and regulated ‘both his appointments and dismissals by questions of personal worth.’
And in this connection we call especial attention to the general scope and bearing of the biographical sketches given in the book— eleven very tame sketches of Confederates, and twenty-six sketches of Federals, most of the latter glowing eulogies.
It will not do to say that the sketches are chiefly of
Generals commanding armies, for many of the
Federals sketched would not come under this head, while a number of Confederates who commanded armies, such as
John B. Floyd,
Henry A. Wise.
J. A. Early,
John B. Hood,
S. D. Lee,
Leonidas Polk,
Stirling Price,
Earl Van Dorn,
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Kirby Smith,
Dick Taylor,
Hardee, &c., are omitted.
The truth is the
Confederates largely outnumbered the
Federals in men worthy of places in
general history, and for Southern schools it is unpardonable to omit such names as
Ashby,
Stuart,
Forrest,
Hampton,
Ewell,
A. P. Hill,
Pat. Cleburne,
M. F. Maury,
Buchanan, and scores of others who should be household words among our people.
The sketches of
Lee and
Jackson are the only ones which make any pretence to being even fairly appreciative, (and
they are both utterly unworthy of their subjects,) and that of
Lee is marred by inexcusable blunders in his name, and place of birth, in giving him the position of commander-in-chief of the Confederate armies in 1862, and in apologizing for his ‘grave mistake’ in invading
Pennsylvania, in 1863, on the ground that he yielded ‘his own judgment and advice to a higher political power,’ whereas the facts are that this campaign was undertaken not only with
General Lee's full appobation, but at his own suggestion, and that it would have culminated in a brilliant success, and in the
Independence of the
Confederacy, but for the failure of others.
9. We insist that the statement about the ‘plundered Kentuckians’ (p. 286) is false, and that if it were true it would be unfair to introduce it without also bringing out, as the book fails to do, the universal plundering done by Federal troops in the
South, and the orders of
General Lee in
Pennsylvania.
10. The statements on pages 295-296 that
Mr. Lincoln acted in good faith as to slavery (notwithstanding he said in his inaugural address that he had no right or disposition to interfere with it), and that ‘
the South’ had declared slavery to be ‘the corner-stone’ of the
Confederacy, are so palpably untrue as to need no discussion.
The quotation from
Mr. Stephens (whose utterances were very far from being those of ‘
the South’), might be met by quoting the declaration of
General Lee, that ‘if the slaves of the
South were mine, I would free them at once to avert this war,’ and by other facts which we have not time to give.
Our printers admonish us that we have no more space, and we must reserve for our next other illustrations of the miserable stuff which some of the children of the
South are learning.
