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Now, as for his doctrine of possibles, how can it but
be repugnant to his doctrine of Fate? For if that is not
possible which either is true or shall be true, as Diodorus
has it, but every thing which is capable of being, though
it never shall be, is possible, there will be many things
possible which will never be according to invincible, inviolable, and all-conquering Fate. And thus either Fate
will lose its power; or if that, as Chrysippus thinks, has
[p. 474]
existence, that which is susceptible of being will often fall
out to be impossible. And every thing indeed which is
true will be necessary, being comprehended by the principal of all necessities; and every thing that is false will
be impossible, having the greatest cause to oppose its ever
being true. For how is it possible that he should be susceptible of dying on the land, who is destined to die at
sea? And how is it possible for him who is at Megara to
come to Athens, if he is prohibited by Fate?
Plutarch. Plutarch's Morals. Translated from the Greek by several hands. Corrected and revised by. William W. Goodwin, PH. D. Boston. Little, Brown, and Company. Cambridge. Press Of John Wilson and son. 1874. 4.
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