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sas were sent thither, but without artillery, of which none was available. From information collected in his front, General Johnston was apprehensive that General Patterson would move to attack him, and he soon abandoned the untenable salient position of Harper's Ferry, held by him unwillingly, and to which General Patterson aftGeneral Patterson afterwards crossed on the 2d of July. General Beauregard's views, based partly on reports from Washington, were that General Patterson's movements merely simulated the offensive, to hold General Johnston in check. About the 20th of June, General Beauregard, having organized his forces into six brigades, began a forward movement, inGeneral Patterson's movements merely simulated the offensive, to hold General Johnston in check. About the 20th of June, General Beauregard, having organized his forces into six brigades, began a forward movement, in order to protect his advanced positions at Centreville, Fairfax Court-House, and Sangster's Cross-roads, so as to be able—as he wrote to Colonel Eppa Hunton—to strike a blow upon the enemy, at a moment's notice, which he hoped they would long remember. His advanced forces, three brigades of three regiments each, occupied a triang
you, leaving from three to five thousand men to guard the passes of the Blue Ridge and to hold Patterson in check. Then, with the combined forces of General Johnston and yourself, you would move rapat once to the [valley with] superior numbers, say thirty-five thousand, to attack and destroy Patterson, at Winchester, or wherever he might be. One week from the time of leaving Winchester would beack on your present position, according to circumstances. General Johnston having disposed of Patterson, would detach a sufficient number from his force to reinforce Garnett, and make him superior trawal of numbers sufficient to effect your object, and, at the same time, leave enough to keep Patterson in check and keep him from coming down upon your left; and the other and main objection was, t, in my front. Then we would go back with as many men as necessary to attack and disperse General Patterson's army, before he could know positively what had become of you. We could then proceed to G
power to make the movement, in view of the relative strength and position of Patterson's forces as compared with his own. Hence the uncertainty, hence the want Davis, based on the estimated numbers, whether of General Johnston or of General Patterson, is utterly without point, in presence of the fact that the former had nothousand men, and not at twenty-five thousand, as Mr. Davis has it. As to General Patterson, his army, at the time we speak of—that is to say, between the 14th and 2 time. General Johnston's Narrative of Military Operations, p. 31. And General Patterson, who must be supposed to have known something about it, in a letter from ton's concentration with General Beauregard, in order to defeat Mc-Dowell and Patterson. These two results, even if not followed by the proposed movement into Maryl Beauregard to carry out his proposed plan of operations against McDowell and Patterson, we should have captured from the enemy all the requisite supplies that the P
ickly wooded, and intricate, to be studied to any purpose in the brief space of time at my disposal; for I had come impressed with the opinion that it was necessary to attack the enemy next morning, to decide the event before the arrival of General Patterson's forces. And here we might properly remark, that General Patterson never arrived, nor has it been shown that he ever intended to do so. Long before writing his book, General Johnston, in his official report, had said: I found General BeauGeneral Patterson never arrived, nor has it been shown that he ever intended to do so. Long before writing his book, General Johnston, in his official report, had said: I found General Beauregard's position too extensive, and the ground too densely wooded and intricate, to be learned in the brief time at my disposal, and therefore determined to rely on his knowledge of it and of the enemy's positions. This I did readily, from full confidence in his capacity. And well may General Johnston have been impressed with the opinion that it was necessary to attack the enemy the next morning; for General Beauregard, in several letters to him, in messages delivered by special aids (Colon
ments, but I can well appreciate them, although I do not believe in the hostile advance of General Patterson, for I am informed, on what I consider good authority, that they have quite a stampede in ry to attack it in rear, while I attack it in front —hence, probably, the proposed movement of Patterson to keep you at bay. . . . Not being able to obtain a full supply of cartridges for my increg works at Winchester, and to guard the five defensive passes of the Blue Ridge, and thus hold Patterson in check. At the same time Brigadier-General Holmes was to march hither, with all of his coft to hold the mountain passes, was to march back rapidly into the valley, fall upon and crush Patterson, with a superior force, wheresoever he might be found. This, I confidently estimated, could b him; or, if not, to retire again for a time within the lines of Bull Run with my main force. Patterson having been virtually destroyed, then General Johnston would reinforce General Garnett suffici