In one place he says, that the vice called 'Επιχαιρεκακία,
or the rejoicing at other men's harms, has no being; since
no good man ever rejoiced at another's evils. But in his
Second Book of Good, having declared envy to be a sorrow
at other men's good,—to wit, in such as desire the depression of their neighbors that themselves may excel,—
he joins to it this rejoicing at other men's harms, saying thus:
‘To this is contiguous the rejoicing at other men's harms, in
such as for like causes desire to have their neighbors low;
but in those that are turned according to other natural motions, is engendered mercy.’ For he manifestly admits
the joy at other men's harms to be subsistent, as well as
envy and mercy; though in other places he affirms it to
have no subsistence; as he does also the hatred of wickedness, and the desire of dishonest gain.
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