AUTOBULUS. Good now, friend Soclarus, who was he
that maintained that, because there are certain beings endued with reason, therefore there is nothing void of reason? For we abound with examples in all things that are
destitute of a soul; nor do we want any other antithesis to
irrational, but only to oppose whatever is deprived of a
soul—as being void of reason and understanding—to
that which is endued with reason and understanding together with a soul. But if any one will assert, that Nature is not defective, and that therefore animated Nature is
partly rational, partly without reason; another may at the
same time allege, that animated Nature is partly endued
with imagination, partly deprived of it; partly sensible,
partly insensible; to the end that Nature may not want
these opposite habits and privations, as it were, equally
balanced in the same kind. For, as it would be absurd to
expect to find some living creatures sensible and others
without sense, and equally ridiculous to grant imagination
to some living creatures and not alllow it to others,—since
there is no living creature that comes into the world but
what is presently endued with sense and imagination,—
thus would he be as much out of the way, who should require one living creature to be rational and another void
of reason, and that too when he is disputing with men
who hold that nothing whatever can partake of sense
which does not also partake of understanding, and that
there is no animal not endued by Nature with opinion and
ratiocination, as well as with sense and instinct. For Nature, which, as they truly say, made all things for the sake
of something and to some end, did not make a sensible
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creature to be merely sensible of barely suffering something; but since there are many things familiar and agreeable, and other things as baneful and pernicious, no one of
them could survive for a moment, did they not learn to
avoid some things and covet the use and benefit of others.
Sense it is, therefore, that affords to every creature the
knowledge both of useful and hurtful; but the discretion
which accompanies the said sense, choosing and seizing
upon things profitable, and discerning and avoiding things
pernicious or troublesome, can never be thought to reside
in any creature not capable to reason, to judge, remember,
and consider. Therefore, if you will deprive the creatures
of expectation, memory, design, preparation, hope, fear,
desire, and grief, you must at the same time deny them the
use either of eyes or ears, and indeed of all sense and imagination; which it is better for them to be without, since
they cannot make use of them, than to labor under grief
and pain, with no means present of averting them.
There is an oration of Strato the philosopher, demonstrating that without sense there can be no understanding.
For many times letters cursorily glanced upon by the eye,
and speeches little regarded by the ear, escape our knowledge, our minds being intent on other matters. Afterwards by recollection the same things return into our mind,
for us to run through and pursue them in our thoughts as
we please. Whence we say proverbially, ‘The mind sees,
the mind hears; all other things are deaf and blind,’ in
regard there can be no sense in the eyes and ears, if understanding be wanting. Therefore King Cleomenes,
after great commendations given to a copy of verses recited
at a banquet where he was present, being asked whether
it were not an admirable piece, bid them that heard it give
their judgment, for that his mind was in the Peloponnesus.
Therefore of necessity, whatever creatures are capable of
sense must also be capable of understanding, if we can
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no otherwise be sensible than by the force of understanding.
But suppose we should grant that sense has no need of
the understanding for the performance of the duty incumbent upon it; nevertheless, when that same sense which
has shown an animal the difference between what is grateful and what is averse to Nature has departed, where is
that faculty which retains this difference in the memory,
—dreading things that are abominable, and longing after
things that are useful, and if they are wanting, seeking
means to compass them,—which provides animals receptacles and places of refuge, that they may look out after their
prey, and avoid the snares and gins of the hunters? And
yet those very authors inculcate these things in their introductions, even to the teasing our ears: defining purpose
to be an indication that something is to be brought to
completion; design to be an impulse before an impulse;
preparation to be an action before an action; memory to
be the comprehension of some certain past impression,
which at first was apprehended by sense. In all which
things there is nothing which may not rightly be said to
partake of reason, and yet all these things are common to
all creatures; as indeed are certainly all cogitations;
which, while they lie concealed in the brain, we call
thoughts, but when they come to be in motion, we name
conceptions. In the mean time they acknowledge all
passions and perturbations of the mind to be false judgments and erroneous opinions; so that it is a wonder to
me, that the same men should oversee so many operations
and motions, some of desire, others of fear, nay, by Jupiter, many times of envy and emulation itself. And many
times they themselves punish their dogs and horses when
they commit a fault, and this not to no purpose, but to
chastise them by causing in them through pain that trouble
of mind which we call repentance. Now the tickling the
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ear by pleasing sounds is called enchantment, but the bewitching the eye is called bewitching; both which we
make use of in the domesticating of wild beasts. Harts
and horses are allured by the sounds of pipes and flutes.
And there are a sort of crabs which are charmed out of
their holes by fifes; and it is reported that the shadfish are
drawn to show themselves above water by singing and
clapping of hands. The otus also, which is a bird not
much unlike a night-raven, is taken by allurement of the
sight; for that while he stands staring upon the fowlers
dancing before him in measure and figure, and out of
affection will be striving to act his part by aping their
motions with his wings and shoulders, he is frequently surprised and taken.
But as for those that more foolishly affirm that beasts
are not affected with joy or anger or fear, that the swallow does not build, that the bee does not remember, that
the lion is not angry, that the hart is not timorous, but that
they do all these things only as it were and apparently; I
would fain know what answer they will make to those who
say, that beasts neither see nor hear, but as it were see and
as it were hear; that they neither neigh nor bleat, but as
it were send forth a certain sound; lastly, that they do not
absolutely live, but live as it were? For, in my opinion,
to aver this is as contrary to plain demonstration as the
rest.
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