And this opinion is consequent to their principal
ones. It is moreover manifest that Chrysippus, though he
has also written many things to the contrary, lays this for
a position, that there is not any vice greater or any sin
more grievous than another, nor any virtue more excellent
or any good deed better than another; so that he says in
[p. 439]
his Third Book of Nature: ‘As it well beseems Jupiter to
glory in himself and his life, to magnify himself, and (if
we may so say) to bear up his head, have an high conceit
of himself, and speak big, for that he leads a life worthy
of lofty speech; so the same things do not misbeseem all
good men, since they are in nothing exceeded by Jupiter.’
And yet himself, in his Third Book of Justice, says, that
they who make pleasure the end destroy justice, but they
who say it is only a good do not destroy it. These are his
very words: ‘For perhaps, if we leave this to pleasure,
that it is a good but not the end, and that honesty is one
of those things which are eligible for themselves, we may
preserve justice, making the honest and the just a greater
good than pleasure.’ But if that only is good which is
honest, he who affirms pleasure to be a good is in an error,
but he errs less than he who makes it also the end; for
the one destroys justice, the other preserves it; and by
the one human society is overthrown, but the other leaves
a place to goodness and humanity. Now I let pass his
saying farther in his book concerning Jupiter, that the
virtues increase and go on, lest I may seem to catch at
words; though Chrysippus is indeed in this kind very
sharp upon Plato and others. But when he forbids the
praising of every thing that is done according to virtue, he
shows that there is some difference between good deeds.
Now he says thus in his book concerning Jupiter: ‘For
since each virtue has its own proper works, there are some
of these that are more to be praised than others; for he
would show himself to be very frigid, that should undertake to praise and extol any man for holding out the finger
stoutly, for abstaining chastely from an old woman ready
to drop into the grave, and patiently hearing it said that
three are not exactly four.’ What he says in his Third
Book of the Gods is not unlike to this: ‘For I moreover
think that the praises of such things as to abstain from an
[p. 440]
old woman who has one foot in the grave, and to endure
the bite of a fly, though proceeding from virtue, would be
very impertinent.’ What other reprehender of his doctrines does this man then expect? For if he who praises
such things is frigid, he who asserts every one of them to
be a great—nay, a very great good deed—is much more
frigid. For if to bear the bite of a fly is equal to the
being valiant, and to abstain from an old trot now at the
pit's brink is equal to the being temperate, there is, I
think, no difference whether a virtuous man is prized for
these or for those. Moreover, in his Second Book of
Friendship, teaching that friendships are not for every
fault to be dissolved, he has these very expressions: ‘For
it is meet that some faults should be wholly passed by,
others lightly reprehended, others more severely, and others
deemed worthy a total dissolution of friendship.’ And
which is more, he says in the same book, that we will
converse with some more and some less, so that some shall
be more and some less friends; and this diversity extending very far, some are worthy of such an amity, others of
a greater; and these will deserve to be so far trusted,
those not so far, and the like. For what else has he done
in these places, but shown the great diversity there is between these things? Moreover, in his book concerning
Honesty, to demonstrate that only to be good which is
honest, he uses these words: ‘What is good is eligible;
what is eligible is acceptable; what is acceptable is laudable; and what is laudable is honest.’ And again: ‘What
is good is joyous; what is joyous is venerable; what is
venerable is honest.’ But these speeches are repugnant
to himself; for either all good is commendable, and then
the abstaining chastely from an old woman is also commendable; or all good is neither venerable nor joyous,
and his reason falls to the ground. For how can it
possibly be frigid in others to praise any for such
[p. 441]
things, and not ridiculous for him to rejoice and glory
in them?
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